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The notion that we are essentially conscious beings has a good deal of intuitive 
appeal, but also gives rise to a number of philosophical problems. As a result of its 
appeal, and in conjunction with a growing dissatisfaction with reductive accounts of 
consciousness, a number of experiential accounts of personal identity have been 
introduced into the relatively recent literature. These accounts offer various analyses 
of the relationship between consciousness and selfhood in an attempt to overcome the 
problems faced by adopting such a position. I argue that a correct appreciation of the 
nature of inner awareness, and experience more generally, entails that the experiential 
approach is indeed justifiable. Specifically, I argue that the relationship between an 
experience and its subject necessitates the view that selves are constituted by episodes 
of consciousness. I then evaluate a number of theories of temporal consciousness and 
argue that the most promising kind of account has implications concerning our 
persistence conditions. Subsequently, I argue for a radical account of our nature by 
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It is certain there is no question in philosophy more abstruse than that 
concerning identity, and the nature of the uniting principle, which constitutes a 
person. (Hume, 2007, p.127) 
 
I am Seeing, pure and by nature changeless … I am unborn, abiding in Myself. 
(Śankarācārya, 1992, p.123) 
 
The conviction which every man has of his identity, as far back as his memory 
reaches, needs no aid of philosophy to strengthen it; and no philosophy can 
weaken it, without first producing some degree of insanity. (Reid, 1854, p.241) 
 
 
What am I? When beings such as ourselves entertain this question a curious friction 
can arise: on the one hand we have a sense of knowing what the question is about. It 
is about me - just this, myself. It is about this being that I am, that I have been since I 
can remember, and that I have no practical problem in identifying each and every day: 
it is so familiar that I don’t need to identify it. On the other hand, we can also be met 
with a deep sense of uncertainty when we try to spell out, precisely, what it is that this 
“me” is. This becomes even more pronounced when we engage in the philosophical 
task of identifying our essential nature and of specifying our persistence conditions - 
what it takes for this “me” to continue on through time as the self-same being. It 
seems that the most familiar being there is, one’s very own self, gives rise to some of 
the most difficult philosophical problems. It is both a unique question and a deeply 
personal question. Its uniqueness is a matter of its direction: as conscious and curious 
beings we look outwards at the world we find ourselves in and ask questions of it. We 
ponder and investigate its nature, its cause and its meaning. The problem of personal 
identity turns such an inquiry back in on itself: who, or what, are we who ask these 
questions? It is a powerfully intimate problem: we can attempt as best we can to retain 
the role of unbiased investigators, treating the subject matter as one more sphere of 
inquiry, but any conclusions we reach will quite obviously have the ability to affect us 
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personally. For all of these reasons it is a philosophical problem worthy of study: it is 
unique, personal, and challenging. It is also a highly contested area of inquiry: despite 
the importance of the question, and the powerfully personal context that has 
motivated an enormous amount of work on the issue for thousands of years, we have 
not reached a consensus. Unless we take this as evidence of the inexplicable nature of 
the problem (or, perhaps, even if we do) this means that there is still work to be done. 
The following inquiry represents one more attempt to solve this puzzle or, more 
realistically, present the foundations of a new theory. Less ambitiously, it will shed 
light on a number of the most important issues at play by re-evaluating the 
implications of some of the strongest options available to us.  
It is important to provide clarity on a number of points before undertaking this 
investigation: the form of the general question under consideration needs to be stated 
and explained, the terms being utilised need to be clarified, and any relevant 
background assumptions and commitments need identifying. To a certain extent the 
first and second issues are interdependent: clarifying one of them elucidates the other. 
Eric Olson has provided a useful interpretation of the issue:  
 
What are we? That is, what are we metaphysically speaking? What is our basic 
metaphysical nature? What are our most general and fundamental properties? I 
claim that this is a real and important question. It is different from the 
traditional mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. 





The most familiar problems of personal identity are the personhood question 
and the persistence question. The personhood question asks what it is to be a 
person. What is necessary and sufficient for something to count as a person, as 
opposed to a non-person? What have people got that non-people haven’t got? 
The persistence question asks what it takes for us (or for people in general) to 
persist through time. What sorts of adventures is it possible, in the broadest 
sense of the word ‘possible’, for you to survive? What sort of thing would 
necessarily bring your existence to an end? What determines which past or 
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future being is you? The question of what we are is more or less completely 
unrelated to the personhood question. What qualifications a thing needs in order 
to count as a person is one thing; what sort of things actually have those 
qualifications - organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you - is 
another. (Olson, 2007, p.42, original italics) 
 
His final point above has in fact become the focus of debate in an area outside of 
specialised philosophical discourse: the growing movement to recognise the 
personhood of certain nonhuman animals, and thereby afford them their relevant 
rights, speaks to this issue. We might also see similar developments in the years to 
come if artificial intelligence research delivers on some of its grander promises: we 
could see the creation of a self-conscious intelligence that, by any reasonable 
definition, matches our criteria for personhood. But surely, Olson’s argument goes, a 
nonhuman person, an artificial person, and persons such as ourselves are different 
kinds of beings in some significant sense? Olson claims that to know “what it is to be 
a person is therefore not to know what we are. Likewise, to know what we are is not 
to know what it is to be a person” (Olson, 2007, p.42). Of course, it follows 
straightforwardly that if we are essentially persons then to know what it is to be a 
person is to know what we are. Olson’s point, however, is that if there is more to be 
said about what we are - metaphysically considered - then identifying the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for personhood will not be enough.  
 A similar point seems to be reasonable with regards to the typical form of the 
persistence question: 
 
What it takes for us to persist may be one aspect of our metaphysical nature. 
Knowing our persistence conditions would tell us something about what sort of 
things we are. But it wouldn’t tell us much. An account of our persistence 
conditions would not by itself tell us whether we are material or immaterial, or 
what parts we have, or whether we are substances. What it takes for a person to 
persist through time is one thing; what sort of beings have those persistence 
conditions, or indeed whether any do, is something else. (Olson, 2007, p.43, 
original italics) 
 
Olson could be accused of being a little too pessimistic with regards to the elucidation 
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that might be achieved in settling such a matter. It is also not obvious that the basic 
question concerning what we are is “more or less completely unrelated to the 
personhood question” (Olson, 2007, p.42, my italics). But it seems right to agree with 
him that the question of what kind of beings we are, metaphysically considered, is 
different to the usual questions of personal identity when they are framed in the ways 
he identifies. For Olson, 
 
That may explain why it is often neglected. It is common practice to defend an 
account of our identity over time at great length without saying a word about 
what we are, except perhaps to rule out our being immaterial substances … 
When the matter is addressed at all, it is frequently little more than an 
afterthought … (Olson, 2007, p.44) 
 
Taking our lead from Olson we will begin our inquiry by confronting this more 
general question first. Having done so, we will then turn our attention to the issue of 
personal persistence. To the general question of what kind of beings we are the 
following (partial) answer is obviously true: we are conscious beings. Whatever else 
may need to be said it is a fact that sometimes we are conscious: indeed, it is only by 
being conscious and knowing this that we can engage in a self-directed inquiry of the 
kind we are considering. It seems, then, an inevitable starting point from which to 
begin answering the general question of our nature. In focusing down on the question 
of what it is to be a conscious being, and, specifically, in dealing with the relationship 
between a subject and its experiences, we will find implications that inform the 
persistence question (both in terms of the form of the question and its most promising 
answer). We will see that Olson’s suggestion to pay attention to the general question 
of our nature is highly useful: there are good reasons to think that only a certain kind 
of being can be conscious in the way that we are, and that such a consideration proves 
damaging to a host of personal identity theories.  
Given, then, that we will take the relationship between a subject and its experience 
as our starting point, it is important to be clear on the general picture of experience 
assumed here. If there were just one philosophical problem more “abstruse”, as Hume 
puts it, than that of personal identity then the hard problem of consciousness would be 
a solid candidate. The relationship between mind and matter is a notoriously difficult 
question and is itself another area in which a consensus has yet to be reached. As 
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such, it will not be the target of this investigation. Many of the following claims can 
in fact be appropriated into a number of different theories of consciousness and to a 
large extent this work will remain suitably agnostic on the issue. There are, however, 
some general assumptions that will be made, the most important of which is that 
conscious experience is real and therefore something we will take seriously. In the 
coming sections the work of Barry Dainton will be covered significantly: his theory of 
personal identity deals with the relationship between a self and its experiences in an 
uncommonly substantial way and therefore has much in common with this 
forthcoming account. As will become clear there are important differences between 
Dainton’s Phenomenal Self and the Ephemeral Self to be presented here, but the 
following stance is shared: 
 
By ‘taking experience seriously’ I mean adopting a stance of robust, full-
blooded realism about consciousness. This means taking consciousness as 
seriously as we take science. From this perspective, sensory experiences, bodily 
sensations and conscious thoughts are regarded as just as real as paradigmatic 
physical things such as mountains, houses and trees, and perhaps more real than 
some of the currently postulated occupants of the microphysical realm. It also 
means rejecting all attempts to reduce the experiential to the non-experiential. 
(Dainton, 2006, p.1) 
 
Another realist about experience, Galen Strawson, puts it the following way: 
 
I say that I’m a real realist about experience because some who claim to be 
realists about experience aren’t really any such thing. What do I mean by real 
realism about experience? The quickest way to say what it is is to say that it’s 
to hold exactly the same general view about what experience is (colour 
experience, say, or pain experience, or taste experience), considered 
specifically as experience, that one held before one did any philosophy, e.g. 
when one was thirteen or ten or six. One then had an entirely correct view. If 
people ask what that view is I’ll ask them to think back to their childhood. If 
they say they still don’t know I won’t believe them. (Strawson, 2015, 
forthcoming, original italics) 
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With regards to the mind-body problem and the shift towards a physicalist account of 
consciousness that has arisen in recent decades, the claims of the following sections 
will be committed only to Strawson’s fundamental point here: 
 
You’re certainly not a realistic physicalist, you’re not a real physicalist, if you 
deny the existence of the phenomenon whose existence is more certain than 
the existence of anything else: experience, ‘consciousness’, conscious 
experience, ‘phenomenology’, experiential ‘what-it’s-likeness’, feeling, 
sensation, explicit conscious thought as we have it and know it at almost every 
waking moment. Many words are used to denote this necessarily occurrent 
(essentially non-dispositional) phenomenon, and in this paper I will use the 
terms ‘experience’, ‘experiential phenomena’ and ‘experientiality’ to refer to 
it. (Strawson, 2006, p.3) 
 
Although I will remain agnostic on the wider issue, some of the claims to be 
presented here might have implications for the debates concerning the relationship 
between mind and matter. Panpsychism is a position that is now being taken more 
seriously than in previous years. The issue of the relationship between experiences 
and subjects plays an important role in the current literature in this area and the thesis 
presented here speaks directly to this relationship.1 
 I will follow Strawson in treating “consciousness” and “experience” as, ultimately, 
synonymous. I will also employ the popular terminology used by Dainton: 
 
By ‘consciousness’ I mean phenomenal consciousness; by ‘experiences’ I 
mean states or items with a phenomenal character. The ‘phenomenal 
character’ of an experience refers to the distinctive feel the experience has. A 
state has a phenomenal character when there is something that it is like to have 
or undergo that state. (Dainton, 2006, p.2, original italics) 
 
Consider your current experience. You are conscious of, among other things, the 
words you are currently reading. This experience has a certain “feel” to it: there is 
something it is like for you to be doing what you are currently doing. What it is like 
                                                
1 See Coleman (2013) and Goff (2006) on this particular issue. 
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for you to be reading this is different from what it would be like for you to be 
swimming in cold water, or watching a film, or doing exactly what you are now doing 
but with a headache (assuming you don’t already have one). The distinctive feel of 
your current experience just is its phenomenal character. Crucially, this experience is 
the one thing whose existence you can be most certain of during its occurrence. It 
seems possible that the world in which we live is a computer generated virtual reality. 
This, of course, strikes us as unlikely but it is perfectly conceivable. Your experience, 
however, considered just in its experiential “what-it’s-likeness” cannot be an illusion 
in this sense: the appearance-reality distinction is not applicable to phenomenal 
consciousness due to the fact that phenomenal consciousness is the appearance of this 
seemingly external world (among other things). There is a certain sense in which if 
someone is to claim that they do not recognise the target of the term “experience” in 
the way just described there is little that can be done. Perhaps the most I can do is 
exclaim, “It is this” and gesture openly at nothing in particular. As well as assuming 
the reality of experience, I will assume that the target of the above pointers is 
recognisable for anyone who genuinely engages with them. 
 I will also follow Strawson in his treatment of the concepts of “experience”, 
“subject”, and “subjectivity” in the following sense: 
 
Experience is necessarily experience-for - experience for someone or 
something. I intend this only in the sense in which it’s necessarily true … To 
claim that experience is necessarily experience-for, necessarily experience-for-
someone-or-something, is to claim that it’s necessarily experience on the part of 
a subject of experience … Some say one can’t infer the existence of a subject of 
experience from the existence of experience, only the existence of subjectivity, 
but I understand the notion of the subject in a maximally ontologically non-
committal way - in such a way that the presence of subjectivity is already 
sufficient for the presence of the subject, so that ‘there is subjectivity, but there 
isn’t a subject’ can’t possibly be true. (Strawson, 2011, pp.274-5, original 
italics) 
 
And, finally, I will follow Dainton’s policy with regards to individuating experiences: 
 
I will assume that token experiences owe their individuality to three factors: 
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their exact phenomenal character, their time of occurrence, and their physical 
basis. In keeping with my stance of moderate naturalism, I will not speculate 
exactly what form this physical basis takes. (Dainton, 2006, p.25) 
 
The scientific picture of our place in the world will also be taken seriously: as 
organisms we have evolved through a process of natural selection and, although an 
agnostic stance with regards to the ultimate relationship between mind and matter is 
adopted here, it is reasonable to assume that this process of evolution has also been 
responsible for the development of our mental capacities. Towards the end of our 
investigation we will consider some soteriological aspects of the theory on offer. We 
will find agreement with particular schools of Indian Philosophy in their claim that 
recognising certain facts pertaining to our own nature, and attending to specific 
features of our experiential makeup, can facilitate meaningful and beneficial 
psychological change. I think this can be argued for without straying from a broadly 
naturalistic perspective concerning our development as a species (and without 
denying the existence of the self). Speaking generally for now, the seemingly 
universal impulse for salvation can be met without recourse to anything supernatural, 
eternal or in any other way out of step with our current scientifically informed picture 
of reality.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows:  
 
§1: Inner Awareness and The Novelty Problem 
 
The following conclusion will be argued for: whenever we are conscious, we are 
aware of our experience, i.e. inner awareness is ubiquitous. This claim will be 
justified by considering a host of serious problems that face rival views. The most 
popular alternative theories fall into two kinds: the first claims that we are never 
aware of the intrinsic nature of our experiences and the second claims that we are not 
usually aware of our experiences, but can become so through introspection. The 
Novelty Problem will be presented and shown to be damaging to both of these views.  
 
§2: Higher-order Theories and Inner Awareness 
 
The nature of this inner awareness will be investigated. I will argue that inner 
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awareness is not the result of a so-called “higher-order” awareness of any kind, and 
that experience is self-intimating.  
 
§3: Being Consciousness 
  
The Exclusivity Argument will be presented. Employing the conclusions of §1 and §2 
as premises it yields the (preliminary) Identity Thesis, which holds that the subject of 
an experience (e) is identical with e.  
 
§4: The Stream of Consciousness  
 
Having established a preliminary answer to the general question of our nature, I will 
then outline the most promising account of temporal consciousness and thereby 
present a theory of our persistence conditions. The findings here will motivate a 
reinterpretation of The Identity Thesis, resulting in The Exhaustive Constitution 
Thesis. 
 
§5: The Ephemeral Self 
 
The conclusions for §3 and §4 will result in The Stream Thesis which holds that the 
subject of experience x is identical with the stream of diachronically co-conscious 
experiences of which x is a part. The use of thought experiments within the literature 
of personal identity will be partially justified and then employed to strengthen both 
the believability and soundness of The Stream Thesis. 
 
§6: The Personal Copernican Revolution 
 
The reconceptualisation of death entailed by The Stream Thesis will be investigated 
and its related soteriological possibilities will be evaluated with reference to similar 
claims made in certain schools of Indian Philosophy.  
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1: Inner Awareness and The Novelty Problem 
 
 
§1.1 The landscape 
 
Consider your current experience. Through it you are conscious of these words and 
their (more or less) central location in your visual field. Although you are focused on 
this text you are also conscious of the page on which it appears and, moving further 
out from your focal point, you are conscious of less clearly-defined yet still visually 
present objects: keep your head still but move your eyes to focus on whatever is just 
above the top of this page in your visual field - a table, the floor, a wall - and then 
refocus on this sentence: the background object is certainly less vivid now, but it is 
still visible; the area above the top of this page is not a visual void. Consider, too, the 
sounds you are currently hearing and the feeling of your body in your seat. Through 
your current experience you are conscious of all these things and more. In short, your 
experience makes you conscious of the world. At this point we can ask an important 
question: are you also conscious of the experience itself? If the answer to this is 
affirmative then a further question must be addressed: were you conscious of your 
experience before you were encouraged to attend to it? 
 It is a fascinating fact that these simple questions about that most familiar of things 
(our very own lived experience) have elicited such markedly opposing answers within 
the literature. The metaphysics of consciousness, particularly the attempt to find a 
place for conscious experience within our current scientifically informed picture of 
reality, has led to infamously disparate positions: for every bullet-biting eliminativist 
who proclaims that although there seems to be phenomenology “it does not follow 
that there really is phenomenology” (Dennett, 1993, p.366, original italics) we can 
find an equally ardent defender of experience as “the fundamental given natural fact” 
(Strawson, 2006, p.4). But this mix of radically opposed views is perhaps somewhat 
understandable given the sheer intellectual difficulty we face in reconciling what have 
come to be known as the scientific and manifest images (Sellars, 1963) (an effort that 
may indeed require a radical overhaul of our current thinking on the issue (McGinn, 
2004)). One might hope that, in contrast to such fundamental disagreement, we might 
be able to reach something approaching a consensus on at least some aspects of 
 17 
experience if we could just put the mind-body problem on the back burner and focus 
on experience itself as opposed to where and how it fits into the rest of the world. 
After all, conscious experience as lived is the most familiar thing there is.  
 But things aren’t quite so easy: even these two simple questions about the 
everyday nature of experience have given rise to fundamental disagreement. The 
reasons for this are likely manifold and interconnected; chief suspects are the limits of 
discursive thought (Strawson, 2013, p.28), prior ontological commitments (not 
everyone can, or will, leave the mind-body problem on the back burner) and 
confusion resulting from an absence of standardised concepts in the literature. This is 
particularly true for the term “self-consciousness”. It seems that despite its eminent 
familiarity the nature of our very own lived experience is not as obvious as we might 
have thought it. It is tempting to wonder whether we are in some sense too close to it: 
it is as if we cannot hold it at arm’s length to get a good look at it. But such pessimism 
should be resisted and, as we will see, so long as care is taken to avoid certain 
stubbornly recurring conceptual traps we can indeed arrive at some reasonably 
confident conclusions concerning the nature of conscious experience as it is in itself. 
It is helpful to approach this issue of inner awareness, as it has come to be known, 
by breaking it down into two questions: firstly, are we ever directly conscious of 
experience and if so, secondly, is this only when we are explicitly attending to it? A 
rough picture of the landscape of answers has three main camps: firstly, those who 
argue that inner awareness is a ubiquitous feature of experience (i.e. we are always 
conscious of our experience when we are conscious at all, regardless of whether or 
not we are explicitly attending to it), secondly - in stark opposition - those who argue 
that we are never directly conscious of the intrinsic qualities of experience even when 
we are engaged in what would colloquially be called “attending to experience” (i.e. 
experience is, in some sense, transparent) and, thirdly, those who inhabit a middle-
ground between these views and hold that although we are not usually conscious of 
our experience we can become so through introspection. Each camp has several 
different ways of fleshing out their shared line but a general picture of the current 
debate sees these as the available options. 
 As it turns out, there are good reasons to think that there are in fact only two 
internally consistent options open to us. A middle-way view can admittedly be an 
attractive one: it promises to account for our ability to introspect our experiences 
whilst at the same time avoiding the (for some) counter-intuitive idea that experience 
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and inner awareness are inseparable. In short, it accepts what many take to be the 
most basic of phenomenological facts (that we can, at least sometimes, be directly 
conscious of the intrinsic character of our own experiences) without positing a 
ubiquitous inner awareness (which hereafter will be referred to as “UIA”). There are 
reasons to think that this turns out to be an empty promise: some of the strongest 
middle-way views gain their plausibility in large part through their willingness to pay 
due respect to our phenomenology but, as we will see, find themselves committed to 
positing either an implausible degree of transparency (with regards to experience) or a 
ubiquitous inner awareness in order to remain consistent. Although a fully 
comprehensive survey of the different options available to a middle-way theorist will 
not be presented here, we will see that a number of the most plausible versions of the 
middle-way view collapse into transparency or UIA views. If we take this to be 
indicative of the wider situation then we are left with just two general options when 
considering the questions posed above: either hold that inner awareness is a 
ubiquitous feature of experience or defend some kind of transparency view. 
Transparency views, however, face their own problems. The notion of transparency, 




§1.2 Transparency and the perceptual model of introspection 
 
On this issue of transparency: 
 
It … has appeared obvious to some philosophers that the so-called transparency 
of experience supports the following claim: either our experiences do not have 
an intrinsic phenomenal character or we are unable to attend to these intrinsic 
features. (Nida-Rümelin, 2007, p.429) 
 
As we shall see, however, not everyone accepts such an entailment. The first use of 
the metaphor in relation to experience is usually attributed to G. E. Moore (1903), but 
its role and meaning alter depending on the theory it is embedded in and, 
subsequently, the transparency claims relevant to the present discussion differ from 
Moore in their application of it. Nevertheless, it is helpful to be clear about its origins: 
 19 
if we find the current use of the metaphor to be unsupportable we may still find some 
use for it, perhaps by returning to its original meaning (or something like it). This is 
Moore’s introduction of the term: 
 
The term ‘blue’ is easy enough to distinguish, but the other element which I 
have called ‘consciousness’ - that which sensation of blue has in common with 
sensation of green - is extremely difficult to fix. That many people fail to 
distinguish it at all is sufficiently shown by the fact that there are materialists. 
And, in general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to 
escape us; it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent - we look through 
it and see nothing but the blue; we may be convinced that there is something, 
but what it is no philosopher, I think, has yet clearly recognised. (Moore, 1903, 
p.446, original italics) 
 
It is clear enough already that Moore, unlike many contemporary defenders of 
transparency, is not arguing that we are unable to become conscious of the intrinsic 
character of experience itself.2 He is merely stating the difficulty faced by someone 
who tries to describe the common factor shared by all experiences. It is admittedly a 
simple linguistic step from Moore’s view to a more radical transparency (the view 
that we are never directly aware of the intrinsic qualities of experience) - for Moore 
when we experience blue we “see nothing but the blue” and for the “radical 
transparency” defender when we experience blue we are aware of nothing but the 
blue (where both cases presuppose a minimally simple experience of blue). But it is 
not an obviously correct step and it is not one made by Moore. He goes on: 
 
the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, 
distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere 
emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the 
blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. Yet it can be distinguished if 
we look attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for. 
My main object in this paragraph has been to try to make the reader see it: but I 
fear I shall have succeeded very ill. (Moore, 1903, p.450, original italics) 
                                                
2 See Kind (2003) for a detailed examination of the differences between Moore’s view and this more 
radical conception of transparency. 
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In fact he goes further and holds that to be aware of a sensation of blue is “to be aware 
of an awareness of blue; awareness being used, in both cases, in exactly the same 
sense” (Moore, 1903, p.449). For Moore, then, his characterisation of consciousness 
as transparent is suggestive rather than explicitly descriptive; in the above selections 
he tentatively claims that it “seems … to be transparent” and that it is “as if it were 
diaphanous” (my italics). The concept has morphed into something much stronger in 
certain areas of the current debate: experience doesn’t just seem transparent - it really 
is. On this view it is not just difficult to be directly aware of the intrinsic qualities of 
experience; it is impossible. Before moving on to assess the strength of this general 
view it is worth mentioning Siewert’s warning that “[it] is not clear there is some 
single, unambiguous, literal thesis that encapsulates what authors generally have in 
mind when they speak of the transparency of experience or consciousness” (Siewert, 
2004, p.17). That being said, we can discern a general claim that is shared by the main 
defenders of this more radical conception of transparency as this: we are never 
directly conscious of the intrinsic nature of our own experiences. The details of if and 
how we can, at least in some sense, be conscious of our experiences make for the 
differing theories, but this general negative claim is helpful to have in mind when 
considering the landscape of options in the debate about inner awareness. Oftentimes, 
the arguments for transparency concentrate on the nature of perceptual experience but 
their scope can be intended for much more, as one of the chief proponents of the 
transparency thesis, Michael Tye, recently made clear: 
 
Qualia realism is the thesis that experiences have intrinsic features that are non-
intentional and of which we can be directly aware via introspection … Qualia 
realism is inconsistent with transparency. (Tye, 2014, p.41) 
 
It seems appropriate to label this concept “radical transparency” (hereafter “RT”). 
This is in contrast to more modest transparency claims having to do with the difficulty 
of attending to consciousness as it is in itself, or the simple and non-committal view 
of experience as something we metaphorically “see through” to the world beyond our 
senses. Tye defines transparency as follows: 
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As far as awareness goes, the thesis is that when we try to introspect a visual 
experience occurring in normal perception, we are not aware of the experience 
or its features (intrinsic or not) period. This, I take it, is the basic thesis of 
transparency. (Tye, 2014, p.40, original underlining) 
 
Such bold claims require equally strong evidence. This is to be found, according to 
the transparency defenders, in our very own phenomenology. We are invited to 
introspect our experience and notice that a full and accurate catalogue of the features 
and qualities we are aware of will have no room for any intrinsic qualities of the 
experience itself (though we might be aware that we are having an experience of 
some kind). In general we are never aware of the intrinsic qualities of experience and, 
specifically, when introspecting a perceptual experience we are not aware of the 
experience itself at all: it is fully transparent. For some, no doubt, such a view seems 
so obviously wrong as to warrant no further consideration. However, there are good 
reasons not to be quite so rash. Firstly, declaring a view “obviously wrong” and then 
ignoring it does not make for much of an argument. Secondly, amidst the highly 
counter-intuitive claims of the RT thesis there does seem to be something of worth: it 
seems reasonable to claim, as Tye does, that upon experiencing such qualities as 
blueness and roundness “you do not experience your experience as blue or round” 
(Tye, 2002, p.138). It certainly strikes the ear awkwardly to describe an experience as 
itself being “round”. Thirdly, tackling the issue and explaining exactly how and why 
the transparency defender mistakenly construes our phenomenology might expose 
conceptual traps relevant to other debates concerning experience. This final point is 
arguably the most important and, as will become apparent, speaks to a mistaken way 
of thinking about experience that repeatedly results in incorrect views concerning 
consciousness (and, by extension, its relation to selfhood).  
 For Tye, when we attend to how things look to us - “as opposed to how they are 
independently of how they look” (Tye, 2003, p.139) - we are introspecting. When we 
introspect a visual experience the only “particulars” we are aware of are external 
ones: surfaces, for example, and how they appear (Tye, 2003, p.139). On Tye’s 
account “[we] are not aware of those objects and a further inner object or episode” 
(Tye, 2003, p.139) and the only qualities we are aware of are the ones the surfaces 
seem to have: 
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Your experience is thus transparent to you. When you try to focus upon it, you 
‘see’ right through it, as it were, to the things apparently outside and their 
apparent qualities … By being aware of the external qualities, you are aware of 
what it is like for you … So, your awareness of phenomenal character is not the 
direct awareness of a quality of your experience. Relatedly, the phenomenal 
character itself is not a quality of your experience to which you have direct 
access. (Tye, 2002, p.139, original italics) 
 
Nida-Rümelin has forcefully argued that in defending such a radical version of the 
transparency metaphor Tye and others are drawing on a further metaphor: the 
“perceptual model of phenomenological reflection” (Nida-Rümelin, 2007, p.429). She 
claims that the arguments of the transparency defenders are oftentimes directed 
against this particular view, and they implicitly assume that such a (problematic) 
model is the only one available to someone who claims that we can be conscious of 
the intrinsic character of our own experiences. According to the perceptual model of 
phenomenological reflection, when someone attends to the phenomenal character of 
her experience she “concentrates her attention upon the experience that appears to be 
there within some inner space and she concentrates her attention upon its apparent 
qualitative properties, upon its quasi-color or ‘mental paint’” (Nida-Rümelin, 2007, 
p.446). Nida-Rümelin readily accepts that neither Tye nor any of the other 
transparency theorists explicitly describe the phenomenological reflection of their 
opponents in this manner, but argues that nevertheless it is an apt “description of a 
metaphor, of a picture that people have in the backgrounds of their minds … [that] 
does influence people’s intuitions” (Nida-Rümelin, 2007, p.446).3 We can see this at 
work in Tye’s description above when he claims that, as we introspect, we “are not 
aware of those objects and a further inner object or episode” (Tye, 2002, p.139, 
original italics). Set up in this way Tye’s position seems reasonable: we are not 
greeted, when introspecting our visual experience of a tree, with some “inner” tree-
like object in addition to what we perceive as the-tree-out-there. Our overall 
experience is, considered phenomenally, very much as it was prior to introspection 
(albeit with a focussing of attention, a reconceptualisation or (particularly when 
                                                
3 A “picture in the background of one’s mind” is, interestingly, a perceptual metaphor for the 
perceptual-model metaphor under scrutiny. It is not clear whether or not Nida-Rümelin is purposefully 
drawing our attention to the ease with which we employ this kind of metaphor when thinking about 
experience, or if she herself has unwittingly used it; either way its seductive power is nicely illustrated. 
 23 
engaging in phenomenological reflection for philosophical purposes) new thoughts 
concerning what one is currently doing). In fact, that there is no grand change in our 
overall experience upon introspection is a claim held in common by UIA defenders 
and RT theorists alike: it seems to be one of those rare basic phenomenological facts 
that both sides take as given. 
 That the transparentists are indeed arguing against the perceptual model of 
introspection is evidenced in their presupposing a fundamental shift in the direction of 
attention as opposed to a change in focus. Nida-Rümelin (2007) catalogues examples 
from various transparentists illustrating such a move including this from Tye himself: 
 
Suppose you are facing a white wall, on which you see a bright red, round patch 
of paint. Suppose you are attending closely to the color and shape of the patch 
as well as the background. Now turn your attention from what you see out there 
in the world before you to your visual experience. Focus upon your awareness 
of the patch as opposed to the patch of which you are aware. (Tye, 1997/2003, 
Section 6, original italics) 
 
Clearly, Tye is presupposing that his opponents are committed to a distinction 
between our seeing-something-out-there and our visual experience in his (rhetorical) 
suggestion to turn our attention from one to the other: the suggested change in 
direction only makes sense if introspection is a perception-like movement from 
“external” objects to “internal” ones. The implicit argument in Tye’s formulation 
presents us with a choice: either defend the existence of these further inner-objects or 
accept that we are never aware of the intrinsic qualities of experience itself, bearing in 
mind the obvious fact that when we introspect there is no substantial 
phenomenological change in our overall experience. But, as Nida-Rümelin correctly 
points out, we do not need to make such a choice if we do not hold introspection to be 
perception-like.  
 For Tye the choice seems to be between consciousness-of-objects or no 
consciousness at all and therefore, given that we do not experience “inner-objects” in 
addition to “outer” ones when attending to our experience, we must not be directly 
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conscious of our experience at all.4 But neither the inner awareness defenders nor the 
middle-grounders need make this choice if they do not hold introspection to be 
perception-like in the way Tye suggests. There is good reason to think that the actual 
choice that the notion of transparency correctly identifies is in fact the following: 
given that we notice no substantial phenomenological change in our overall 
experience upon introspection either we are never directly conscious of experience or 
we are always directly conscious of experience (when we are conscious at all). This is 
an important point that will be best developed and defended by considering some 
middle-ground views that attempt to deny this choice by holding that we can 
sometimes be aware of the intrinsic qualities of our experience. Upon seeing this third 
option as unviable we can then return to the crucial dichotomy and consider which 
side to take. 
 
 
§1.3 Unconscious phenomenology and The Novelty Problem 
 
So, as I have set up the issue, a middle-ground view defends the following claims: 
although we are not normally directly conscious of our experience we can become so 
by reflecting on it (i.e. introspecting). A middle-grounder is not merely saying that we 
are not normally focussed on our experience (this is, after all, perfectly compatible 
with the idea that inner awareness is a constant feature of experience) but that we are 
quite literally unconscious of our experience, except when actively reflecting on it. 
The problem for this view, as has been hinted at above, is that it does not seem to 
each of us, upon introspecting our experience, that anything particularly new has been 
revealed to us. There is a lack of phenomenological novelty. For brevity’s sake, from 
here on out this will be referred to as “The Novelty Problem”.5 What is notable about 
this claim is that it is shared by strikingly opposed theories: both RT and UIA 
defenders make use of this phenomenological data in working towards their 
conclusions (and it is in fact an integral part of both of their arguments).  
                                                
4 This impression is rooted in what Michel Henry dubbed “ontological monism”: “the assumption that 
there is only one type of manifestation, only one type of phenomenality” (Zahavi, 1999, p.226).  
 
5 For a similar problem see Kriegel’s “Argument from Surprise” (2009): when we introspect we are not 
surprised by the content we find. I think that framing the argument in terms of the reason for this lack 
of surprise (namely; that there is a lack of novel phenomenal content) helps to present a more powerful 
case. 
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 This point stands in favour of the claim when we bear in mind the notorious 
disagreements that can come from using phenomenological data as evidence for a 
particular view: a stalemate can quickly be arrived at which sees each side simply 
disagreeing with the proposed phenomenology of the other, with no clear way to 
settle the dispute; it’s not as if we can enter into our opponent’s stream of 
consciousness to verify their description of it. So when such opposing views share a 
phenomenological claim it is reasonable to take this as a good indication of its 
reliability. Further to this it is a claim that can be quite easily confirmed personally. 
(Despite being about our own experience not all phenomenological claims are easily 
verified in this way.) Given the kinds of questions being asked in this debate (in other 
words, given that we cannot verify these sorts of claims in the same way that we 
successfully can with, for example, (many of) the claims of hard science) this level of 
broad agreement and personal confirmability affords us the strongest degree of 
confidence that we can reasonably hope to achieve in such a domain.  
But why should this lack of novelty be a problem for middle-ground views? 
Simply put, because it is reasonable to claim that we should expect to find something 
interestingly novel, phenomenally speaking, when introspecting if we had indeed 
moved from the state of being-conscious-of-non-experiential-things-only to the state 
of being-directly-conscious-of-experience. To appreciate the pull of this expectation 
remember that we are supposed to be moving from an ordinary awareness of our 
everyday world to an awareness of the phenomena responsible for, among other 
things, the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996), the explanatory gap 
(Levine, 1983) and the intuition of distinctness (Papineau, 2002)!6 It seems reasonable 
to expect that, upon such a proposed change in the contents of our experience, we 
would be met with at least some kind of substantial phenomenological novelty.  
At the very least, we can say that the onus is on the defender of such a middle-
ground view to explain why there would be none. For the UIA defender there is a 
ready explanation: we were already conscious of our experience (albeit perhaps in 
some kind of non-focal way), hence nothing new is discovered when reflecting. The 
RT defenders also have their answer: we are never directly conscious of the intrinsic 
qualities of experience so we shouldn’t expect to find something new when we attend 
                                                
6 The “intuition of distinctness” is Papineau’s term for the psychological difficulty we experience when 
trying to accept the identity of conscious states with material states: they just strike us as such different 
kinds of things. For Papineau, to explain this mistaken intuition is to solve the hard problem of 
consciousness (Papineau, 2002, p.3). 
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to what our experience is like for us. Ultimately, a middle-grounder who claims that 
we are not usually conscious of our experience, but can sometimes become so, must 
either deny the lack of novelty or offer an explanation as to why we are not met with 
any upon introspection.  
 Understandably, the most notable attempts are of the second kind. But, as we shall 
see, such attempts run the risk of moving away from the middle-ground and into 
either a UIA or a RT view. A particularly popular tactic in attempting to explain this 
lack of novelty has been to appeal to a special kind of availability with regards to our 
experiences. On this view the reason for the lack of novelty upon introspection is not 
that we were already conscious of our experience but that our experience was, in 
some relevant way, available to us at any given moment should we have decided to 
introspect at that particular time. Thus, the lack of novel content is explained by the 
fact that although we were unaware of the experience prior to reflection, it was not 
completely absent from us: we had unconscious knowledge of it. This is how 
Thomasson describes her position on the issue: 
 
Nonetheless, the view I am proposing does preserve the grain of truth behind 
the common association of conscious states with those we are conscious of. A 
mental state is made conscious by a phenomenology that ordinarily makes us 
aware of things in the world around us. Although that phenomenology is not 
ordinarily the focus of our attention, as an immediate part of that conscious state 
it is already and automatically available so that we can turn our attention to it if 
we so desire, and gain an awareness of the character of our conscious mental 
states (in the way that we cannot gain direct awareness of unconscious mental 
states that lack that phenomenology). That is to say, if I consciously see an 
orange tree, that mental state has a phenomenological character that makes it 
seem to me that there is an orange tree there. Ordinarily, my focus is on the 
orange tree, but since there is also a phenomenology, I can turn my attention to 
that and examine what my experience of seeming to see an orange tree is like. 
So the grain of truth of this view is that conscious experiences are those that are 
available for direct introspection; we can focus attention on the phenomenology 
if we so choose. (Thomasson, 2000, p.205, original italics) 
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In contrast to Thomasson, UIA views all share the claim that when having an 
experience a subject is necessarily conscious of that experience. The exact nature of 
this awareness is explained and described in a number of different ways: some claim 
that it is a perception-like awareness or a higher-order representation of some kind, 
and others that it is the result of a pre-reflective consciousness intrinsic to the 
experience itself. The latter view is of particular importance when considering the 
position described by Thomasson above.  
 UIA theorists of the pre-reflective sort can (and should) readily accept 
Thomasson’s claim that our “phenomenology is not ordinarily the focus of our 
attention” and that we “can focus attention on the phenomenology if we so choose”. 
(It is important to bear in mind that a UIA theorist need not argue that we are 
conscious of our experience in exactly the same way that we are ordinarily conscious 
of worldly objects: no one need argue that we “see” our visual experience, for 
example.) As we have seen, for the UIA theorist the very reason that we are easily 
able to focus on our phenomenology (and are not met with novelty upon doing so) is 
that we were conscious of it to begin with; it was already phenomenally there for us, 
and simply required an alteration of attention in order to come into explicit focus. 
Thomasson’s explanation is not so straightforward. For one thing, on this view 
someone can be unconscious of his or her current conscious state, despite the fact that 
it is the qualitative character of this very conscious state that allows them to be 
conscious of what that state represents in the world: 
 
on this view it’s not that the internal phenomenological character is 
unconscious; on the contrary, it is the immediately present character that makes 
it like something to be in that mental state, and enables us to be aware of other 
things. (Thomasson, 2000, p.204) 
 
The phenomenological character of the conscious state is “immediately present” yet 
something the subject fails to be conscious of. It is true that “immediate presence” can 
be meant in such a way that does not entail its referent being something we are 
conscious of: in a sense the back of my skull is immediately present but I am not 
currently conscious of it (at least, not until I thought about it as an example). At a 
stretch we might say that my unconscious beliefs are immediately present in the sense 
that they are able to affect my current behaviour, and can be available to conscious 
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introspection. But these uses of “immediate presence” do not seem to be viable for 
phenomenological character if we take seriously the claim that this character is 
responsible for making the subject conscious of other things. Let’s consider 
Thomasson’s example of seeing an orange tree: 
 
Ordinarily, my focus is on the orange tree, but since there is also a 
phenomenology, I can turn my attention to that and examine what my 
experience of seeming to see an orange tree is like. (Thomasson, 2000, p.205) 
 
We have here a subject, an experience and an apparent object (as this may not be a 
case of veridical perception). From the subject’s point of view it is impossible to 
know with absolute certainty whether or not she is hallucinating an orange tree or 
actually perceiving one, but either way it seems to her that there is one standing on the 
hill in front of her. What is making something seem to her anyway at all is her 
phenomenology, i.e. the qualitative character of her experience.7 That the 
phenomenology is what makes anything seem anyway at all is a point Thomasson 
agrees with and is right, I think, to do so. The problem with this picture is that it is 
difficult to see how qualitative character could be the kind of thing that could do the 
work of making something seem a certain way to a subject whilst itself being entirely 
absent from the conscious apprehension of that very subject. The point can be put like 
this: a phenomenology of which the subject is completely unconscious is an 
unconscious phenomenology, and an unconscious phenomenology is not a 
phenomenology at all. Thomasson stresses, however, that the phenomenology is not 
unconscious - it’s just not something the subject is conscious of. The trouble is that to 
be “phenomenal” in this sense standardly means to appear, i.e. to be manifest in a 
subject’s consciousness; to be something the subject is conscious of (but, of course, 
not necessarily to appear in the way an object “out there” does). Thomasson’s issue 
with this way of describing the situation is with the possible implications of “of”. 
There is something suspicious, it seems, with saying that a subject is conscious of 
their phenomenology. She is right to be wary: we are not conscious of our 
phenomenology in exactly the same way that we are conscious of objects in our 
                                                
7 By “qualitative character of experience”, recall, I mean the totality of what is phenomenally present 
for the subject of that experience. This, in turn, determines what it is like for the subject to be that 
subject at that time. 
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environment. However, it seems entirely reasonable to hold that the phenomenal 
content of an experience is something the subject is conscious of, no matter how 
awkwardly we might hear that expression at first glance. 
 Taking care to note that the following metaphor is not entirely analogous, consider 
a painting of Thomasson’s orange tree. Suppose that it is a very good painting and 
that it can, in some sense, make it seem to you that there is an orange tree in front of 
you.8 If this was a particularly powerful illusion your attention might become 
explicitly focused on the tree seemingly “over there”: you may be able to forget that 
what is in front of you is in fact a painting. In this sense you are not currently 
conscious of the painting as a painting. But you are still just as conscious of it as you 
previously were: it is still part of the phenomenal content of your consciousness. If 
you weren’t at all conscious of it, there would not seem to be an orange tree before 
you. This is because your awareness of the apparent orange tree is (in part) constituted 
by your awareness of the painting.  
 The same general point can be applied to the case of our phenomenology when 
perceiving a real tree. Whatever might need to be said about external content, it is 
right to say that a conscious perception of a tree is in large part constituted by the 
experiential-qualitative character of that very perception, assuming that direct realism 
is false. This is precisely why it is our phenomenology that “enables us to be aware of 
other things” (Thomasson, 2000, p.204). No conscious awareness of qualitative 
character - no experience. No experience - no conscious perception. The 
phenomenological-representational-event (the experience) has to be something we are 
conscious of if we are to apprehend the tree in the first place. It is true that we may 
not, prior to introspection, be considering our phenomenology as phenomenology (we 
are not necessarily employing any concept of “experience”, just as we may not be 
employing any concept of “painting” when transfixed by what a picture represents) 
but we are still, in some sense, conscious of it. “In some sense” needs spelling out and 
the precise nature of this inner awareness is a difficult matter (there are a number of 
candidate answers) - but the claim that qualitative character needs to be something we 
are conscious of in order for it to make us conscious of some object in the world 
                                                
8 This is not generally what occurs when we appreciate a painting, of course, but it seems possible in 
principle. Substitute the painting for a hologram if this seems more appropriate. 
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seems very reasonable. This point retains its force even after any “extra inner-object”9 
notion of experience is rejected so long as we take conscious experience (as with the 
painting) to be a real part of the process, regardless of its relationship with the rest of 
reality, and regardless of the veridical status of any particular conscious 
representation.  
Thomasson says that “since there is also a phenomenology, I can turn my attention 
to that” and examine it (Thomasson, 2000, p.205). This is perfectly in keeping with 
the view that we are always at least non-focally conscious of our phenomenology; it’s 
“there” (that is, it is present in experience) and so we can turn our attention to it with 
ease. But this line of thought sits at odds with the idea that we were, until 
introspecting, entirely unconscious of our phenomenology. On this view we would 
not just be shifting our attention to a particular aspect of our conscious content, we 
would be bringing into our conscious apprehension something that previously wasn’t 
(phenomenally) there for us at all. This doesn’t seem to describe the 
phenomenological data of introspection accurately: when we attend explicitly to the 
intrinsic quality of our experience it does not strike us as something that wasn’t 
already there for us. It seems that we were in fact already conscious of it, even though 
we were not previously explicitly attending to it. Succinctly put, for Thomasson’s 
view to work it needs to tackle The Novelty Problem. Claiming that the 
phenomenology is conscious or  “present” prior to introspection even though its 
subject is unconscious of it does not adequately do this: the kind of novelty relevant 
here has to do with what the subject is conscious of. The qualitative character, claims 
Thomasson, has moved from something the subject is unconscious of to something 
the subject is conscious of. The Novelty Problem is therefore left untackled, and the 
introduction of a new category of consciousness (wherein something can be part of a 
subject’s phenomenal consciousness but not something the subject is conscious of) 
seems questionable. 
Ultimately, Thomasson needs qualitative character to be something the subject is 
conscious of in order for it to do the work afforded it by her theory. This is, at least, a 
plausible interpretation of the situation. Given that she holds phenomenology to be 
responsible for all of a subject’s experiential contact with the world, she is thus 
committed to a UIA view. This entailment follows from two key premises: firstly, that 
                                                
9 i.e. the point of the painting metaphor applies even though our visual experiences, for example, are 
not little “inner pictures” that we look at. 
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experience is real (really real) and, secondly, that phenomenology is what makes 
anything seem anyway at all to a subject. If one holds both these premises to be true 
(and it seems very reasonable to do so) then one is committed to the ubiquity of inner 
awareness thesis due to the straightforward observation that phenomenology 
(experiential what-it’s-likeness) cannot be without being something the subject is 
conscious of. It might be argued that assuming the truth of this observation is 
question-begging. The following response seems reasonable: it is analytical that 
phenomenology is itself always phenomenal. Being phenomenal, in this sense, 
reasonably means appearing to, or for, a subject, i.e. being something the subject is 
conscious of. To be phenomenal and yet not appear in this way is a highly 
counterintuitive idea (at odds with the standard employment of the concept), and so 
long as we can make good sense of an alternative, ubiquitous inner awareness for one, 
we should focus our efforts there. Given that there are good reasons to accept some 
kind of UIA view (as we shall see) and given that such a view does not require us to 
use the concept of “phenomenal” in such a counter-intuitive and non-standard way, 
we have little reason to accept middle-ground views of this kind as favourable. 
 
 
§1.4 Affordance and The Novelty Problem 
 
To take stock then: middle-ground views that hold phenomenology to be conscious 
face a difficulty when they deny that the subject of said phenomenology is conscious 
of it. They are forced towards a UIA view in order to account for the work done by 
qualitative character. There is, however, another (somewhat ingenious) option that a 
middle-grounder can take put forward by Tom McClelland (2014). On this view the 
subject is not conscious of the non-introspected experience (as with Thomasson), but 
is phenomenally conscious of the experience’s potential to be introspected. This 
seems to go some way to addressing The Novelty Problem as although the experience 
itself is not pre-reflectively present to the subject, phenomenal traces of it are. The 
crucial difference with this view, as compared with more standard middle-ground 
views, is that our knowledge of our own phenomenology is not entirely absent from 
our conscious apprehension: our experience is, one might say, vicariously (and, 
crucially, phenomenally) present for us by way of its affording introspection. 
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McClelland draws our attention, firstly, to affordance as a general feature of 
conscious experience: 
 
If we wish to give a rich and accurate description of our phenomenology, we 
need to have the notion of affordances in our conceptual toolbox. When we 
perceive the world we are not merely passive spectators but rather active 
participants. Our potential to engage with our environment figures in our 
perceptual experience. The ball is not just given to us as red and round, it is 
given to us as kickable. (McClelland, 2014, p.16, original italics) 
 
This seems to be the right thing to say. Further to this: 
 
Our opportunity to perform these acts figures in our experience: there is a 
manifest phenomenological difference between just seeing the ball and seeing it 
as kickable. (McClelland, 2014, p.16, original italics) 
 
Affordance is not simply a matter of an unconscious desire or belief affecting our 
behaviour (though this may well be part of the whole story): it is phenomenally 
present for the subject or, in other words, the subject is conscious of it.10 The 
suggestion is that something similar is happening with respect to our experiences 
themselves: 
 
Armed with the concept of affordances, we can offer a novel account of how 
inner awareness figures in our ordinary non-introspective experiences. 
Introspection is an action. All conscious states - or at least all ordinary 
conscious states of normal adult humans - are introspectable … My suggestion 
is that this ever-present potential for introspection actually figures in our 
experience. Your capacity to gain inner awareness of your concurrent conscious 
state colours what it is like to be in that state for you. Although our outer 
awareness of the world is not generally accompanied by an inner awareness of 
that very state, it is accompanied by an awareness of the opportunity for 
                                                
10 Although perhaps less obvious than other elements of our experience, the existence of this kind of 
mental phenomena has been recognised and defended for some time now: see Findlay (1955) for a 
particularly insightful investigation.  
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introspection. In other words, an affordance of introspectability is a ubiquitous 
feature of our phenomenology. (McClelland, 2014, p.17, original italics) 
 
McClelland’s view concerns the relationship between consciousness and inner 
awareness generally, but it can also be employed as an interestingly novel approach to 
The Novelty Problem itself. Taken as such, however, it has its drawbacks. For one 
thing, as McClelland concedes, a reliance on potential introspectability in accounting 
for our (pre-reflective) inner awareness creates a distinction between normal human 
adults and any conscious beings incapable of introspection (perhaps certain other 
animals and human infants, depending on one’s view of the mental abilities required 
for introspection). For some this distinction will be suspect and provide good reason 
to avoid explaining the UIA view as resulting from a misinterpretation of 
introspectability affordance. It is worth noting that we may not want to deny that 
affordance of this kind is part of a normal human adult’s phenomenology - only that it 
is not all there is to (pre-reflective) inner awareness.  
Further to this McClelland admits of the possibility that “in normal humans the 
capacity for introspection might go ‘offline’ during abnormal states of consciousness 
such as dreaming” (McClelland, 2014, p.18). Once again this introduces a distinction 
that we might be best avoiding - this time between what it is like to be awake and 
what it is like to be dreaming. There are, of course, a number of interesting 
differences between these two kinds of states (especially for those fortunate enough to 
experience lucid dreaming), but it is not obvious that there is such a global 
phenomenological difference as the one entailed by the affordance theory. Given that, 
as McClelland himself states, the affordance of introspection is meant to be a 
ubiquitous feature of waking experience this implies a dramatic difference in the 
nature of the phenomenology that it is absent from. But as strange as our experiences 
during sleep might be, they are still very much experiences in the fullest sense of the 
word: they are fundamentally the same kind of things we live through in our waking 
life. They are not “dreamed experiences” if what is meant by this is anything other 
than “real experiences during sleep”. Lacking such a ubiquitous feature of normal 
experience, we should expect to see a significant difference in the nature of our 
phenomenology when dreaming and it is not obvious that we do.  
Perhaps the affordance theorist can bite the bullet on these points though: infants 
and non-human animals may well be drastically different from us 
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phenomenologically speaking,11 and perhaps we have no good reason to think 
otherwise aside from an intuition (and a fondness for our pets).12 They might go on to 
point out that dreaming is indeed radically different from waking life: perhaps the 
affordance theory sheds light on one of the underlying reasons for this contrast. There 
is, however, a further problem confronting the affordance theorist. 
 The difficulty stems, once again, from the attempt to occupy a theoretical middle-
ground between UIA and RT views, and comes to the fore as a result of the following 
question. What is it, exactly, that affords introspection? Everyday affordances seem to 
be tied to objects in some sense, as McClelland readily accepts: 
 
When kicking is afforded, for example, there must be a specific object that 
seems kickable to us. We never have a free-floating sense of kickability 
detached from any particular apparent object. (McClelland, 2014, p.19, original 
italics) 
 
The trouble is that McClelland does not want to claim that any particular object 
affords introspection. It seems to make little sense to say, for example, that we can 
introspect a tree. One way out of this problem would be to adopt a RT view and say 
that we are never directly conscious of the intrinsic nature of our experiences: when 
we introspect an experience of a tree we just focus on certain parts of the tree’s 
objective qualities, never getting to the intrinsic nature of the experience itself. But 
McClelland, rightly, wants to allow for our ability to be directly conscious of our own 
experiences. At the same time, as a middle-grounder, he wants to avoid becoming 
committed to a ubiquitous inner awareness. For this reason he cannot hold that it is 
our experiences that afford introspection, as this would entail a constant awareness of 
our own phenomenology (given that he holds the affordance of introspectability to be 
ubiquitous). He is, as a result, forced to claim that what affords introspection is our 
worldly situation. To be clear: the claim is that although the situation affords 
introspection, it is the experience that is introspected. To clarify: 
 
                                                
11 Peter Carruthers (1989), for example, has argued that the mental states of animals are nonconscious. 
 
12 The affordance theorist can also claim, as McClelland does (McClelland, 2014, p.19), that an 
affordance need not require any sophisticated judgement on the subject’s behalf, and that therefore this 
kind of objection is misplaced. 
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When you experience an affordance to dance in a nightclub, it is the situation - 
the music, the lights, the right degree of intoxication - that presents an 
opportunity for dancing. My suggestion is that introspection is like dancing in 
this respect. We can be aware of the opportunity to introspect in our current 
situation without having to be aware of any object as a thing to be introspected. 
Unlike with dancing, every ordinary situation presents an opportunity for 
introspection which is why the affordance of introspectability is a ubiquitous 
feature of our phenomenology. (McClelland, 2014, p.19, original italics) 
 
McClelland adds that this picture of things is ultimately “answerable to [our] 
phenomenological reflection” (McClelland, 2014, p.20) and an idea that might take 
some mulling over before striking one as convincing. That said it does not seem, on 
the face of it, to be obviously wrong. Furthermore, it has a substantial advantage over 
the standard middle-ground views: its concept of “introspectability affordance” 
acknowledges the phenomenal presence of experience to its subject in a much fuller 
sense than “unconscious knowledge” and “availability for reflection” can (although, 
of course, not in the fullest sense we see granted by the concept of ubiquitous inner 
awareness). However, once again, The Novelty Problem comes into view.  
 On the affordance view what we are conscious of prior to introspection are, 
perhaps among other things, worldly objects and our worldly situation. McClelland 
does not give a full catalogue of the kinds of things we are typically conscious of, but 
the relevant point is that we are not conscious of our experience. Until introspection 
occurs this is very much in keeping with the previously discussed transparency views: 
although our experience is not something we are conscious of it allows us to be 
conscious of, roughly speaking, the world. For McClelland the situation affords 
introspection, the concurrent experience is introspected and we thus become 
conscious of our experience. It is here that the novelty objection reappears: if we had 
moved from a state of being conscious of the situation to being conscious of 
experience itself we should expect to notice some kind of substantial 
phenomenological novelty.  
 This point assumes (as I take it McClelland does) that experiential qualitative 
character is real. The affordance theory claims that a subject can move from an 
awareness of everyday objects and one’s situation to an awareness of the stuff that 
strikes us as being so at odds with these worldly objects that it has, for many, required 
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an ontological category all of its own (a category in part defined as the opposite of a 
worldly-object category), and yet not notice any major phenomenal difference. It is 
important to note that even if some form of reductive materialism were true it would 
still be the case that the experiential-qualitative dimension of our lives strikes us as 
being substantially different in nature from ordinary worldly objects. Very few people 
are inclined to think, for example, that there is anything it is like for a tree to be a tree 
or for an electron to be an electron: such objects strike us as fundamentally different 
kinds of things when compared to experiences (precisely in their seeming lack of any 
experientiality of their own).13 It is of course true that there are differences between 
our everyday awareness of the world and our introspective experience: there is a 
change in the focus of our attention and quite often (although not necessarily) a 
reconceptualisation (such as when we consider our current experience as an 
experience). But these changes all occur against the background of a general 
familiarity that we should expect to find disrupted if we really did bring 
experientiality into our conscious apprehension only upon introspection. This general 
point assumes that we take both experience and our current scientifically informed 
picture of reality seriously, in the way outlined previously. Direct realists arguably 
fail to do the latter, and as such the arguments presented here are not aimed at them.  
In order to avoid The Novelty Problem McClelland could claim that, even upon 
introspection, we are in fact still only conscious of worldly objects, properties and 
situations, but that we have in some sense reconceptualised them. The affordance 
theory would at this point, however, have collapsed into a kind of RT view; we would 
not be directly conscious of the intrinsic nature of our experiences, but instead would 
be thinking about worldly-objects using a different conceptual picture. It is tempting 
to see middle-ground views as trying to have their cake and eat it too: in attempting to 
maintain phenomenological accuracy (i.e. by accepting our ability to be directly 
conscious of our experiences) whilst at the same time wishing to deny the ubiquity of 
inner awareness, they struggle to adequately deal with the The Novelty Problem.  
 Aspects of the middle-ground views covered here can indeed be appropriated into 
a workable theory that avoids the novelty objection. It seems, however, that in order 
to do so they must move towards RT or UIA views. Both of these positions have no 
                                                
13 Panpsychists are all too familiar with this natural impression, and have to work hard to convince 
their opponents to part with it when proposing that experientiality is a fundamental part of objective 
reality. 
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problem with the lack of phenomenal novelty we find upon introspection: on one 
view we are always already conscious of the intrinsic qualities of our experience, on 
the other view we never are. Whilst it is true that both of these views can be made to 
appear quite counterintuitive, depending on the details supplied, there are reasons to 
hold that the notion of radical transparency is the least promising of the two. Firstly, 
there are a number of strong arguments in favour of ubiquitous inner awareness and, 
secondly, radical transparency faces serious difficulties in its own right.  
 
 
§1.5 Radical transparency and phenomenal novelty 
 
One of the chief problems confronting RT views is related to the notion of 
phenomenal novelty already discussed. As we saw, the lack of substantial 
phenomenal novelty found during introspection gains its dialectical power from the 
contrasting ways in which the experiential-qualitative aspect of reality and ordinary 
physical things (lacking any experientiality of their own) impress themselves upon us 
(regardless of the actual relationship between the two). Their apparent 
incommensurability has led to a number of different versions of dualism and idealism, 
and a recent surge of interest in panpsychism. It is also precisely why eliminative 
materialists feel the need to eliminate our experiences (as we typically know and 
describe them): they don’t seem to fit with our standard picture of wordly objects. But 
if RT is true, if we are never conscious of the intrinsic qualities of our experience - 
“period” (Tye, 2014, p.40, original underlining) - then why is it that we have such a 
powerful “intuition of distinctness” (Papineau, 2002, p.3)? Why did this ontological 
category, defined by its opposition to the everyday world of objects, get off the 
ground in the first place?  
 To claim that the motivation for such a category only comes about as a result of 
deep (and mistaken) philosophising ignores how readily we are apt (prior, even, to 
any consideration of ontology) to recognise the apparent distinction at issue. It is not 
unreasonable to speculate that one of the most commonly held beliefs concerning 
selfhood in human culture involves a presumed distinction between the body and its 
“soul”. Intuitively regarding experiences and worldly-objects as different kinds of 
things would go some way to explaining this (and to claim that the motivation might 
come from prior religious commitments is likely getting things the wrong way round). 
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RT defenders lack an adequate explanation for this state of affairs and it is difficult to 
see what this might be on their account, given that they deny our ability to be 
conscious of the intrinsic qualities of our experiences at all. Once again, UIA 
defenders have, on the other hand, a ready explanation: we are prone to make such a 
distinction because we are indeed both directly conscious of the experiential-
qualitative aspect of reality and at the same time conscious of worldly-objects, and 
they (accurately or not) strike us as fundamentally different features of reality.  
A further serious problem confronting radical transparency has already been hinted 
at: the guiding impetus for one of its central claims is based on mistakenly assuming 
that there is only one model of introspection available to those wishing to defend 
inner awareness. This is the view that introspecting an experience is akin to shifting 
the focus of our attention away from worldly objects and “inwards” towards a further 
set of internal objects. However, if a different take on inner awareness can be 
successfully developed that does not require such a mistaken view of introspection, 
then one of the chief motivating reasons for accepting radical transparency 
disappears. In other words, if we can make good sense of inner awareness without 
having to deny something as basic as our ability to be directly conscious of the 
intrinsic qualities of our experiences, then this is preferable. (Middle-ground views 
are examples of just such an attempt but, as we have seen, face various problems.) On 
the assumption that there is a workable alternative view, the outlandish nature of RT 
counts against it.  
No knock-down argument against either RT or middle-ground views has been 
offered: there are possible responses that we have not dealt with, and perhaps 
responses that are in fact yet to be articulated. Having said as much, the kinds of 
issues we have seen serve to highlight the ease with which UIA deals with the lack of 
novelty we find upon introspection. Taken in tandem with the forthcoming arguments 
in §2, this adds to the plausibility of such a view. We will, then, accept the existence 
of inner awareness and hold that there are strong reasons to think that it is a 
ubiquitous feature of experience. What is now needed, then, is a solid general account 
of inner awareness. If it is true that, in being conscious, we are always already 
conscious of our experience (i.e. we are conscious of our phenomenal consciousness) 
then we need a convincing account of the nature of this awareness. As we will come 
to see, the most promising answers to this question (when combined with a very 
reasonable account of temporal consciousness) entail some surprising things about the 
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relationship between consciousness and selfhood, resulting in a radical view 




2: Higher-order Theories and Inner Awareness 
 
 
§2.1 The landscape 
 
What we require now, then, is a convincing account of the nature of this inner 
awareness. Let’s put aside its ubiquity for now and consider a different problem. 
Granting that we can, at least sometimes, be directly aware of our own experiences 
the following question can be posed: what is the relationship between an experience 
and our awareness of it? The ensuing debate can be framed in the following way: is a 
subject’s awareness of any given experience somehow contained within that very 
experience, or is it a secondary awareness directed at the original (and distinct) 
conscious state? We can label the first picture the “intrinsic-inner awareness view” 
and the second the “higher-order view”. 
The foundational maxim upon which the various higher-order theories are built can 
be put the following way: 
 
When a mental state is conscious, one is to some degree and in some way 
conscious of that state. (Rosenthal, 1994, p.356) 
 
This is a highly intuitive starting point. Consider the occurrence of a typical conscious 
mental state such as a painful sensation. We care to be rid of such a state precisely 
because we are conscious of it (and, usually, dislike it). To say otherwise is to employ 
a radically non-standard and counterintuitive notion of consciousness as we saw with 
Thomasson in §1.3 (pp.26-31). Consider being told by some sufficiently advanced 
future neuroscientist that although you are currently not conscious of any pain, one of 
your present conscious mental states is an agonisingly painful sensation. It is a 
conscious state, you are assured, but not one you are conscious of. Given that you feel 
quite fine in fact (i.e. you are not conscious of any pain), it seems something has gone 
wrong with the diagnosis (or the conceptual framework within which the diagnosis 
was formed). Intuitively, what we mean by a “conscious mental state” is one that we 
are conscious of. Recall a memory from your childhood: a moment ago this was an 
unconscious mental state of yours, and now it is a conscious one. What accounts for 
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its changing status? An eminently reasonable (and, some might say, trivially obvious) 
answer is Rosenthal’s: it has now become a state you are conscious of. With the 
previous issue of novelty we saw that both sides of the debate shared a highly 
intuitive fundamental claim (namely that there is a lack of phenomenal novelty when 
introspecting), and it was argued that this agreement, considered in the context of 
such markedly contrasting theories, counted in its favour. We see a similar 
development in the coming discussion in that its competing theories give 
fundamentally different accounts of inner awareness, yet all defend the common-
sense notion that a conscious state is one that its subject is conscious of. Once again, 
in the midst of such different agendas, the sharing of this claim stands in its favour.  
 There are a number of different ways higher-order theories have attempted to 
account for this inner awareness, but their unifying claim is that a subject’s awareness 
of its own conscious state is of a higher-order than the original target state (which is 
to say; it is a further and distinct state or act of consciousness). When first confronted 
with this general picture of inner awareness it can seem very reasonable indeed. When 
we are conscious of some worldly object before us it is (in part) because that object is 
taken as an intentional object of some conscious state of ours. To be conscious of 
something “external” is to have a conscious state directed at it. It seems to follow, 
then, that we should say something similar regarding inner awareness: when we are 
conscious of some conscious state of ours it is because that state is an intentional 
object of some further conscious state of ours. Questions can then be asked as to the 
precise nature of this secondary awareness (whether it is perception-like or thought-
based, for example). Unsurprisingly, however, things are not quite so simple. A 
number of damaging arguments against higher-order theories can be made. It seems 
that each variation of the higher-order take on inner awareness brings with it more 
problems that it solves, and that consequently a different kind of theory is called for. 
Before turning to just such a view, it will be instructive to see how and why the 
higher-order theories run into trouble. 
 
 
§2.2 Attention and consciousness 
 
This is Armstrong’s view of inner awareness: 
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I think it is an additional form of perception, or, a little more cautiously, it is 
something that resembles perception … a perception-like awareness of current 
states and activities in our own mind. (Armstrong, 1981, p.724) 
 
Again, the rationale for adopting such a perspective seems, on the face of it, quite 
reasonable: we are conscious of objects in the world around us due to acts of 
perception. It seems to follow that, similarly, when we are aware of our own mental 
states it must be because we have some kind of perceptual (or perceptual-like) 
awareness of them. Armstrong pushes the analogy even further: just as external 
objects can exist unperceived, so too can conscious states. This is partly why 
Armstrong takes awareness to be distinct from the conscious mental states it takes as 
objects: they can exist even in its absence.  He claims that most of us are in fact quite 
familiar with such a state of affairs, and puts forward the following example: 
 
After driving for long periods of time, particularly at night, it is possible to 
“come to” and realize that for some time past one has been driving without 
being aware of what one has been doing. (Armstrong, 1981, p.723) 
  
There are a number of problems with Armstrong’s view in virtue of its being a higher-
order theory, but before delving into the specifics it will be useful to challenge this 
seemingly innocent phenomenological description. The kind of experience Armstrong 
is recalling is, although not typical, one that many of us can no doubt relate to. Upon 
“coming to” (as Armstrong knowingly calls it) there can indeed be a sense of surprise 
at having navigated for such a stretch of time without having paid much attention to 
the task at hand. But paying a small amount of attention is not the same as paying no 
attention at all. More importantly, even if we grant that zero attention was being paid 
to the acts of perceiving and navigating the road (the driver being, in the fullest sense, 
on “autopilot”) this does not secure the conclusion that the driver was unconscious of 
such things. To achieve this one would have to establish a necessary connection 
between attention and consciousness, with the latter dependant on the former. This 
seems an implausible project when we pause to consider our own typical conscious 
streams fully, particularly the virtually constant “phenomenal background” to which 
we rarely attend: 
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[There can be] experience without conscious awareness, in the sense of 
‘awareness’ as attention or recognition. But experience that is not attended to is 
still experience. Indeed, it is plausible to suppose that the bulk of our 
consciousness consists of this sort of unnoticed experience. I will call this 
sphere of experience the phenomenal background. The phenomenal background 
goes largely unnoticed because it is constantly present for as long as we are 
awake (and often while we dream). Most experiences that go on long enough 
for us to become habituated to them (but which do not cease altogether) will 
sink into this background, for example the sound of a refrigerator, or the noise 
of a car engine. (Dainton, 2006, p.31, original italics) 
 
The humming of an electrical appliance can be a particularly vivid example of the 
phenomenal background: consider the following phenomenological description in 
response to Armstrong’s autopilot story.  
You are reading in a quiet room when you notice a subtle but constant humming 
coming from a nearby electrical appliance, perhaps the light above you or your 
personal computer nearby. It may have gone unnoticed during previous reading 
sessions in this room but your attention has been called to it now (perhaps because 
you are reading about background humming). You endeavour to ignore it. You 
succeed and become fully immersed in your reading once again. Half an hour passes 
when suddenly the noise stops. You are immediately aware of its departure and in fact 
welcome the contrasting peace. Though you had not been attending to the sound just 
prior to its cessation (you were deeply engaged in thought), the difference in your 
experience is concretely tangible and the change in its quality is directly experienced 
(not merely inferred). It was not as if you noticed some kind of change, examined the 
contents of your experience for a clue as to its nature and then, remembering your 
previous experience, deduced that it was the noise stopping. This picture 
overcomplicates the matter: it is more accurate to say that you simply heard the noise 
stopping. Which is to say that you experienced the transition from humming to 
(relative) silence. For this to occur the humming must have been part of your 
conscious experience prior to its cessation, even though you were not explicitly 
attending to it (or else the transition would not have been directly experienced). In 
short, it was in the phenomenal background (along with much else).  
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The phenomenal background is rich and multi-faceted but for the present point it is 
enough to focus on just one part of it, namely its “world-presenting perceptual 
experience, what we see, hear, touch, smell and taste” (Dainton, 2006, p.31). Dainton 
goes on: 
 
The content of this experience is nothing less than the surrounding world: the 
ground underfoot, rooms, walls and furniture, streets, fields and trees, animals 
and people, the sky above - these are all parts of the phenomenal background, 
they all feature in our experience, for the most part unnoticed, as we go about 
our ordinary business. (Dainton, 2006, p.31) 
 
Staying only with this aspect of the phenomenal background for now, we can say that 
the relevant features of the world surrounding a deeply distracted driver (the road, the 
other cars, the twists and turns, the dashboard, the feel of the wheel etc.) have receded 
into the phenomenal background (or, thinking in less binary terms, have at least 
moved towards it) when little or no attention is being paid to them. But in that case 
there is still something it is like, for example, to be seeing the road in front of you - 
even if this is not at the forefront of your mind. The road and the scene before you is 
not a phenomenal void (such as the “visual space” outside of your periphery and 
behind your head right now). The claim that we are only ever conscious of what we 
are explicitly attending to leaves out so much of the typical moment of human 
conscious experience.  
 Suppose your attention is now called to the many elements of your experience that 
are currently in your phenomenal background (necessarily, of course, therefore 
bringing them into the foreground in the process). Consider the feel of the chair you 
are sitting on, the distant noises of traffic or people or birds, the touch of the clothes 
you are wearing, the feeling of your feet being enclosed by your shoes, your general 
mood, the vague shapes and patches of colour in your peripheral vision. This is a very 
small list compared to the length a full catalogue of an average conscious moment 
would need to be. Does it really seem reasonable to suppose that before your attention 
was called to these aspects of your experience they were all nothing at all for you, 
experientially speaking? Whilst there doesn’t seem to be anything self-contradictory 
in this idea, we would be better off if we can accept inner awareness without 
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becoming committed to such an implausibly impoverished view of what it is typically 
like to be conscious. 
Armstrong is well aware of the oddness of claiming that we are unconscious of 
conscious mental activity to which we are not attending, and tries to avoid saying as 
much. He identifies three kinds of consciousness: minimal, perceptual and 
introspective (Armstrong, 1981, p.723). He defines them as follows: when a person is 
dreaming they are only minimally conscious. If awake and perceiving the world they 
are both minimally and perceptually conscious. If they are attending to their mental 
activity then they are introspectively conscious (i.e. inner awareness is occurring). So 
for Armstrong the autopilot driver is minimally conscious (in virtue of having some 
kind of mental activity going on) and perceptually conscious (in virtue of not being 
asleep) but lacks introspective consciousness of the act(s) of driving. With this 
terminology in place Armstrong can avoid claiming that the driver is unconscious of 
the activity of driving and its relevant environmental features. But all he means by 
this is that, with regards to driving, “there is mental activity going on” (Armstrong, 
1981, p.723) (minimal consciousness is occurring) and the driver is not currently 
dreaming (perceptual consciousness is occurring). There is no room in this picture for 
any phenomenal consciousness (with regards to the relevant aspects of driving). On 
this view there is nothing it is like for the driver to be negotiating the twists and turns 
in the road, to be seeing the other vehicles or to be handling the wheel. All of this is 
entirely absent from the currently occurring experiential reality of the driver. There 
may be good reasons to employ the concept “consciousness” as Armstrong does, but 
the claim that all unattended mental activity is experientially non-existent for its 
subject is hard to take seriously. Once again, a view of inner awareness that doesn’t 
make such implausible claims would be preferable. 
Suppose that the driver, upon “coming-to”, attempts to settle this philosophical 
dispute by recalling the past five minutes of her autopilot journey. Suppose she is able 
to remember some event along the way (a turn in the road or a pedestrian she gave 
way to) and in fact remembers this moment in just the usual way: as an experience of 
the very same kind as any other. That this could occur seems highly likely (the reader 
is invited to investigate this claim for themselves the next time they “come-to” during 
some routine activity). Armstrong would now need to account for how this moment of 
mental activity could be recalled in such a typical way given that it was not originally 
part of any experience. Is the phenomenality mysteriously (and mistakenly) projected 
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backwards? He might claim that it is precisely because the driver is able to recall 
what it was like to undergo that particular mental activity that it must have been 
introspectively conscious in the first place. Perhaps most of the autopilot period was 
introspectively unconscious, save for this particular moment (and maybe a few 
others). This would seem to be somewhat of an ad hoc response.14 Furthermore, it 
would admit of the following: that (at least sometimes) someone can feel justified in 
claiming that they were, in Armstrong’s terminology, not “introspectively conscious” 
of some mental activity when in fact they were. This would count against Armstrong 
in that his evidence for supposing a lack of phenomenal consciousness (i.e. that one 
has a sense of “coming-to” and cannot remember the relevant experience(s)) is, at 
least sometimes, unreliable. Contrastingly, the notion of the phenomenal background 
comes away unscathed and, in fact, neatly explains why someone might mistakenly 
assume a lack of (full-blown) consciousness of any given activity (simply put: it was 
not the focus of their attention at that time and thus more difficult (perhaps even 
impossible) to recall). 
As a final point on the phenomenological accuracy of Armstrong’s autopilot 
example, consider the substantial experiential difference that exists between 
dreamless sleep and conscious waking life. These are not typically taken to constitute 
two contrasting instances of the same general kind of thing. For many, they are in part 
defined by the very absence of the other: 
 
Consciousness consists of inner, qualitative, subjective states and processes of 
sentience or awareness. Consciousness, so defined, begins when we wake in the 
morning from a dreamless sleep and continues until we fall asleep again, die, go 
into a coma, or otherwise become “unconscious”. (Searle, 2000, p.559) 
 
When we are dreamlessly asleep we are not experiencing at all (or, at least, this seems 
a very reasonable position to hold on the issue - one we shall return to in §5.5). 
Armstrong claims that although the (driving-relevant) mental activity is 
“perceptually” conscious it lacks any experiential component. The problem here is 
                                                
14 This would be particularly problematic if a third party were to randomly prompt experience-recall of 
this kind (by asking questions such as “Do you remember the bend in the road by the post office?”). If 
the successful recall frequency was similar to that of typical (non-absent-minded) stretches of 
experience then Armstrong would have some explaining to do. Unfortunately, this kind of data would 
be incredibly difficult to obtain. 
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that although there is indeed a qualitative difference between attentive and inattentive 
conscious mental activity, the contrast is not as dramatic as Armstrong’s theory needs 
it to be (where the latter is claimed to have no subjective quality at all). Dainton 
argues the following on this very point:  
 
Armstrong’s day-dreaming driver may not have been paying attention to what 
he could see on the road ahead, he may have been instantly forgetting what he 
was seeing, but this does not mean that he wasn’t consciously seeing anything at 
all during this period. To appreciate this fact it suffices to imagine how different 
his overall state of consciousness would be in the absence of all visual, auditory 
and bodily experience: the experience of driving on auto-pilot is certainly 
different from the experience of driving with one’s attention fully focused on 
the job in hand, but it is nothing like driving in total darkness and silence - or 
being dreamlessly asleep! (Dainton, 2004a, p.8) 
 
 
§2.3 Inattentional blindness 
 
Relatedly, the notion of “inattentional blindness” has been used to defend the claim 
that attention is necessary for consciousness. One of the more striking psychological 
experiments dealing with this was conducted by Simons and Chabris (1999). A 
version of the video used in the experiment is easily searchable online and is worth 
watching before reading on (though, of course, its effects might be lessened for you 
given the information already supplied about its context). Simons and Chabris begin 
their account by identifying the phenomenon under examination: 
 
Perhaps you have had the following experience: you are searching for an open 
seat in a crowded movie theater. After scanning for several minutes, you 
eventually spot one and sit down. The next day, your friends ask why you 
ignored them at the theater. They were waving at you, and you looked right at 
them but did not see them. Just as we sometimes overlook our friends in a 
crowded room, we occasionally fail to notice changes to the appearance of those 
around us. We have all had the embarrassing experience of failing to notice 
when a friend or colleague shaves off a beard, gets a haircut, or starts wearing 
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contact lenses. We feel that we perceive and remember everything around us, 
and we take the occasional blindness to visual details to be an unusual 
exception. (Simons and Chabris, 1999, p.1059) 
 
Just how accurate they are in their final claim is questionable, but the general 
experience they describe is certainly an easily recognisable one. Such inattentional 
blindness is a powerful tool for certain professions: pickpockets and magicians 
employ exactly this when they divert the attention of their victim or audience. A 
person’s failure to notice a substantial change in their immediate environment can 
also provoke a comical effect: in a section from a popular television show a prankster 
approaches a member of the public in the street and asks for directions. As the helpful 
stranger is looking at the map held by the prankster an accomplice smoothly takes his 
place. So long as this is done whilst the helper’s attention is on the map, the change 
goes unnoticed even when eye contact is subsequently re-established. The extent of 
the comical effect increases in conjunction with the extremity of the contrast between 
the prankster and his accomplice. That such occurrences can be found amusing is 
presumably linked to the surprise we feel in witnessing someone fail to notice 
something so substantial occurring in their midst: although we may not feel that we 
perceive and remember “everything around us”, as was claimed above, we do feel that 
we perceive most things of significance in our immediate environment.  
The experiment conducted by Simons and Chabris (1999) is similarly amusing: 
participants were asked to watch a video of a group of basketball players and count 
the number of times a ball is passed between them. In one version of the video a 
woman wearing a full-body gorilla suit enters the frame and leaves after five seconds, 
and in another version a woman enters holding an umbrella. After watching the video 
the participants were asked to provide answers to a number of questions, one of which 
concerned whether or not they had seen anything unusual in the footage. The results 
were interesting and are effectively summarised by Daniel J. Simons as follows: 
 
On average, approximately 35% of subjects did not see the fully visible 
umbrella woman and gorilla. In one extra condition, the … gorilla stopped 
halfway across the display, turned to face the camera, thumped its chest, and 
then exited on the other side of the screen … half of the observers did not see it! 
In fact, when we showed the video again after explaining what had occurred, 
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observers were often shocked, sometimes even exclaiming, ‘I missed that?!’ 
Most observers intuitively believe that unusual events will explicitly capture 
attention. (Simons, 2000, p.152) 
 
To avoid question begging the above claim should in fact be that approximately 35% 
of subjects did not report having seen anything unusual. This speaks to an alternative 
interpretation of the results. It is possible that the subjects may have in fact seen the 
gorilla only to instantly forget it: 
 
Subjects might attend to an object, consciously perceive it, and then forget it by 
the time they are asked about it. Although we can safely argue that a stimulus 
was attended to if subjects can recall it, we cannot necessarily infer that it was 
unattended to if it was not recalled. In practice, these two explanations, 
blindness and amnesia, might be empirically inseparable. No matter how 
quickly subjects can be asked about a critical event, the questioning will still 
occur after the event. If observers fail to report it, proponents of the 
inattentional amnesia hypothesis can claim a failure of memory rather than a 
failure of perception. (Simons, 2000, p.153) 
 
It may at first appear unlikely that one could consciously perceive such a strange 
thing and then forget it. This concern becomes less pressing when we consider the 
different ways in which an object can be consciously perceived. One such way is for 
the object to make a phenomenal difference to the overall qualitative character of the 
experience and also be conceptualised, i.e. consciously singled out from the other 
objects perceived and explicitly recognised as the particular kind of object it is. As we 
saw with our discussion of the phenomenal background, however, this is not the only 
way that an entity can be consciously perceived: the feel of the chair on your body is 
something that you were conscious of even before this sentence urged you to attend to 
it - it was making a phenomenological difference to the overall character of your 
experience. The case of the gorilla might well be explainable in the same way: its 
visual presence was making a phenomenological difference to the overall character of 
the experience, but it was not explicitly attended to and thus did not reach the level of 
conceptualisation. Having failed to become conceptualised it is not surprising that it 
would also fail to be stored in accessible memory. It may even be that it was 
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successfully conceptualised as a gorilla (or, at any rate, as a person in a gorilla suit) 
but not attended to. In this case it is seen as a gorilla figure but not explicitly 
recognised as such: it is not re-cognised to the extent necessary for it to enter into 
explicit attention or memory - it flits in and out of conscious awareness before such a 
process can occur. On either view, you - as the observer - were conscious of the 
gorilla figure. Although the object was in front of you it was part of your phenomenal 
background: it was part of the vast array of phenomenal content that, although 
unattended to, goes to make up the overall qualitative character of any given stretch of 
your experience. As Simons notes (Simons, 2000, p153), this alternative explanation 
accounts for the experimental data just as well as the blindness hypothesis. It seems, 
then, that such considerations alone do not force our acceptance of attention as a 
prerequisite for conscious experience. 
 
 
§2.4 The phenomenal background in focus 
 
Watzl (2011) has proposed a theory of attention that goes some way to making the 
notion of the phenomenal background and its claims concerning attention even more 
attractive. A core claim in his argument is the following: “consciously attending to 
something in part consists in consciously experiencing what is unattended in 
characteristic peripheral ways” (Watzl, 2011, p.155, original italics). To clarify: 
 
When one attends to something, other aspects of one’s experience recede to the 
periphery. This affects their phenomenology, just as it affects the experience of 
what your attention is focused on. Instead of asking about the phenomenology 
of attention, we might ask about the phenomenology of the periphery. Focus 
and periphery seem to be two sides of the same coin. (Watzl, 2011, p.156) 
 
He presents the following example: suppose that you are enjoying a musical 
performance by a jazz band whilst at the same time undergoing a pain in your left 
foot. Suppose that you decide to try and ignore the pain by closing your eyes and 
concentrating your attention on the sound of the saxophone. Your attention is now 
focused explicitly on the saxophone but, so Watzl argues, there is more to the overall 
qualitative character of your experience than just that: you do not only experience the 
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saxophone when you are attending to it - you also experience the piano and the pain 
as being in the periphery (Watzl, 2011, p.156). Crucially, Watzl claims that this 
background is structured: when you attend to the saxophone the piano is “experienced 
as relevant for or close to the experience of the melody played by the saxophone” 
(Watzl, 2011, p.156). Your pain, irrelevant as it is to your desire to hear the music, 
might be further towards the “fringe” owing to the merely marginal awareness you 
have of it (depending, of course, on its severity) (Watzl, 2011, p.156). Watzl 
references a similarly persuasive case made by Sartre: 
 
When I enter this café to search for Pierre, there is formed a synthetic 
organization of all the objects in the café, on the ground of which Pierre is given 
as about to appear ... [If] I should finally discover Pierre, my intuition would be 
filled by a solid element, I should be suddenly arrested by his face and the 
whole café would organize itself around him as a discrete presence. (Sartre, 
2010, pp.33-4) 
 
The accuracy of this description will be obvious to many. Its reasonableness is 
especially bolstered when we consider the proposed phenomenology of the opposing 
claim that unattended content is unconscious. In the case of the café scenario, 
recognising a friend’s face and attending explicitly to it should result in the 
momentary annihilation of any phenomenal content to which one is not attending. 
Suppose that you had been attending to the sounds in your environment. On this 
account the sounds of muffled conversations and clinking cutlery will suddenly 
vanish from your phenomenology the moment you recognise and attend to your 
friend’s face. It is not at all clear that this is an accurate description of what it would 
be like to undergo such a meeting. Sartre’s model seems far more accurate: the 
unattended content “organises” itself around your friend’s face. In other words, it 
moves into the phenomenal background. For Watzl, this is because “consciously 
attending to something consists in the conscious mental process of structuring one’s 
stream of consciousness so that some parts of it are more central than others” (Watzl, 
2011, p.158). Watzl argues that the structure of this stream is determined by 
“attentional relations” between its parts: the simplest kind of relation is that of some 
content (x) being peripheral to some other content (y) (Watzl, 2011, p.158). Crucially, 
these relations are phenomenal and thus make a difference to the overall qualitative 
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character of the experience. Remain visually focused on the ‘+’ below whilst 
consciously attending to, firstly, the left ‘§’’ and then the right one: 
 
§  + § 
 
The qualitative character of your experience changes depending on which ‘§’ you are 
explicitly attending to, even though it is clear that both symbols remain part of your 
phenomenology throughout the switching process. What it is like for you to focus on 
the left one is different from what it is like for you to focus on the right one. This 
difference cannot be accounted for by the phenomenal absence of the unattended 
content, as it is clearly still present. What then is the best way to account for the 
phenomenological difference? Watzl has a convincing model: the structural 
relationship between the central content and the peripheral content is changing when 
you switch focus. When you are attending to the left ‘§’ the right one is experienced 
as being peripheral to the left one and vice versa upon switching: 
 
The relevant structure has as its primitive the phenomenal peripherality relation 
“x is peripheral to y” (importantly distinct from any spatial form of 
peripherality). Consider the case where you are focusing your attention only on 
the sound of the piano. In the corresponding attentional structure, all other parts 
of your experience are peripheral to your experience of that sound … 
Consciously attending to the piano consists in creating and sustaining a total 
state of consciousness where your experience of the piano is central to the other 
parts of your experience. We can now also make sense of the idea that in a 
scenario like this your experience of pain is likely to be more peripheral than 
your experience of the saxophone. Your pain experience is peripheral not only 
to your experience of the piano, but also to your experience of the saxophone. 
(Watzl, 2011, p.160, original italics) 
 
As a phenomenological description of what it is like to attend to an aspect of one’s 
phenomenology, Watzl’s account is convincing. It goes without saying that you 
cannot experience some content y as peripheral to x, if you fail to be conscious of y. 
As such the claim that attention is a necessary condition for consciousness is suspect.  
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 This issue concerning unattended content is difficult to settle with absolute 
certainty. One reason for this is the nature of the subject matter: usually when we 
intend to examine or investigate some issue we focus our explicit attention on it. This 
is, however, precisely what we cannot do when the matter at hand is unattended 
content: as soon as we focus on it directly it becomes attended to. This has prompted a 
further concern with regards to the reliability of claims relating to this kind of content, 
which has come to be known as the “refrigerator light fallacy”: 
 
This is the fallacy, perhaps committed by a technologically naïve person, of 
thinking the light is always on in the refrigerator because whenever he opens the 
refrigerator the light is on. We can see how the fallacy applies to the domain of 
self-consciousness. We start with a point about what’s immediately knowable, 
hence reportable, if asked. The query (“what are you doing?”) is, 
metaphorically, the opening of the refrigerator. But just as it doesn’t follow 
from the light being on when we open the refrigerator that the light is always 
on, so it doesn’t follow from our being able to report knowingly on our 
conscious lives when asked that our conscious lives always includes self-
consciousness. The fallacy is particularly inviting when we engage in 
phenomenological reflection. After all, to reflect on the structure and character 
of our own experience is an intensely self-conscious enterprise. As soon as 
we’ve set off on the investigation, we’ve “opened the refrigerator.” 
Unsurprisingly, self-consciousness turns up wherever we look. (Schear, 2009, 
p.101) 
 
Although Schear is making the above points in relation to inner awareness in general, 
they can also be levelled at those who claim that unattended content can be conscious. 
In a nutshell the argument is as follows: in attending to some content and finding it to 
be conscious, it does not follow that it was previously so. It may have been 
unconscious but still capable of pulling your attention in its direction. As we saw in 
§1.3 and §1.4 (pp.24-36), however, there are good reasons to believe that such a 
changing status in content, from unconscious to conscious, would result in 
phenomenological novelty of the kind that we do not find when engaged in such a 
practise. A ready explanation for this lack of novelty is that the peripheral content was 
indeed something you were already conscious of. Accepting that this is a particularly 
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tricky area to investigate does not mean accepting that we are incapable of making 
informed judgments on the issue. For one thing we can use our short-term memory: 
“[we] can ‘replay’, perhaps repeatedly, the past few moments of our experience, 
trying to remember it as best we can” (Dainton, 2006, p.33). We can attend to aspects 
of our experience that we failed to notice when we were undergoing them and can, as 
it were, retroactively attend to them. If, in so doing, you recall some content that you 
identify as having been unattended at the time then there are three possible 
explanations for this: either you have confabulated some content, or you have 
mistakenly remembered some content to which you were attending as unattended, or 
you have indeed correctly recalled some unattended content. It is difficult to see why 
we should hold the third option to be impossible. There is also another way we can 
gain access to the phenomenal background: 
 
We can make judgements about the phenomenal background more or less as it 
happens. Try the following experiment. Focus your attention as hard as you can 
onto the page in front of you, onto its colour or texture; keep your attention 
focused here, and while doing so describe out loud something else you can 
perceive, e.g. the colour of the walls that you can see in your peripheral vision, 
or any sounds you can hear. Suppose the walls are green: you can notice and 
report on this without significantly lessening the degree of attention you are 
paying to the page in front of you. There will probably be some reduction in the 
degree of attention you are paying to the page, but not a great deal. The 
important point is that you can register something of the character of the 
contents of your peripheral experience without focusing your attention onto 
your peripheral experience itself. We can call this procedure passive 
introspection. (Dainton, 2006, p.33, original italics) 
 
Not everyone will find such techniques convincing but considered in conjunction with 
Watzl’s account, Dainton’s notion of the phenomenal background, and the problems 
facing Armstrong’s autopilot scenario, they go towards the strong case that can be 
made for unattended conscious content. We have good reasons, then, to disagree with 
William James’s well-known claim that “[my] experience is what I agree to attend 
to” (James, 1890, p.402, original italics). This motivation for adopting a higher-order 
view of inner awareness is not free from attack. 
 55 
As was stated previously, there have been a number of arguments levelled against 
the higher-order views. There are also a number of ways to group these arguments. 
MacKenzie (2007) puts forward a categorisation that also takes into account the 
related debates from Indian Philosophy and thus provides a comprehensive overview 
to jump off from. Concentrating on the most powerful objections facing the higher-
order views a triple-pronged attack can be made: it consists of what MacKenzie calls 
“the objectification argument”, “the reportability argument” and “the regress 
argument” (MacKenzie, 2007). Armstrong’s questionable phenomenology regarding 
the autopilot driver stems from issues concerning the objectification argument. 
 
 
§2.5 The objectification argument 
 
In a nutshell the objectification argument holds that a perceptual (or perceptual-like) 
model of inner awareness attempts to conceive of subjectivity in only objective terms, 
and that this is inappropriate (MacKenzie, 2007, p.58). More specifically: it 
misdesribes the way in which a subject is typically acquainted with its own 
subjectivity. Experiences, for example, are mistakenly characterised as perceptual 
objects, partly owing to the fact that “it is easy to lapse into talking as though 
experiences are things we perceive or observe, in essentially the same way as we 
perceive or observe ordinary physical things” (Dainton, 2006, p.44). Just why this 
mistaken characterisation of inner awareness is so seductive is easy to see: focus your 
attention on the feeling of your body sat in your seat. Now move your attention to 
your visual experience. Finally, move it to focus on the sounds in your environment. 
It can seem, on the face of it, that this kind of activity is a matter of looking around at 
different things: “[it] might seem as though [you] have a single sensory faculty, akin 
to an eye, a sensory organ of a special kind which [you] can point or focus wherever 
[you] like” (Dainton, 2006, p.45). Just as our eyes provide us with visual objects and 
our ears with the auditory variety, it can seem that a special organ of inner-perception 
is able to apprehend all manner of experiences as objects, regardless of their modality. 
But this picture of inner awareness is problematic: it entails a duplication of 
experiences that is neither parsimonious nor phenomenologically accurate: 
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If we really did have this additional organ, and if it worked like our other 
sensory organs, our sensory experiences would be items that causally interacted 
with this additional organ to generate a second set of experiences - everything 
would be experienced twice over. Or rather, it would be more correct to say that 
the only experiences we would have - if we regard ourselves as the inner eye - 
would be experiences generated by the additional organ. After all, the 
experiences produced by our eyes and ears would be as absent from our 
consciousness as the physical things in the environment which causally 
stimulate these organs. These absurdities are the result of taking introspection to 
be a form of sensory perception on a par with ordinary sense perception. 
(Dainton, 2006, p.45, original italics) 
 
A further possible reason for the allure of thinking this way might be traced to 
language. Janzen, in attempting to account for the popularity of this erroneous model, 
says just that: 
 
I would hazard a surmise that this is due, in large part, to the misleading surface 
structure of the grammar of perception sentences. Expressions like ‘I had a 
perceptual experience’ and ‘I am having a perceptual experience’, i.e., 
expressions in which the term ‘perceptual experience’ is grammatically the 
accusative object, are perfectly licit. But we should not be misled by the 
grammar of these expressions. To have a perceptual experience is simply to be 
in a conscious perceptual state; it is not to possess an object that happens to be a 
perceptual experience. (Janzen, 2006, p.60) 
 
Having said as much, it would be rash to deny our ability to objectify our experiences 
in any sense at all. It is quite possible now, for example, for you to focus your 
attention on your experience of a particular object presently in your visual field. By 
focusing on what it is like for you to have that experience you are “objectifying” it in 
a certain sense: you are seemingly adopting the position of a spectator on an aspect of 
your experience. This is not at issue. The objectification argument against higher-
order theories need not dispute this sense of “objectifying”. What it does seek to show 
is that, firstly, when an experience is reflected on this act is not relevantly similar to 
sense perception, secondly; reflection is not in fact the typical way we are made aware 
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of our own experiences and, thirdly, that if subjectivity can be objectified it can never 
be entirely so. Having briefly considered points in favour of the first (less contested) 
claim, the latter two must now be defended and their relevance to the evaluation of 
higher-order theories made clear. 
  Higher-order theories claim that inner awareness is a matter of reflection or 
introspection. The problem for this view is that it seems wrong to say that we are only 
ever conscious of our experiences when reflecting upon them. Zahavi succinctly 
expresses this subsection of the objectification argument in arguing that “[my] pre-
reflective access to my own mental life in first-personal experience is immediate, non-
observational and non-objectifying” (Zahavi, 2006, p.6). What he means when he 
claims that it is “non-objectifying” is that he “[does] not occupy the position or 
perspective of a spectator or in(tro)spector on it” (Zahavi, 2006, p.6). The sense of 
being a spectator can come about owing to our ability to direct our attention towards 
various aspects of our experiences, as we have seen. This is a misinterpretation of the 
nature of introspective experience. To further claim that a subject objectifies all of its 
occurrent experience in such a manner is to either accept that unattended conscious 
states are non-experiential (which is to (implausibly) deny the existence of the 
phenomenal background) or it is to hold that a subject occupies the position of 
spectator at every moment of their experiential life. This latter entailment is at least as 
problematic as denying the phenomenal background: it utterly mischaracterises vast 
portions of our streams of consciousness. Zahavi describes this kind of reflective 
consciousness as “a detached objectifying self-awareness that (normally) introduces a 
phenomenological distinction between the observer and the observed” (Zahavi, 
2005b, p.21). 
 If you pause for a moment and once again reflect upon your current conscious 
experience as a whole, with a little practice and some effort you might be able to 
seemingly adopt the perspective of a mere observer of it. Although difficult, it is 
possible to get the sense that your experience, considered as a whole, is something 
entirely distinct from you, which you are able to passively observe. Even if sense can 
be made of such an impression it is not at all what it is typically like to enjoy 
experiences. Our attention is usually on the objects, people and states of affairs that 
we are dealing with or interested in. The experience itself is something we simply 
consciously live through, not something we adopt the perspective of spectator on 
unless we are purposefully introspecting in such a manner. This is perhaps most 
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obvious when we consider less specific elements of our experience, such as our 
overall mood. We can sometimes be only dimly aware that we are in a particular 
mood, even though its effect on the overall character of our stream of consciousness 
can be pervasive. We can be in the midst of it, utterly in its grip, yet not be explicitly 
reflecting on it. To claim that we are observing this and all other aspects of our 
experience as an objectifying spectator is to misdescribe the situation entirely.  
 As Zahavi notes, “in my everyday life, I am absorbed by and preoccupied with 
projects and objects in the world, I am not aware of my own stream of consciousness 
as a succession of immanent objects” (Zahavi, 2011, p.17). This, as it stands, is a 
purely phenomenological claim to which, arguably, there is only one direct way of 
evaluating its veracity: by attending to one’s own experience often and diligently in 
an attempt to ascertain which model of description is most accurate. Claims such as 
this are abundant in the philosophy of mind and this basic call to “look and see” has 
been expressed in a number of different ways. This is Reid’s version: 
 
In order, however, to our having a distinct notion of any of the operations of our 
own minds, it is not enough that we be conscious of them; for all men have this 
consciousness. It is further necessary that we attend to them while they are 
exerted, and reflect upon them with care, while they are recent and fresh in our 
memory. It is necessary that, by employing ourselves frequently in this way, we 
get the habit of this attention and reflection; and, therefore, for the proof of facts 
which I shall have occasion to mention upon this subject, I can only appeal to 
the reader’s own thoughts, whether such facts are not agreeable to what he is 
conscious of in his own mind. (Reid, 1854, p.57) 
 
There are many, no doubt, who would regard this kind of evidence as suspect at best 
and patently unreliable at worst. It seems, however, that if we are to take 
consciousness seriously as something to be investigated and explained then this kind 
of evidence (personal confirmation) is somewhat unavoidable. This is a result of 
taking a “consciousness-first approach” (Goff, MS) as opposed to a “brain-first 
approach”. This means accepting that the physical sciences are needed in order to 
explain consciousness, but also holding that “our first person grasp of consciousness 
should shape, rather than be shaped by, our scientific picture of matter” (Goff, MS). A 
theory of consciousness can have (and, indeed, almost certainly will have) 
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counterintuitive implications, but it must also respect personal confirmation at a 
fundamental level. Suppose a grand theory of consciousness was put forward based 
on solid third-person evidence. Further suppose that one of its implications was that 
seeing green and seeing red are qualitatively indistinguishable experiences for human 
subjects (or that all people with your colour of hair are philosophical zombies). In this 
(unlikely) scenario it would be most reasonable to reject such a theory based on 
nothing but personal confirmation from the first-person perspective. An honest 
attempt to explain consciousness will, in the end, need to match up with many central 
aspects of our subjectively attained knowledge of conscious experiencing (otherwise, 
it will be explaining something else).15 However, even if such an appeal to personal 
confirmation is not wholly without merit it would certainly be better if we had more 
reliable means of evaluation with which to back up the original phenomenological 
claim. As it turns out, this subsection of the objectification argument (the claim that 
we are not typically aware of our experiences by way of reflection) finds strong 
support in the regress argument, as shall be detailed shortly.  
Firstly though, the final strand of the objectification argument needs consideration: 
this is the claim that a moment of experience can never be entirely objectified, even if 
some element of it can be. A subsection of the objectification argument is relevant 
here (which itself lends support to all three of the objectification argument’s principle 
claims) and can be called “the first-person argument” (MacKenzie, 2007). Consider 
your current experience. Intellectual honesty demands acceptance of the following 
claim: you might be very mistaken in your beliefs about the world. You might, in fact, 
be (almost) entirely mistaken. It could be that your experience is being caused not by 
the world you take yourself to be in but by a Cartesian demon, an advanced computer 
simulation or some other unknown power. That we cannot know either way need not 
be taken to be a “scandal to philosophy” (Kant, 1934, xi). Instead, we can just accept 
this as a basic fact about our epistemological situation (perhaps a universal fact for all 
conscious beings, necessarily entailed by the fundamental division between an 
experiencing subject and the world its experience presents). That this is our situation 
is indeed recognised by most. Granting, then, that your current experience might be 
utterly misleading with regards to the nature of the external world, notice that there is 
                                                




at least one element of your experience that you cannot be wrong about: that it is 
yours (setting aside, for now, the question of precisely what you are) and not 
(exclusively)16 someone else’s. You might be misidentifying the objects in front of 
you, perhaps even all of them, but you cannot misidentify yourself as the bearer of the 
experience. Descartes was right: hyperbolic doubt does not stretch this far. Shoemaker 
puts the point as follows: 
 
The statement “I feel pain” is not subject to error through misidentification 
relative to ‘I’: it cannot happen that I am mistaken in saying “I feel pain” 
because, although I do know of someone that feels pain, I am mistaken in 
thinking that person to be myself. But this is also true of first person statements 
that are clearly not incorrigible; I can be mistaken in saying “I see a canary,” 
since I can be mistaken in thinking that what I see is a canary or (in the case of 
hallucination) that there is anything at all that I see, but it cannot happen that I 
am mistaken in saying this because I have misidentified as myself the person I 
know to see a canary. (Shoemaker, 2003, p.8) 
 
The rest of the first person argument follows quickly on: “identification goes with the 
possibility of misidentification” (Shoemaker and Swinburne, 1984, p.103) and as it is 
not possible to misidentify yourself as the bearer of an experience, your awareness of 
yourself as the bearer of your experience cannot be the result of identification or 
recognition. This is a problem if you hold that you are aware of yourself as the subject 
of your experience by way of some perception-like awareness of an inner object.17 
The first person argument shows that even if an aspect of your experience is 
objectified (where a seeming “phenomenological distinction between the observer and 
                                                
16 It might be that you are wrong in believing yourself to be the only subject of your current experience: 
one of the more intriguing interpretations of split-brain phenomena explores the possibility that even 
normal human subjects have a second subject of experience residing in their brain (one who is unable 
to communicate this fact). We cannot know, from our own pre-theoretical perspective, that this is not 
the case. Such a subject might also be aware of some of your experiences (depending on whether or not 
experiences are the kind of things that can be shared in such a way). But this curious possibility does 
not change the basic point: you cannot be mistaken that your current experience is indeed yours, and 
not solely someone else’s.  
  
17 Consider, by analogy, the act of perceiving oneself in a mirror for the first time. There is nothing 
about the mirror image itself that can identify it as an image of you unless you are already aware that it 
is you who perceives it. The same problem arises when the “mirror image” is held to be an objectified 
aspect of an experience identifying its bearer. 
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the observed” (Zahavi, 2005b, p.21) occurs) not all of it is; namely your awareness of 
yourself as the bearer of it (or, less contentiously, your awareness of its occurrence in 
this particular stream of consciousness, as opposed to some other stream)18. 
Furthermore, it shows that objectification is not the typical structure of inner 
awareness (for you are always aware that your experiences are yours in the sense that 
they are occurring here; in this stream of consciousness). The upshot of these 
arguments is that at least this aspect of our inner awareness is immediate and pre-
reflective. It is not the result of a secondary act of inner perception, directed at a 
distinct inner object. As we will see in §2.8 there are also more general, and 
fundamental, reasons to deny that inner awareness is perception-like. 
 
 
§2.6 The reportability argument 
 
Right now your attention is, hopefully, focused on the words you are reading and the 
meaning they seek to convey. You are not (at least, until you read this sentence) 
focusing on yourself or on what it is like for you to be reading this. Yet if someone 
were to interrupt your concentration and ask you what you were doing, you would be 
able to immediately report that you were engaged in the activity of reading. This 
ability to instantly report on your experience extends to every kind of conscious 
activity that you might be engaged in (aside from, of course, when you are asleep and 
unable to respond to any environmental stimuli, or in some other way incapacitated). 
This is the plausible starting claim of the reportability argument. Further to this, your 
report would not be the result of, firstly, hearing the question and then studying your 
current situation in order to determine what you had been doing. You would not scan 
your environment and, upon seeing a document in front of you, infer that you had 
been reading. Your knowledge of your current activity was already available to you, 
prior to any investigation of your context, and thus allowed for an immediate report. 
The reportability argument holds that the explanation for this is that you were already 
conscious of your experience prior to the question, which allowed you to instantly 
recall it and report it. Given that you were not explicitly attending to the experience 
(you were focused on understanding the text) it follows that introspective attention (or 
                                                
18 We will return to this consideration in §6.3. 
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reflection) is not necessary for inner awareness. You had a pre-reflective 
consciousness of your experience. Therefore a distinct higher-order awareness, 
directed at another state in an act of reflection, is not required for inner awareness to 
occur. This is the essence of the reportability argument. Zahavi elaborates: 
 
the self-consciousness on the basis of which I answer the question is not 
something acquired at just that moment, but a consciousness of myself that has 
been present to me all along. To put it differently, it is because I am pre-
reflectively conscious of my experiences that I am usually able to report 
immediately, that is, without inference or observation, if somebody asks me 
what I have been doing, or thinking, or seeing, or feeling immediately prior to 
the question. (Zahavi, 2005b, p.21) 
 
The latter sentence is better for our current purpose: it does not make use of the easily 
misunderstood phrase “self-consciousness” and does not presume that the inner 
awareness we are currently interested in is synonymous with, or always entails, a 
consciousness of oneself (this requires further argument, which is forthcoming in §3). 
As should be obvious this Sartrean position on the issue of inner awareness is in 
radical disagreement with higher-order theories. Armstrong, for example, holds that 
inner awareness is the result of our introspecting our mental activity. For Sartre, it is 
in fact exactly the other way around: our pre-reflective inner awareness is what allows 
for reflection in the first place: “it is the non-reflective consciousness which renders 
the reflection possible” (Sartre, 2010, p.9). We can reflect in such an immediate way 
precisely because we were already conscious of our experiences, albeit often non-
focally. In other words, our awareness of any given experience is always already 
there: it is not the result of an act of reflection. This is not, however, an argument 
against a perceptual-like higher-order theory such as Armstrong’s (although, as we 
have seen, his theory faces other serious problems). He too can account for the data of 
immediate reportability: he can claim that our ability to report on our experiences 
without inference is the result of an accompanying inner perception of them. What the 
reportability argument does do however, in conjunction with the following regress 
argument, is force the hand of another kind of higher-order theory into making 




§2.7 The regress argument 
 
The objectification argument’s various attacks on a perceptual or perceptual-like 
model of inner awareness have been influential. In an effort to avoid losing the 
theoretical benefits of a higher-order theory of consciousness and inner awareness 
(namely; its compatibility with a reductive account of consciousness) a different take 
on higher-order awareness has been suggested (one that does not posit the 
problematic notion of inner perception). In this version the higher-order awareness in 
question is a thought or a mental representation of some kind. Rosenthal is arguably 
the most prominent exponent of this kind of view. His starting assumption is strong: 
 
There is a natural way of understanding how conscious states differ from mental 
states that are not conscious. No mental state is conscious if the individual that 
is in that state is in no way aware of it. (Rosenthal, 2012, p.2) 
 
This much seems easy to agree with. The intrinsic-inner awareness view can (and 
should) concur with this starting point. What is, however, very much open to dispute 
are the following claims from Rosenthal: 
 
We are conscious of our conscious mental states by virtue of having 
accompanying thoughts about those states. When a mental state is conscious, 
we are transitively conscious that we are in that state. So the HOT [higher order 
thought] that accompanies it will be a thought to the effect that one is in the 
target mental state. Because these thoughts are about other mental states, it will 
be convenient to call them higher order thoughts. (Rosenthal, 1994, p.361) 
 
Rosenthal identifies three distinct kinds of consciousness: creature consciousness, 
transitive consciousness and state consciousness. Creature consciousness is “roughly, 
the opposite of being asleep or knocked out” (Rosenthal, 1994, p.355) and transitive 
consciousness occurs when such a creature perceives or thinks of an object. 
Rosenthal’s reason for calling this “transitive” consciousness is as follows: 
 
A full description of a creature’s being conscious of something always involves 
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mentioning the thing the creature is conscious of. So it is natural to call this 
property transitive consciousness. (Rosenthal, 1994, p.355) 
 
For Rosenthal, being transitively conscious of x means being in a mental state that 
represents x (Rosenthal, 1994, p.356). And, finally, state consciousness is that 
property which distinguishes conscious mental states from unconscious mental states. 
Although Rosenthal does not use such language it seems natural to hold the concept 
of state consciousness, as defined, to be referring to the property of phenomenality. 
There is nothing it is like to be in an unconscious state precisely because it has no 
phenomenology. So on the higher-order thought view when a mental state is 
phenomenally conscious this is because its subject currently has a thought about that 
state. The subject is transitively conscious of the target state, in virtue of which the 
mental state in question is phenomenally conscious. Before considering this theory 
specifically with reference to inner awareness, it will be helpful to see how the regress 
argument tackles its more general goal of accounting for the difference between 
conscious and unconscious mental states. 
The regress argument seeks to force a higher-order account of Rosenthal’s kind to 
choose between two equally problematic horns of a dilemma (whilst also claiming 
that an intrinsic-inner awareness view faces no such difficulty). The argument can be 
condensed as follows. On Rosenthal’s theory what makes a mental state conscious is 
its being the target of a distinct higher-order thought. The following question can then 
be posed: is the HOT conscious or not? If it is conscious then, in order to be 
consistent, we must posit yet a further state directed at the HOT (an even higher 
HOT) to account for its being conscious (given that being the target of a higher-order 
thought is held, on this view, to be what a mental state’s being phenomenally 
conscious consists in). At which point, the same question can then be asked of the 
second HOT, and so on. We now face an infinite regress that would require an infinite 
chain of higher-order thoughts to accompany each and every one of our world-
directed conscious states.  
Not only is this picture completely at odds with how the general character of 
experience strikes us in having it (there is not the slightest hint of an infinite hierarchy 
of states in our phenomenology), but also such a view would clearly not sit well 
within any reasonably naturalistic perspective on the relationship between the brain 
and consciousness. It is justifiable to hold that, although we may be ignorant of the 
 65 
precise relationship between the brain and consciousness, we can be fairly confident 
that the brain is intimately involved in the production of the experiences we enjoy. To 
hold that the lump of matter inside our skulls is capable of producing an infinite chain 
of mental states for every conscious one is absurd. Thus, HOT theorists cannot, and 
do not, hold that the original higher-order thought is itself conscious.19 Instead, they 
must hold that it is unconscious and, as we shall see, this claim has serious problems 
of its own. This, in a nutshell, is the regress argument. That there is a choice that the 
HOT theorist must make seems evident.20 Whether or not it is a dilemma depends 
entirely on the plausibility of holding higher-order thoughts (or representations) to be 
unconscious. This issue now needs addressing. 
An immediate problem facing a higher-order thought theory of this kind concerns 
the issue of animal and infant consciousness. The HOT theory claims that, in order for 
a state to be phenomenally conscious, an unconscious thought about that state is 
required. However, even a relatively simple thought along the lines of “I am seeing a 
tree” demands a certain level of mental sophistication and linguistic mastery that is 
unlikely to be present in non-human animals and human infants. The question of 
animal and infant consciousness is, of course, a difficult one: we know of other 
people’s conscious experiences in large part because they tell us about them, and this 
option is unavailable to us when we are concerned with conscious beings who cannot 
speak. Having said as much, it seems quite reasonable to suppose that at least some 
non-human organisms (and human infants) are capable of conscious experience. 
There are plenty of persuasive instances that we can bring to mind: the shame a pet 
dog seems to suffer when caught in the middle of a forbidden act is a particularly 
powerful one, and difficult to make sense of if we are restricted to admitting the 
existence of “shame-behaviour” only. This intuition is especially powerful when we 
consider species whose neuronal architecture is closer to our own, in terms of its 
evolutionary history and functional structure (or, indeed, younger members of our 
                                                
19 Even if we were to suppose that, somehow, the HOT is conscious without requiring a further 
conscious HOT there is another problem: it does not seem reasonable to hold that we are consciously 
thinking about every conscious experience we undergo - this would entail that “consciously thinking 
about something other than one’s current experience (e.g. pondering some abstract subject matter) 
would plunge one into darkness and silence” (Dainton, 2004a, p.12) and this is clearly not the case. 
 
20 There is, of course, a third possible choice: hold that inner awareness is intrinsic to the (“target”) 
conscious mental state, and thus cut the regress off before its very first step. This choice is unavailable, 
however, to someone committed to a higher-order view.  
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own species).  
The HOT theorist can bite the bullet and deny this powerful intuition, but a more 
convincing move is to modify the theory: it is not a higher-order thought that is 
responsible for conscious experience, but an intentional state or mental representation 
of some suitable kind. So long as the supposed representational state does not require 
conceptual capabilities beyond that of all non-human animals and human infants, a 
higher-order representation (HOR) theory can avoid such counterintuitive claims 
regarding their conscious lives (or lack thereof). But, as we shall see, this modified 
version of the higher-order model is itself fundamentally problematic.  
Firstly, there are yet more problems with holding the higher-order state in question 
to be a thought. These concern the issue of misrepresentation (and, as such, can also 
speak to the non-linguistic intentional state versions of the HO model, if those states 
are held to represent their target). The first issue concerns inference: I may be able to 
infer that I am in a certain conscious state by observing my behaviour or by being told 
by someone else. I would, as a result, have a thought about that specific state. 
However, it would clearly not be in virtue of this inference-based thought that its 
target state is conscious. A HO theory, without amendment, would wrongly claim 
otherwise. Not surprisingly, an amendment is now usually offered to the effect that 
the relevant thought is not arrived at inferentially. It seems, however, that this is not 
much more than a stopgap: in attempting to explain phenomenal consciousness in 
terms of the relation between a distinct representation and its target state, the 
possibility of radical misrepresentation is an unavoidable threat. To be sure, there are 
ways we can be mistaken regarding our experiences. But, as Block shows, the kind of 
misrepresentation possible on HO views is problematic: 
 
Suppose that at time t, I have an assertoric higher order thought to the effect that 
I am experiencing seeing something green, but in fact I am having no visual 
representation at t: the thought is ‘empty’. Let us suppose further that the higher 
order thought is not arrived at inferentially. Also, I have no other higher order 
thoughts at t. The theory supplies a necessary and sufficient condition for a 
conscious episode. An episode is conscious at t if and only if it is the object of 
an assertoric higher order thought at t, arrived at non-inferentially. The 
sufficient condition dictates that this thought at t is sufficient for a conscious 
episode at t. By the necessary condition, that conscious episode at t is the object 
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of a simultaneous higher order thought. In the example, there is only one higher 
order thought at t, and we can assume it is not self-referential. So there is no 
conscious episode at t after all. Thus, the sufficient condition and the necessary 
condition are incompatible in a situation in which there is only one non-self-
referential higher order representation. (Block, 2011, pp.424-5, original italics) 
 
In others words, the theory is incoherent. If accurate, this is a powerful objection and 
there are only a limited number of ways around it. The first would be to hold that the 
conscious state in question is in fact the higher-order thought itself, or that the higher-
order thought is itself somehow part of the conscious state. This, however, would no 
longer be a higher-order thought at all. Alternatively, one might claim that although 
there is no visual representation there is still a conscious experience “instantiated only 
in intentionally inexistent states” as Block puts it (2011, p.425). At this point, it seems 
that we have departed from taking consciousness seriously.  
 Block’s treatment of the issue can, however, be called into question: 
 
But Rosenthal’s theory is not vulnerable to this objection, as Rosenthal doesn’t 
endorse the stated necessary condition. He is happy that lone, targetless HOTs 
supply the subjective mental appearances characteristic of consciousness. 
Block’s necessary condition is really only necessary for a pre-existing sensory 
state: its only hope of entering consciousness is via HOT representation. But 
HOTs are ultimately responsible for generating subjective mental appearances. 
So Block’s attempt to disintegrate HOT theory fails. (Coleman, 2015, p.4) 
 
As Coleman goes on to say, however, “there’s surely something solid within the 
residue of dissatisfaction around Rosenthal’s treatment of HOT mistargeting” 
(Coleman, 2015, p.4). The issue of misrepresentation also comes into view when we 
consider what HO theories have to say about the nature of inner awareness. For 
Rosenthal, when the (typically unconscious) HOT, in virtue of which we have a 
conscious experience, is itself the target of a further higher-order thought, inner 
awareness is present. The reportability argument puts pressure on this view: given that 
we are typically able to instantly report on our conscious activity Rosenthal would 
have to hold that we are almost constantly thinking about our experiences whenever 
we are having them. The phenomenal background, in its diversity and depth, stands 
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strongly against such a claim.  
 Further to this, applied as a higher-order take on inner awareness, this view faces 
the same fundamental problems that the general higher-order take on conscious 
experience suffers. It also has a new one: 
 
If one is introspecting, that is, directing one’s attention to one’s own mental 
states, then, according to Rosenthal, one has a (so far) unconscious third-order 
thought whose intentional object is the second-order thought with the content 
that one is in S. The content of the third-order thought, however, is not that one 
is in S, but that one thinks that one is in S. If S is a perceptual state of seeing the 
blue sky, then the content of the third-order thought would be that I think I am 
seeing the blue sky. This is the content that should be conscious. But, in fact, 
what is really conscious when we are introspecting are contents of the form ‘I 
am now in S’. We may be focussing on our focussing on mental states too, and 
then we would have conscious contents of the form ‘I think I am in S’. But in 
all cases of consciousness of first-order mental states like perceiving, feeling or 
desiring, the form of content is ‘I am now in S’. Thus, it seems that explaining 
introspective consciousness by third-order thoughts leads to a wrong prediction 
as to the content which is conscious. (Schroder, 2001, p.38) 
 
It is tempting to suppose that there is a fundamental problem with the higher-order 
model. In all of its perceptual, thought-based and representational forms considered 
here, and in its tackling of both phenomenal consciousness in general and inner 
awareness more specifically, it seems forced into making one problematic claim or 
another. There are, of course, many kinds of higher order theories in the literature - 
each with their own strengths and weaknesses. Some, such as Coleman’s (2015) 
“Quotational” higher-order thought theory, deal with the problem of mistargeting, for 
example, in a more optimal fashion than Rosenthal’s. But one might be forgiven for 
thinking that there is something fundamentally faulty with the model as a whole. 
Dainton expresses this general concern well: 
 
even if objections such as these do not prove insuperable, there is a difficulty, or 
perhaps more accurately, a deficiency, of a more fundamental kind. The prime 
goal of the HOT theorist is to provide a coherent and believable account of the 
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difference between conscious and non-conscious mental states. Evidently, this 
is a non-trivial task, as there is a world of difference between the two (just think 
what it is like to regain consciousness). The HOT theorist would have us believe 
that all hangs on the presence or absence of non-conscious intentional states. I 
fail to see how this can be the complete story. (Dainton, 2004a, p.14) 
 
Considering the wealth of objections that have been put to the various higher-order 
views, it would be unreasonable to blame such skepticism on prior ontological 
commitments or a lack of imagination (on the contrary, it seems that one of the few 
powerful motivations for defending a higher-order view is its compatibility with a 
reductive account of conscious experience: a common background commitment). If 
we honestly accept the reality of conscious experience on its own terms it can seem 
likely that higher-order views are on the wrong track: 
 
Suppose HOT theorists are correct, and all manner of mental states can exist in 
both conscious and non-conscious modes. Consider two subjects, S1 and S2, 
both of whom are having experiences (or sensory states) caused by looking at a 
red balloon; call these E1 and E2. Whereas E1 is conscious, E2 is non-
conscious. In virtue of this difference, the overall consciousness of S1 will be 
different from that of S2: S1 will be aware of an intrinsic quality, phenomenal 
redness, S2 won’t be. The HOT theorist explains this intrinsic difference in 
relational terms: S1 is conscious of phenomenal red by virtue of possessing 
appropriate unconscious intentional states, intentional states that S2 lacks. But 
the intrinsic difference between what it is like to be S1 and what it is like to be 
S2 surely cannot consist in a relational difference, or at least, not in this 
relational difference (i.e., being differently related to non-conscious states). 
(Dainton, 2004a, p.14, original italics) 
 
There are, then, a number of problems that higher-order theories face in their attempts 
to account for phenomenal consciousness generally and inner awareness specifically. 
In particular, the effort to explain intrinsic differences in merely relational terms 
appears fundamentally problematic. It goes without saying that the current discussion 
is not a fully exhaustive treatment of the issue: such a project would require far more 
space than is available here, given the other arguments and claims I wish to make. 
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Having said as much we have seen a host of problems that can motivate a desire to 
look elsewhere for convincing answers. In this respect, the way in which higher-order 
theories get into trouble might help us to form a clearer picture of the issues at hand. 
At bottom, their problems arise from positing a distinction between a conscious state 
and the subject’s awareness of that conscious state.  
 
 
§2.8 An alternative to the higher-order model 
 
This basic idea is at work in each of the perceptual, thought-based and 
representational versions and is used to explain the difference between conscious and 
unconscious mental states, as well as to account for inner awareness. We may be in a 
better position if we reject this underlying claim. With reference to consciousness 
considered generally, the lesson to be learnt is as follows: 
 
consciousness is inseparable from phenomenal contents: when a given 
phenomenal item comes into being, it comes into being as a conscious 
experience; to be an experience it does not need to fall under any separate 
awareness … In other words, contents are themselves intrinsically conscious, 
and hence - in a manner of speaking - they are self-revealing or self-intimating. 
That is, phenomenal contents become conscious simply by coming into 
existence. Whenever phenomenal properties are realized, or phenomenal objects 
come into existence, conscious experience occurs. I shall call this non-dualistic 
model of consciousness the Simple Conception of experience. (Dainton, 2006, 
p.57) 
 
This model avoids the various pitfalls of the higher-order approach. We can condense 
the claim as follows: experience is self-intimating. There is, however, one problem 
that it faces which a higher-order view seemingly avoids: it is difficult to see how we 
can reductively explain conscious experience if it is held to be self-intimating.21 To 
claim, however, that only reduction-friendly theories are to be put on the table is to 
                                                
21 There is good reason to think that the self-intimation of experience is in fact the most fundamental 
aspect of the mind-matter problem: the true source of the explanatory gap. 
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beg the question in a serious and unhelpful way. The Simple Conception avoids the 
many problems facing the higher-order theories, and is perfectly in keeping with our 
basic phenomenological data. If it makes the reductive explanatory project seem more 
difficult then this is a problem for the reductive approach, not the Simple Conception. 
The hard problem of consciousness exists for everyone (excluding eliminativists and 
illusionists, who have their own difficulty to deal with)22; the Simple Conception 
merely identifies and admits of an important aspect of it.  
 The Simple Conception avoids the problems leveled at higher-order theories 
because of its refusal to posit a separation between phenomenal content and 
awareness. Dainton presents his account in stark opposition to the notion of awareness 
detailed here: 
 
Awareness cannot itself be observed, it is not an object, not a thing. Indeed, it is 
featureless, lacking form, texture, colour, spatial dimensions. These 
characteristics indicate that awareness is of a different nature than the contents 
of the mind; it goes beyond sensation, emotions, ideation, memory. Awareness 
is at a different level, it is prior to contents, more fundamental. Awareness has 
no intrinsic content, no form, no surface characteristics - it is unlike everything 
else we experience, unlike objects, sensations, emotions, thoughts or memories. 
 Thus experience is dualistic, not the dualism of mind and matter, but the 
dualism of awareness and the contents of awareness. To put it another way, 
experience consists of the observer and the observed. Our sensations, our 
images, our thoughts - the mental activity by which we engage and define the 
world - are all part of the observed. In contrast, the observer - the ‘I’ - is prior to 
everything else; without it there is no experience of existence. If awareness did 
not exist in its own right there would be no ‘I’… no transparent centre of my 
being. (Deikman, 1996, p.351) 
 
I will follow Dainton in labeling this concept awareness*. Its fundamental 
characteristic is its distinction from whatever content it happens to be observing. The 
above description can in some ways seem convincing: that there is an aspect of 
conscious experience that is not easily described as a “thing” or an “object” is not an 
                                                
22 Namely: the self-evident existence of conscious experience. 
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entirely objectionable claim. Such thinking might go some way to explaining the 
historical popularity of the notion of an immaterial soul. It can also become even 
more convincing when one engages in certain meditative practices: “neti neti” (not 
this, not that) is one such practice and a rough instruction can be put along the 
following lines.  
 Consider your current experience. Notice that it seems obvious to you that you 
cannot be any of the worldly objects that you are currently conscious of: they are 
distinct from you and this is evident to you on the basis of the fact that you are here 
observing them, and they are there being observed. This seems to hold regardless of 
the veridical status of your perceptions: even if the objects are in fact hallucinated 
objects, or part of a virtual world, they are seemingly distinct from you as the 
observer of them. Now consider your body: the same basic fact seems to apply. 
Although there are important differences in the way your body figures in your 
phenomenal sphere - for one thing it is constantly present in a way that other objects 
are not - it is still something you can observe, and therefore something experientially 
distinct from yourself as the observer. Now consider your entire inner mental life: 
your thoughts, sensations, emotions and, even, the sense of being the person that you 
are. All of this, so the argument goes, is something you can observe. Such observation 
is different from the perceptual kind, but it is still an act that consists of an observer 
and something observed. In short: if you are the one who is observing x then you 
cannot be x owing to the fact that x has the property of being observed, whereas you 
have the property of observing.  
 Having followed such instructions the following insight is purportedly available: 
you, as the observer, can never be observed. If you think you have managed to 
observe yourself as awareness, you have in fact constructed a subtle image of 
yourself: you are always one step behind the observed phenomena. We have arrived at 
awareness*. Such a model can indeed be attractive: it is possible, although difficult, to 
enact the above practice and be met with the impression that, as an observer, one is 
something akin to an invisible witness. As will be seen in sections §6.4 and §6.5, 
however, there are good reasons to think that such an impression can be explained, 
and even utilised, without positing a distinction between awareness and content. Such 
a reappropriation is necessary for the following reason: it is not at all obvious that 
such an alleged distinction between content and awareness is in fact coherent. This 
will become clear by examining the four possible options available to an awareness* 
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defender, identified by Dainton as follows: 
 
S1 awareness* cannot exist independently of content, and content cannot 
exist independently of awareness* 
 
S2 awareness* cannot exist independently of content, but content can exist 
independently of awareness* 
 
S3 awareness* can exist independently of content, and content can exist 
independently of awareness* 
 
S4 awareness* can exist independently of content, but content cannot exist 
independently of awareness* (Dainton, 2006, p.48). 
 
Consider S1: on this view content cannot exist independently of awareness. Why 
should this be so? Dainton asks us to consider some phenomenal content: a token of 
blueness. Picture a simple blue region of a visual field. What reason do we have to 
think that this can only exist in the presence of an awareness*? Remember that 
awareness* does not, in itself, possess any phenomenal characteristics: as Deikman 
argues it is “featureless” and “has no intrinsic content” (Deikman, 1996, p.351). What 
then does it bring to the blueness in order to make it exist? There is no blueness or 
“colorfulness” to be found in awareness*. This problem is exacerbated when we 
consider the sheer diversity of the phenomenal content that we enjoy: 
 
If awareness* is in itself diaphanous, perfectly transparent, bringing the same 
intangible illumination to all its objects, how can it bring such diverse 
phenomenal properties as colour and sound into the world? Supposing a 
transparent awareness* could be responsible for phenomenal diversity is as 
absurd as thinking one could convert a television from black-and-white to 
colour by holding a sheet of plain glass in front of the screen. (Dainton, 2006, 
p.49) 
 
Think of the dramatic phenomenal difference that exists between a patch of blueness 
and a loud ringing noise, or between a feeling of nausea and the smell of wine. How 
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could a featureless awareness be responsible for such different kinds of content when 
it is itself devoid of all of these kinds of properties? Wolfgang Fasching (2009) finds 
the above consideration unconvincing, and argues that “[one] could equally ask what 
ingredient extension brings to colour and conclude from the fact that it does not 
contribute any colour-shading to it that colour can do just as well without extension” 
(Fasching, 2009, p.144). This, however, does not seem entirely analogous: Dainton is 
not claiming that content can do “just as well” without awareness full stop, if this is 
taken to mean that phenomenal content can exist in the absence of consciousness. He 
is claiming that phenomenal content can do just as well without a distinct and 
featureless awareness. The Simple Conception of experience does not claim that 
phenomenal content can exist unconsciously: it is not without consciousness or 
awareness in this sense. Dainton’s claim is that the concept of awareness* does not 
successfully refer to anything distinct from the intrinsic nature of phenomenal 
contents themselves. In terms of Fasching’s analogy, a “Simple Conception of 
Extension” would assert the following: extended contents, including colour, can do 
just as well without a featureless (and thus unextended) “space” (or space*). This 
would be a reasonable position to hold. S1, then, seems dubious. The next option 
needs examining: 
  
S2 awareness* cannot exist independently of content, but content can exist 
independently of awareness* 
 
On this view, content does not require awareness* in order to exist. The role of 
awareness*, then, is not to create content but to reveal it. As Dainton argues, this view 
is just as problematic as S1, if not more so, in that it renders awareness* 
fundamentally superfluous (Dainton, 2006, p.50). Consider all of the phenomenal 
content that is currently determining what it is like for you to undergo the particular 
experience you are enjoying at this moment. If this content can exist independently of 
awareness* (as is claimed in S2) then what difference would it make should this 
awareness* suddenly cease to exist (Dainton, 2006, p.50)? The phenomenological 
character of your current experience would remain unchanged. Dainton goes on: 
 
even if a pure awareness* is now gazing down upon your consciousness and is 
in some manner apprehending the character of your experience as it unfolds, 
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what has this entity got to do with you? The answer seems to be: nothing 
whatsoever. The idea that you would cease to experience anything if this 
awareness* were to vanish seems quite absurd. Once again the difficulty lies 
with the featureless character of awareness*: if awareness is wholly without 
phenomenal features it is hard to see that anything would be lost if it were to 
disappear, and it is very hard to see why experience itself should be impossible 
in its absence. (Dainton, 2006, p.50) 
 
It seems, then, that both S1 and S2 are problematic. What of S3 and S4? Both of these 
views hold that awareness can exist without content. A fundamental problem faces 
this view and is neatly presented by Dainton when he asks “[what] would a wholly 
contentless awareness* be like? … What would differentiate a bare awareness from 
nothing at all?” (Dainton, 2006, p.53). What it is like to experience x is in part 
determined by the phenomenal content involved. If x is an awareness that is itself 
empty of all phenomenal content, then so too is the “experience” of x: a contentless 
awareness would leave no impression at all. In short, a truly featureless awareness is 
not something that we could become aware of. We can put the issue in terms of a 
rhetorical question: what would this pure observer (or witness) be like in itself? As we 
will investigate in §6 certain meditative techniques espoused in Indian philosophy are 
geared towards facilitating a self-recognition on the part of their aspirant. The 
practitioner is guided into recognising their essential nature as consciousness. 
Consider this: what would be the point in achieving such a realisation if one’s nature 
was not like anything at all? Crucially: how would you even know when you had 
achieved the desired recognition if such an awareness* is incapable of showing up in 
your experience? It is worth keeping in mind the distinction between objectless and 
contentless experience: 
 
It has been reported that in very advanced states of meditation … a mode of 
pure objectless conscious experience can be attained where there is something it 
is like to be in such a state. If such modes are really possible, then they would 
suggest that this subject-awareness has its own intrinsic phenomenal character - 
always present but largely unnoticed in ordinary conscious states. (Albahari, 
2009, p.64, original italics) 
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Clearly such an awareness is not contentless: there is something it is like to reach such 
a state of consciousness. Indeed, it is presumably quite an enjoyable state of mind 
given the efforts many undergo in an attempt to reach it. Emptying one’s mind of all 
object-directed thoughts and perceptions would indeed be an atypical experience: it 
might strike us as considerably less cluttered, and thus further towards “contentless”, 
than our usual conscious states, but in order for it to be worth pursuing it must have 
some qualitative character.  
It seems, then, that separating content from awareness causes serious problems for 
both the HOR approach and the featureless awareness account. Instead of positing 
such a distinction we should agree with Dainton that experience is self-intimating: it is 
not revealed by a distinct awareness but instead reveals itself. It is crucial to note that 
self-intimation is a different, but related, concept to “self-consciousness”, even when 
“self-consciousness” is taken to refer only to inner awareness (i.e. not to a 
conceptualisation of oneself). A defender of self-intimation might wish to claim that 
experience is self-intimating but that it lacks inner awareness. As has been shown, 
however, this latter impulse needs to be rejected. 
 We have covered a lot of shifting ground, and it will be useful to offer a general 
analysis of the situation. The view that inner awareness is intrinsic to experience, as 
we saw, can be motivated by an appeal to the pre-reflective nature of consciousness, 
in opposition to reflective and higher-order views. Many have claimed that such 
considerations speak directly to the issue of what we are. Sartre (2010), for one, 
claims that the pre-reflectivity of awareness entails that our nature is “being-for-itself” 
(consciousness). I think such an impulse is right, and that - in fact - such an 
entailment can be defended merely on the basis of accepting two plausible views: 
Dainton’s Simple Conception of experience and UIA. Such a simple presentation of 
the issue might make for a more persuasive case for those who are suspicious of, or 
find it understandably difficult to follow, Continental Phenomenology’s 
terminological style. More importantly, its simplicity might shed light on just why 
inner awareness has such implications concerning our essential nature. 
 To take stock then, and allow ourselves access to only the minimal amount of 
concepts necessary for the forthcoming argument to hold: conscious experience is 
self-intimating and inner awareness is a ubiquitous feature of conscious experience. It 
therefore follows that, if we momentarily take “self-consciousness” to mean nothing 
more than “inner awareness”, we can concisely summarise our findings into the 
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following claim: conscious experience is necessarily both self-intimating and self-
conscious. This is just to say that, for any given experience (e) of a subject (s); e is 
self-intimating (it doe not require a distinct awareness or HOR in order to be 
conscious) and s is aware of e (i.e. inner awareness is present). It is important to note 
that this formulation makes no claims about the subject’s awareness of itself. 
However, as I have hinted, these simple premises have an interesting implication 
concerning just that. This now needs addressing. 
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3: Being Consciousness 
 
 
Having done the necessary work we are now in a position to advance a core 
argument. Simply put, if we accept the claims previously defended then we must also 
accept the following (preliminary) thesis: 
 
The Identity Thesis: the subject of an experience (e) is identical with e. 
 
The Identity Thesis is, of course, not particularly new. What is of interest is that only a 
minimal amount of (plausible) premises are needed for it to be entailed. It does not 
depend on the notion of “mineness” (or “for-me-ness”), although it need not deny the 
existence of such a feature of consciousness (depending on how “mineness” is 
interpreted). Given that the notion of “mineness” is open to serious attacks (an issue 
we will cover in §6.3), avoiding the need for it affords the argument a good deal of 
strength. We can call it “The Exclusivity Argument” and its most succinct form is the 
following: 
 
P1.  Any given experience (e) is self-conscious and self-intimating 
Therefore: 
C1.  Only e is conscious of e 
 Therefore: 
C2.  The subject of e is e 
 
The first premise has already been argued for and found to be a reasonable claim, so 
long as the term “self-conscious” is taken to mean no more than that inner awareness 
is present, i.e. that the subject of e is conscious of e. C2 follows from the conjunction 
of C1 and the first clause of P1 quite obviously, given this definition of self-
consciousness. The crucial element left to defend, then, is the entailment of C1 from 
P1.  
This is most easily done by starting with the first clause of P1: any given 
experience (e) is self-conscious. Recall that “self-consciousness” so used is not 
referring to any concept of self that may or may not be present in e. Neither is it 
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referring to an awareness of the property of “mineness”. According to the foregoing 
discussion, e is self-conscious just when the subject of e is conscious of e (i.e. inner 
awareness is present). The key claim, then, is that C1 is entailed when this is accepted 
along with P1’s second clause. Recall the Simple Conception’s view that experience is 
self-intimating. Once again the “self” in the phrase “self-intimating” should not be 
taken to imply, on its own, an awareness of “a self” or an awareness of “itself”. To 
say that experience is self-intimating is, in one sense, a merely negative claim: it is to 
claim that phenomenal properties do not require a distinct awareness in order to 
become manifested. Experience is, metaphorically speaking, “self-illuminating”. 
Perhaps less contentiously, it is “self-revealing” (Dainton, 2006, p.57) in the sense 
that it reveals itself without the need of a distinct awareness or HOR.  
Notice that “self-revealing” can here be read in two ways: the thing doing the 
revealing is itself (not some distinct awareness) and the thing revealed is itself. As it 
stands this says nothing of experience revealing itself to itself. This third kind of self-
revelation is entailed, however, when the experience in question is self-conscious in 
the way already defined. Recall that inner awareness occurs when an experience is 
revealed to its subject. If one holds that this inner awareness is present and that this 
experience is self-intimating then it follows that the experience is revealing itself to 
itself. The experience is revealed to someone or something but, according to the 
Simple Conception, an experience is self-intimating; it is not revealed to a distinct 
awareness. Thus, it must be the case that it is revealed to the only eligible conscious 
candidate left: itself.  
 There are two possible meanings of the phrase “consciousness of e”. The first 
refers to inner awareness: there is a consciousness of e in the sense that someone or 
something is conscious of e. The second refers to self-intimation: in this sense 
“consciousness of e” just means e’s being conscious, which is to say e’s having the 
property of consciousness; e’s being phenomenally present or “revealed”. What The 
Exclusivity Argument claims is that when there is “consciousness of e” in the first 
sense and e is self-revealing, e is therefore conscious of e.  
 Suppose, for the sake of argument (and contrary to the conclusion of the previous 
section) that an experience occurs lacking inner awareness. We can ask: who or what 
is this experience revealed to? The Simple Conception, which I take to be the correct 
view for the reasons we have looked at, claims the following: it is not revealed to 
anyone or anything. It is just there. It is self-intimating or self-revealed. It is not made 
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conscious by falling under the gaze of a distinct awareness. In other words, 
phenomenal properties are conscious just by virtue of being the kind of properties 
they are. But now, suppose inner awareness is added to this experience. It becomes 
true, by definition, that it is revealed to someone or something (as this is what inner 
awareness amounts to: when a subject is aware of its experience, its experience is 
phenomenally present to that subject). But to who or what is it revealed? Given that e 
is self-intimating it cannot be that it is revealed to or through some distinct 
consciousness. It must therefore be that it is revealed to itself: there is no other option, 
i.e. e is the exclusive candidate. Thus, the subject (the one who is conscious of e) must 
be identical with e. 
There are a number of ways to reject this conclusion. The argument appears valid, 
so its soundness is where this must happen. Both clauses of P1 can be attacked. We 
saw as much in the foregoing sections, but I hope to have shown that we have strong 
reasons to accept the claim that experience is necessarily self-intimating and self-
conscious (in the way defined). With regard to self-consciousness, in this limited 
sense, it is worth noting that, for many, “it has seemed so obvious as hardly to need 
defense” (MacKenzie, 2007, p.41). The necessary existence of inner awareness for 
any given experience can seem to be an analytical truth:   
 
It is impossible to think or experience something consciously without thinking 
or experiencing it self-consciously, i.e., without being peripherally aware of 
thinking or experiencing it. (Kriegel, 2004 p.200) 
 
In his own defence of the notion, Strawson (2013, p.8) notes that Aristotle (1936) 
accepted it too. Sartre, also, is in agreement when he states that “what can properly be 
called subjectivity is consciousness (of) consciousness” (Sartre, 2010, p.17). I have 
advanced an argument in support of such a view in §1 (pp.16-39), but it is tempting to 
hold that no such argument is necessary.  
 We can flesh out The Exclusivity Argument as follows: for any given experience 
(e) for a subject (s), 
 
P1. e is self-revealing (e is not revealed to a distinct awareness) 
P2. e is revealed to s (s is conscious of e) 
P3. an experience cannot be revealed to x if x lacks any form of awareness 
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P4.  given P3: e is not revealed to an x lacking any form of awareness 
P5. given P2 and P4: s cannot be an x lacking any form of awareness, i.e. s 
possesses awareness 
P6. given P1: s’s awareness cannot be distinct from e 
C. s is e 
 
Typically we think of ourselves as the kind of beings that have experiences: not as the 
experiences themselves. The Exclusivity Argument gives us reason to believe that we 
are incorrect in thinking this.  
In a nutshell, then, The Identity Thesis supports the following line of thought: we 
do not tell the whole story when we say that a subject of experience is conscious. 
More accurately, we should say that a subject of experience is consciousness. This 
prompts some important questions. Switching to the first-person for simplicity’s sake, 
The Identity Thesis identifies what I am. At the very least, it tells me what kind of 
being I am. As it stands, however, it does not tell me who I am; it does not tell me 
which consciousness is “me” except to say that I am the current experience of which I 
am aware. In other words, it says nothing of the persistence conditions for personhood 
or of how subjects are to be individuated. These questions need addressing and some 
crucial objections need to be tackled. 
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4: The Stream of Consciousness 
 
 
The Identity Thesis holds that we are, to put it simply, episodes of consciousness. In a 
nutshell the reasoning is as follows: if you are conscious of an experience (in the 
immediate, non-inferential way that we typically are)23 then you must be that 
experience, given that only the self-intimating experience (e) can be immediately 
conscious of e. We are not merely “conscious beings” (if this just means “beings who 
have conscious experiences”); rather, our being (our nature) is consciousness. This 
claim, however, is compatible with very different theories concerning our identity 
over time. Given that I am defending an experiential account of selfhood, the question 
of our persistence conditions will necessarily lead us into the infamously difficult 
terrain of temporal consciousness and its problems. Although a definitive solution to 
these problems cannot here be offered, a solid account can be defended that is both 
internally consistent and in accordance with our most basic intuitions concerning our 
moment-to-moment survival. It also necessitates a reinterpretation of The Identity 
Thesis and provides its successor with a robust framework for individuating selves.  
 
 
§4.1 Synchronic unity 
 
Before dealing with the relations between experiences across time it is helpful to 
become clear on the relations between the elements of any given experience in one 
moment. Happily, a claim can be made here that seems difficult to find fault with: 
namely that “[from] a phenomenological perspective, it is perfectly obvious that our 
typical streams of consciousness are unified at any given time” (Dainton, 2004b, 
p.368). In other words, there exists a synchronic unity within experience. As you read 
these words the various elements of your experience at any given moment - the look 
of the page, the sounds you are hearing, the thoughts you are entertaining - are all 
given together. Furthermore, this “unity or togetherness is itself something we 
                                                
23 We can, in a sense, be conscious of experiences that are not our own: if I observe someone laughing 
I can infer that they are in a state of happiness. In a sense I am therefore conscious of their experience. 
This is clearly not how we are conscious of our own experiences: we do not infer their existence - we 
are immediately conscious of them. 
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experience” (Dainton, 2004b, p.368). The evidence for these claims is 
phenomenological: focus on two seemingly distinct aspects of your current 
experience and notice that, firstly, they are given together and, secondly, that this 
unity is itself something you experience. To the second point, note that “there is 
something distinctive that it is like to experience these two experiences together, 
rather than separately” (Dainton, 2004b, p.368). Consider the following description of 
what it is like to smell coffee and listen to bird-song at the same time: 
 
There is something it is like to have the auditory experience, there is something 
it is like to have the olfactory experience, and there is something it is like to 
have both the auditory and olfactory experiences together. These two 
experiences occur as parts or components or aspects of a larger, more complex 
experience. And what holds of these two experiences seems to hold - at least in 
normal contexts - of all of one’s simultaneous experiences: they seem to be 
subsumed by a single, maximal experience. (Bayne, 2004, p.219) 
 
Dainton calls this ubiquitous relation “co-consciousness” and holds that, so long as 
we are performing a merely phenomenological investigation (i.e. remaining agnostic 
on the causal mechanisms involved in the production of consciousness), not much 
more can be said on this particular matter: such unity is a primitive feature of 
consciousness and can thus only be analysed up to a certain extent. As Dainton puts 
it: “[unified] states of consciousness simply consist of experiences related to one 
another by co-consciousness, and that is all there is to be said” (Dainton, 2004b, 
p.369). Arguably all theories must bottom out in some kind of primitive given or 
logical assumption, and the unity of consciousness at a time is one that we can 
certainly live with: we can verify it any time we care to focus our attention on the 
togetherness we experience constantly.  
 David Chalmers and Tim Bayne (2003) have offered an account of the synchronic 
unity of consciousness that differs, in certain respects, from Dainton’s approach. They 
offer strong arguments in defence of the following Unity Thesis (UT): 
 
Unity Thesis: Necessarily, any set of conscious states of a subject at a time is 
unified. (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003, p.24) 
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They provide the following reasonable account of the scope of their aims: 
 
Our central project will be to isolate a notion of unity on which the unity thesis 
is both substantive and plausible. That is, we aim to find a more precise version 
of the unity thesis that is neither trivially true nor obviously false … we aim to 
suggest at least that the thesis is plausible, that it captures a strong intuition 
about the nature of consciousness, and that there are no knockdown arguments 
against it. (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003, p.24) 
 
One way to attempt to account for the unity of consciousness is to appeal to the 
subject: if we isolate a set of experiences belonging to a certain subject, we can say 
that those experiences are unified in virtue of belonging to one subject. The problem 
with this approach is that this kind of synchronic unity is not merely primitive but also 
trivial and, as Bayne and Chalmers point out, as such “it cannot capture the intuition 
that there is some non-trivial way in which consciousness is unified” (Bayne and 
Chalmers, 2003, p.26). This desired notion, according to Bayne and Chalmers, is 
“subsumptive unity” (2003, p.26).  
 
 
§4.2 Spatial unity  
 
One way of elucidating subsumptive unity is by contrasting it with the other kinds of 
unity we find in consciousness. Synchronic experiences can sometimes be unified in 
terms of the object one is aware of: this occurs when two or more experiences are 
directed at the same object and experienced as such. This kind of unity, however, is 
quite clearly not sufficient for the task at hand: in holding a book in my hands my 
experiences of its shape and colour are object-unified but the distracting sound of an 
incoming email is clearly not, even if it is experienced simultaneously with the book. 
There is another kind of unity that we can identify here: although the email chime and 
book experiences were not object-unified they were, nevertheless, spatially so. The 
sound of the incoming email was not part of the same visual space, but it was 
experienced as occurring somewhere in my immediate environment: it was spatially 
unified with the book experience by being spatially related to it. The book was here, 
in my hands, and the email chime came from a metre or so behind it. Spatial unity is 
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an admittedly pervasive phenomenon: spatial relations “play a privileged role in our 
conception of what constitutes a unified physical world: we regard objects that are not 
related in any other way as belonging to the same universe if they are spatially 
related” (Dainton, 2004c, p.2). Sitting at my desk now I am experiencing a manifold 
of things that, despite being quite different kinds of things, enjoy spatial relations with 
one another. The feel of the chair on my body occupies a central location, my desk 
and computer are visually experienced as being a little way in front of my body along 
with the sounds of my typing, and a lawn mower can be heard in the distance. The 
spatial unity that we experience as a result of our unified physical world is a 
prominent part of our experiences.  
 However, there are reasons to doubt that spatial unity is necessary in order for 
synchronic unity to be present. Imagine the following thought experiment proposed 
by Dainton (2004c, p.3). You are put under a general anaesthetic, during which time 
your brain is removed from your head and placed in a vat with transceivers fitted to 
your nerve endings. Transceiver links to your body connect your brain to all of your 
usual bodily inputs except for sight and sound. These inputs will now come from an 
artificial head that is not connected to your body. You slowly wake up… 
 At first the transceiver-links are not turned on and, as such, you have no sense of 
spatial location. Without any sensory or perceptual experience you feel “distinctly 
disembodied” (Dainton, 2004c, p.3) and wait quietly with your thoughts. Your 
artificial head is now placed on a mountaintop and its transceiver-links are turned on: 
you can hear and see again. You immediately “feel yourself “transported” to the 
mountain environment” (Dainton, 2004c, p.3): you are looking down over a vast 
valley and you can hear the wind around you. You continue to take in the view for 
some time when you are suddenly met with darkness and silence again: the 
transceiver-links to your artificial head have been switched off. Now, the links 
connecting your brain and body are switched on: you can feel your body again, 
although you cannot see or hear anything. You move around and discover that your 
body is underwater. You explore your watery home for a while: swimming and 
bouncing over the terrain. Suddenly, your body disappears again: you have been 
disconnected. A moment later you are looking back over the valley from atop the 
mountain. This switching continues on: for some time you are gazing over the 
landscape, then you are swimming blind for an hour, and then back again etc. After a 
while you become “accustomed to perceiving the world from two vantage points; in 
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fact, you get used to existing (or so it seems) at two different locations” (Dainton, 
2004c, p.3). Dainton proposes yet another curious development… 
 We can suppose that this strange state of affairs is something you volunteer for as 
part of a philosophical inquiry into the nature of consciousness: the necessary 
technological advancements occur rapidly over the next couple of decades and, as part 
of a team of researchers, you attempt to tackle various problems by engaging in such 
experiments. Your current topic is the synchronic unity of consciousness and as such 
the following strategy has been devised in order to verify or falsify the spatial unity 
theory: both sets of inputs will now be turned on simultaneously. Your first set of 
experiences is confusing to say the least: visually you have the experience of gazing 
over a landscape yet when you move your body you feel as though you are 
underwater. After some time, you get used to having two sensory-fields instead of 
one: Dainton argues that each sensory-field would come to “constitute a distinct 
phenomenal space” (Dainton, 2004c, p.4). You would no longer have the 
phenomenological impression that these two different kinds of experiences were 
spatially related: your bodily experiences would seem to be occurring in one 
phenomenal space, and your audio-visual ones in another (Dainton, 2004c, p.4). 
Crucially, despite such a spatial fragmentation your experiences would remain fully 
co-conscious: you would still experience your visual and bodily content together. 
This, at least, is Dainton’s claim and it seems plausible. If this could happen then it 
seems that the synchronic unity of consciousness is not dependant on spatial unity. 
The crucial issue, then, is whether or not this could happen. We can certainly imagine 
such a scenario, but the move from conceivability to possibility is not a 
straightforward one. As we will see in §5.1 the method of thought experimentation 
has seen serious criticism directed at it - perhaps, then, we should be cautious of 
concluding too much from the intuitive responses such scenarios cause us to have. 
The following claims from Dainton, however, seem reasonable: 
 
This form of imagination may be a wholly unreliable guide to physical 
possibility, and a less than wholly reliable guide to logical possibility in general, 
but as a guide to phenomenal possibility - to the logically possible forms and 
combinations of experience - its deliverances are not to be scorned. After all, 
imagined experiences are experiences in their own right! It goes without saying 
that delusions, mistakes, misdescriptions and misjudgments are possible, in this 
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domain as in most others. But if a form of experience is clearly and vividly 
imaginable - if it can be unambiguously instantiated in the imagination - then in 
the absence of any counter-evidence, we have a good reason for thinking that 
this form of experience could actually occur. (Dainton, 2004c, p.8) 
 
There is a different problem that can be raised: accepting that such scenarios are both 
conceivable and a justifiable guide to phenomenal possibility, we might still want to 
disagree with Dainton’s interpretation of the phenomenology at play. Antti Revonsuo 
(2003) attempts just this and claims that there are good reasons to think that, instead 
of experiencing two distinct phenomenal spaces at once, the subject would either 
switch between these two different spaces intermittently or enjoy a kind of spatial 
superimposition. Such superimposition would result in a “very unusual phenomenal 
world” (Revonsuo, 2003, p.7), to say the least, but Revonsuo reworks Dainton’s 
thought experiment into a fairly convincing picture. As with before, your body is 
underwater and your surrogate head is perched on a mountaintop. The two channels 
of input connecting them to your brain are now activated simultaneously…  
 You are looking out over a valley from atop the mountain. At the same time you 
seem to have an invisible body and the space around you “seems to be filled with a 
cold, invisible liquid” (Revonsuo, 2003, p.7). You can move your body around and 
interact with various invisible objects but your viewing position remains the same: the 
invisible world seems to be moving in relation to the visible world (Revonsuo, 2003, 
p.7). As such, there is just one phenomenal space: “an audiovisual phenomenal space 
filled with transparent liquid moving in relation to your invisible body and the 
surrounding invisible objects” (Revonsuo, 2003, p.7). Imagining such a scenario takes 
some work but it does seem to be a coherent picture.  
 The problem for Revonsuo is that in order to defend spatial unity as necessary for 
the synchronic unity of consciousness, he must not only show that such a 
superimposition is possible but also that either it must occur or the subject’s 
awareness must switch between the two spatial fields intermittently. In other words, 
he needs to provide a convincing argument to the effect that it is impossible for a 
subject to enjoy co-conscious experiences that are spatially unrelated. This is much 




suppose that your eyes tell you that you are about two feet away from a tree. 
You reach out to touch it. However, instead of finding the expected bark and 
branches, your hand collides with what feels like a large slimy boulder. Your 
initial impression is confirmed by further tactile investigations, as is the total 
absence of anything that resembles - to your sense of touch - a tree. As you stare 
at the tree and its surroundings, trying (and failing) to discern some visual trace 
of the boulder that feels so solid beneath your touch, you see a squirrel 
approaching. It hesitates at the foot of the tree, but only for a moment, before 
running straight up the trunk. An hypothesis which until now had seemed quite 
promising - that the tree is embedded in and surrounded by an invisible boulder 
- has just been refuted. Squirrels can reach many hard-to-reach places, but they 
cannot pass through solid rock! (Dainton, 2004c, pp.6-7) 
 
In short “the single-space hypothesis is vulnerable to empirical refutation, the two-
space hypothesis is not” (Dainton, 2004c, p.7). As Dainton argues, you may at first 
have the impression that your visual experience and your sense of touch are connected 
to a single spatial area but as soon as you begin to investigate your surroundings this 
impression will likely dissolve: the hypothesis that there is only one spatial area 
simply does not make sense given your experiences (Dainton, 2004c, p.7). When it 
becomes undeniable that you are located in more than one region of space it seems 
likely that your brain will attempt to provide experiences that are commensurate with 
this (Dainton, 2004c, p.7). It is true that, having previously spent so much time 
navigating a spatially unified world we would be constantly, and sometimes 
successfully, trying to interpret these strange experiences as occurring in one unified 
space. But it does not seem obvious that we would always manage to do so (even if 
we were purposefully trying to). It also does not seem obvious that, in failing to do so, 
we must also fail to enjoy co-conscious experience at all. In short then, spatial unity 
does not seem necessary for our experiences to be unified in the way they usually are.  
The inadequacy of spatial unity is also suggested by less exotic scenarios: consider 
the previous example of being interrupted by the sound of an incoming email chime 
when looking at a book. The sense of frustration felt upon hearing the chime does not 
seem easily described as having any spatial relation to the sound (we will stipulate 
that the chime was sufficiently long in duration that the emotional response occurred 
when the sound was still present in experience). This is particularly true for more 
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pervasive, yet subtle, emotional experiences such as a general feeling of malaise that 
can colour much of one’s experience of the world without itself being the explicit 
focus of attention.  
 
 
§4.3 Subsumptive unity 
 
It seems, then, that neither spatial unity nor object unity can fully account for the kind 
of unity we find in experience. Having seen what the subsumptive unity proposed by 
Bayne and Chalmers is not we now need to offer a positive characterisation of it: “two 
conscious states are subsumptively unified when they are both subsumed by a single 
state of consciousness” (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003, p.27, original italics). Consider 
all of the visual experiences that you are having right now: on the subsumptive 
account these are all subsumed by a single state corresponding to your visual field 
(Bayne and Chalmers, 2003, p.27). Moving further out, as it were, your state of 
perceptual consciousness subsumes both your visual and auditory experiences and, 
further out still, “it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that there is a single 
encompassing state of consciousness that subsumes all of [your] experiences: 
perceptual, bodily, emotional, cognitive, and any others” (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003, 
p.27). Elaborating further, Bayne and Chalmers propose the following: 
 
We can think of this last encompassing state of consciousness, for a given 
subject, as the subject’s total conscious state. When it exists, a subject’s total 
conscious state might be thought of as the subject’s conscious field. It can be 
thought of as involving at least a conjunction of each of many more specific 
conscious states: states of perceptual experience, bodily experience, emotional 
experience, and so on. But what is important, on the unity thesis, is that this 
total state is not just a conjunction of conscious states. It is also a conscious 
state in its own right. If such a total conscious state exists, it can serve as the 
“singularity behind the multiplicity” - the single state of consciousness in which 
all of a subject’s states of consciousness are subsumed. (Bayne and Chalmers, 
2003, p.27, original italics) 
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In short, two phenomenal states are subsumptively unified when they have a “conjoint 
phenomenology”: “a phenomenology of having both states at once that subsumes the 
phenomenology of the individual states” (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003, p.32). There is 
something it is like for you to taste wine, and there is something it is like for you to 
hear your favourite song. When these two experiences have a conjoint 
phenomenology there is also something it is like for you to have them together. The 
two experiences are subsumed into a complex state and it is this that unifies them. 
Although this phenomenal unity is, as with Dainton’s synchronic co-consciousness, a 
primitive notion it is not trivial in the way that subject unity is. If a subject is in 
multiple conscious states then, clearly, the subject is in the conjunction of those states: 
this is trivial (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003, p.34). However, it is not trivial that “this 
conjunction will itself be, or be subsumed by, a phenomenal state … that there will be 
something it is like to be in the conjunctive state” (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003, p.34, 
original italics). Consider the idea of a subject whose simultaneous phenomenal states 
are only partially unified: experience x is phenomenally unified with experience y, y is 
phenomenally unified with experience z, but z is not phenomenally unified with x. As 
Bayne and Chalmers claim, “[one] might suspect (as we do) that such a scenario is 
impossible and perhaps incoherent” (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003, p.34). It is arguably 
impossible to even imagine what it would be like to be the subject of such a 
phenomenology. On the subsumptive view this is, in part, because there would not be 
anything it is like to be that subject, “or at least there is no single something-it-is-like 
that captures all the phenomenal states of the subject” (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003, 
p.34). In other words, there is no complex state into which x, y, and z are subsumed.  
 It is not, then, a trivial kind of unity: it makes a difference in a way that subject 
unity does not. The possibility of partially unified experience is an interesting one that 
would require more space than is available here in order to be adequately covered. It 
is enough to say, for now, that experiences of the kind we typically enjoy do indeed 
seem to be unified in the way that Bayne and Chalmers describe and that, 
furthermore, their notion of subsumptive unity is informative. Dainton has argued, 
however, that subsumptive unity is ultimately dependant on co-consciousness: 
 
If two experiences, E1 and E2, are co-conscious they automatically constitute a 
more complex experience W, and in virtue of this E1 and E2 are subsumed in W. 
And what goes for E1 and E2 goes for any collection of experiences that are all 
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mutually co-conscious. Looking at it from the other direction, if we know that 
W is a fully unified experience which subsumes the simpler experiences E1 and 
E2, we also know that E1 and E2 are co-conscious. And what goes for E1 and E2 
also goes for larger collections of experiences. (Dainton, 2006, pp.256-7) 
 
Furthermore, it seems that a subsumptive description will need to make reference to 
the co-consciousness of the subsumed experiences in order to give a full account of 
the phenomenology: 
 
Since the subsumptive relation applies outwith the phenomenal domain, to 
capture the manner in which [the maximal conscious state subsuming a 
collection of simpler experiences] M’s parts are unified, it won’t be enough 
simply to state that M’s lesser parts are subsumed within it, we also need to 
specify precisely how these parts are experienced as unified. And to do this we 
will need to point out that irrespective of how we divide M into parts, each and 
every one of the resulting parts is directly co-conscious with every other part: a 
relationship of immediately experienced togetherness binds all parts of M into a 
unified ensemble. As soon as we try to spell out what subsumption in the 
phenomenal domain is like as a mode of unity, co-consciousness quickly enters 
the picture. (Dainton, 2006, p.258, original italics) 
 
Ultimately, then, it seems that Dainton’s notion of co-consciousness is something we 
cannot do without. There is a further problem for the subsumption account: consider a 
total state (S) consisting of [e1, e2, e3]. On the approach offered by Bayne and 
Chalmers [e1], [e1, e2], and [e2, e3] are subsumed in the larger experience S. What of 
[e1, e2, e3]? This is not subsumed in a larger state but it is phenomenally unified. 
Subsumption does not seem to account for the unity of the state considered as a 
whole. One possible response is to claim that subsumption is reflexive, in which case 
the total state subsumes itself. However, this is arguably a somewhat artificial move 
and alters the usual meaning of the term.24 Synchronic co-consciousness, then, is 
responsible for the unity of conscious experience at a time. What of a set of 
experiences considered over time? 
                                                
24 With thanks to Barry Dainton for this point (personal correspondence). 
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§4.4 Temporal consciousness: the landscape of options 
 
There are good reasons to think that the very same relation of co-consciousness is 
responsible for the unity of experience considered in this sense as well: 
 
the diachronic unity of experience is no different, in essentials, from the 
synchronic: both are the product of co-consciousness. Just as simultaneous 
experiences such as a thought, a bodily sensation and a visual experience, can 
be experienced together, so can successive experiences, experiences occurring 
at different (but not distant) times. (Dainton, 2006, p.113) 
 
On this view, diachronic co-consciousness explains a feature of experience that we 
are intimately familiar with: its unity and continuity over time. The successive 
experiences that we enjoy throughout our conscious life seem to flow into each other 
seamlessly: together they form a stream of consciousness. Coining the phrase, 
William James put it as follows: 
 
Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 
‘chain’ or ‘train’ do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. 
It is nothing jointed; it flows. A ‘river’ or a ‘stream’ are the metaphors by which 
it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream 
of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life. (James, 1890, p.239, original 
italics) 
 
As with the unity of consciousness, the proposed stream-like nature of the succession 
of experiences is a phenomenological claim: it is a claim about how our experiences 
seem to us in having them.  
There are three possible responses to this claim: the first is to accept it and to 
further hold that conscious experiences really do flow uninterruptedly as they seem to 
(putting aside, for now, the question of dreamless sleep or other extended periods of 
unconsciousness). The second is to accept that although it seems continuous, the 
structure of experience is in fact quite different from how it appears. The third option 
is to deny the claim from the start and hold that if we pay closer attention to the nature 
of our own lived experience we will see that in fact it does not even seem to be 
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continuously flowing. Each view would subsequently give very different answers to 
the question of personal identity when consciousness and selfhood are as intimately 
related as The Identity Thesis states. It is important, then, to ascertain which view is 
most accurate. 
 Before delving into the technical and complex views that have been put forward in 
accounting for temporal consciousness, it is helpful to begin with the familiar and 
seemingly obvious: we directly experience change and persistence. On the 
obviousness of our ability to directly experience motion, Broad states it 
straightforwardly: 
 
There is no doubt that sensible motion and rest are genuine unanalysable 
properties of visual sensa. I am aware of them as directly as I am aware of the 
redness of a red patch, and I could no more describe them to anyone who has 
never sensed them than I could describe the colour of a pillar-box to a man born 
blind … The only way to find out whether a sensum does or does not have a 
certain quality is to inspect the sensum itself as carefully as possible. (Broad, 
1923, p.287)  
 
Albeit couched in terminology we have not been employing, these observations are 
(on the whole) convincing. A “careful inspection”, then, is what we now need to 
engage in. That we do, indeed, directly experience movement seems very difficult to 
disagree with: 
 
Consider some basic data. If I hold my hand in front of me and rotate it at the 
wrist, I see this rotation as clearly as I see my fingers: my hand’s movement is 
as much a part of the intrinsic phenomenal content of my experience as its 
colour, shape or size. Whenever we see movement, our visual experience has a 
temporal character; the content of such an experience is as much temporal as it 
is spatial … the succession of thoughts and perceptions is itself something we 
experience; the succession is not just a succession of experiences, it is a 
succession within experience. (Dainton, 2006, p.114) 
 
When we are engaged in a phenomenological inquiry into the nature of 
consciousness, putting aside questions concerning the causal mechanisms involved or 
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the relationship between mind and matter, we should allow the experiential data to 
dictate the theory. Building an increasingly abstract theory from solid, familiar 
phenomenological grounds invests its claims with reliability. In this sense, Dainton’s 
view concerning temporal consciousness is strong: that we directly experience change 
and succession is a highly intuitive starting claim. Slowly move your hand from the 
left to the right side of your visual field. Do you, firstly, see it on the left and, then, 
somewhere further to the right whilst merely remembering its being to the left? Do 
you infer that movement has occurred from the fact that your hand is now to the right 
in conjunction with your memory that it previously wasn’t? Not at all: you just 
directly experience its movement. A theory of temporal consciousness needs to 
account for this feature of experience, or provide a robust argument for denying it. 
Given the seeming obviousness of our directly experiencing change and succession, 
such an argument will need to be a particularly powerful one.  
 For anyone unfamiliar with the area it might seem strange that such an obvious 
feature of everyday experience could be the subject of disagreement. Other familiar 
features of our phenomenology are readily accepted: there may be a good deal of 
disagreement over the nature of colour, for example, but the fact that we 
straightforwardly experience it is not often denied. Yet the fact that we directly 
experience change and succession is arguably just as obvious. This contrast in 
acceptance can seem even more odd when we consider other less vivid, yet usually 
accepted, features of experience. Think of listening to a constant humming that 
gradually decreases in volume until it is barely audible. So long as it is, indeed, still 
audible realists about experience have no trouble accepting that the subject of the 
experience is immediately conscious of that feature of their phenomenology when 
attending to it, even though it has become a subtle one. Compare this with the starkly 
apparent movement of a car driving by you: the movement of the vehicle is a 
prominent part of your current experience. It is much more discernable for you than a 
dim humming noise. There are, of course, reasons for the lack of universal acceptance 
concerning the existence of this phenomenal feature. An important one is the 
following: the ability to be directly conscious of change and succession seems to 
entail that a conscious experience is not confined to the present instant - it can 
seemingly exist in two different moments at once. This entailment is, for some, reason 
enough to deny our ability to be directly conscious of change and succession. Thomas 
Reid encapsulates such a view when he claims that, “if we speak strictly and 
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philosophically, no kind of succession can be an object of either the senses or of 
consciousness; because the operations of both are confined to the present point of 
time” (Reid, 1854, p.235). 
  
 
§4.5 The Augustinian argument 
 
To set up the dichotomy in such a way is, however, to oversimplify. Before fleshing 
out the disagreements in adequate detail it is helpful to begin with a basic puzzle at 
the root of the philosophical problem of consciousness over time, hinted at by Reid 
above. The problem stems from the following line of thought: 
 
Augustine reasoned that the present has no duration whatsoever: evidently, what 
is present is neither past nor future; take any temporal interval, and make it as 
short as you like; not all of this interval can be present, because the initial part 
of the interval occurs before the later part; since the same reasoning applies for 
any finite interval, no matter how short, it seems that the present, strictly 
speaking, must be a durationless interface between past and future, between 
what was but is no more, and what will be but is not yet. (Dainton, 2006, p.120) 
 
If this were true it would follow that any conscious experience confined to the present 
has no duration whatsoever. Even if we focus only on the issue of experience at-a-
time, this alleged state of affairs is difficult to accept: how could there be anything it 
is like to experience x if the experience of x is “literally instantaneous” (Dainton, 
2006, p.120)? There would, quite factually, not be the time for it to register. Things do 
not get any more plausible for this view when we consider experience over time 
either: change and succession are precisely the kinds of things that require the passing 
of time. If our experiences were confined to an instantaneous existence it seems 
difficult to see how we might ever come to be aware of such things either directly or 
indirectly.  




There’s almost universal agreement that we don’t experience the present of 
experience just as a (moving) point or front in time that is itself temporally 
dimensionless, but as something that has an intrinsically temporally extended 
phenomenological character. (Strawson, 2009, p.249) 
 
Indeed, the bulk of the debate concerning temporal consciousness does not consist of 
a disagreement concerning whether or not experience seems to extend over time (as 
Strawson points out, this is nearly universally accepted) but over the relation between 
the subjective experience of time and objective time itself. To put it simply, the 
disagreement concerns the phenomenological mechanism responsible for our 
subjective experience of time. The point of broad agreement is fixed on what has 
come to be known as the “specious present”. William James characterised it as 
follows: 
 
the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a 
certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in 
two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a 
duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were - a rearward - and a forward-looking 
end. It is only as parts of this duration-block that the relation of succession of 
one end to the other is perceived. We do not first feel one end and then feel the 
other after it, and from the perception of the succession infer an interval of time 
between, but we seem to feel the interval of time as a whole, with its two ends 
embedded in it. (James, 1890, pp.609-10) 
 
Dainton also offers an elucidating description: 
 
Rather than being confined to a durationless instant, our direct awareness 
extends (or seems to extend) over a brief interval of time, the so-called 
“specious present”. The contents within these brief stream-phases are 
experienced together; think of what it is like to hear the successive rat-tats of 
machine gun fire, or to see a shooting star flash through the sky - the streak-like 
motion is experienced as a whole even though it extends over a short interval of 
time. (Dainton, 2012, p.187) 
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Dainton’s above bracketed qualification pinpoints the major disagreement: although 
both sides of the debate agree that we directly experience change (and persistence) 
and that our awareness therefore presently apprehends contents that are stretched out 
through objective time, not everyone accepts that it extends in the way that it seems 
to. Exactly how long the specious present lasts is difficult to ascertain, but it seems to 
be less than a second: click your fingers in quick succession five times. Depending on 
the speed of your clicking, two or three of these clicks were experienced together 
(albeit not simultaneously), whereas upon the last click the first one was present for 
you only as a memory, if at all. It is this brief duration of the experienced togetherness 
of non-simultaneous content that is the target of the term “specious present”. For 
some, the specious present is in an important sense an illusion: consciousness does 
not straddle a significant portion of time in the way it seems to. In turn, each of the 
two major sides of the debate has its own account of the structure of temporal 
consciousness: it is either “retentional” or “extensional”.  
 
 
§4.6 The extensional approach 
 
Dainton offers a concise summary of the major disagreement concerning how to 
account for the temporality of immediate experience: 
 
Extensional theorists take a simple and direct approach: they hold that our 
awareness (or consciousness) itself extends a short distance through ordinary 
objective time. Retentional theorists take a different tack: they hold that our 
awareness is confined within momentary (or very brief) episodes of 
experiencing, but they also hold that these momentary episodes of experiencing 
seem to extend over temporal intervals, and hence can contain change and 
persistence. The appearance of temporal depth is a direct consequence of the 
contents contained in a specious present. (Dainton, 2008a, p.625) 
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The extensional approach is, as Dainton notes, the simpler approach.25 The essential 
model is as follows. Consider hearing the notes C-D-E-F-G-A played on a piano in 
fairly quick succession. Suppose that your specious presents seem to last the length of 
two notes every time: C and D are given together in your experience, as C flows 
smoothly into D. We can represent the stretch of experience comprising this specious 
present as [C-D] and the following as [E-F]. There is something else that needs to be 
taken into account: you do not merely experience C flowing into D, and then E 
flowing into F. You also experience D flowing into E: your stretch of experience is 
continuously flowing in a uniform fashion - in other words the phenomenal content of 
D is diachronically co-conscious with that of E. We are in effect missing the specious 
present [D-E]. The retentional approach has its way of accommodating [D-E] but, as 
we shall see, faces considerable objections. The simpler approach, available to an 
extensional theorist and defended by Dainton (2006), is to hold that the stretch of 
experience comprising specious present [D-E] overlaps with its joining experiences. 
On this account, the stretch of experience comprising your hearing C-D-E-F-G-A is 
extended through objective time: specious present [C-D] shares its latter part with the 
beginning of the next specious present [D-E], and so on. We will look more closely at 
how well such an overlap model accounts for our experience of change shortly, by 
contrasting it with the problems faced by the retentional approach. For now it is 
enough to say this: accepting that experience extends through objective time, being 
comprised of overlapping specious presents, offers an attractively simple account of 
how we are able to directly perceive change and persistence.  
 One possible weakness with such an account is that it does not fully explicate the 
structure of the specious present: it bottoms out in the somewhat impenetrable 
(perhaps mysterious) notion of diachronic co-consciousness. This objection will only 
hold sway, however, if we have viable alternative theories that do in fact more aptly 
elucidate the phenomenological mechanism(s) at play. The retentional approach 
hopes to do just this but faces a host of problems. If these difficulties appear fatal then 
the simpler, if seemingly less informative, extensional account should be accepted. 
The claims of the retentional approach now need investigating. 
 
 
                                                
25 Dainton is far from alone in making a strong case for this approach: see Hoerl (2009) and Phillips 
(2010). 
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§4.7 The retentional approach 
 
A full analysis of the host of retentional accounts on offer is beyond our scope, but 
some general recurring claims and problems can be identified through tackling the 
theories of Edmund Husserl, whose work on the topic arguably represents “by far the 
most sustained attempt to describe and understand temporal awareness in the 
literature” (Dainton, 2006, p.150). Dainton provides the following general description 
of Husserl’s model: 
 
A stream of consciousness consists of a compact succession of momentary 
experiences. Each of these momentary experiences contains a representation of 
the preceding stretch of the stream. As one momentary experience gives way to 
another, these representations change in a systematic manner, such that 
phenomenal items seem to occur in the immediate present and then sink into the 
past … Each momentary experience comprises a momentary primal impression 
and a simultaneously apprehended sequence of representations, the retentional 
modifications of preceding primal impressions. (Dainton, 2006, p.151, original 
italics) 
 
To try and ground this rather abstract picture of things, it is helpful to apply it to an 
actual experience. Close your eyes for a moment and then quickly flash them open 
and shut again. Let’s focus on the brief moment of experience when you opened your 
eyes (time t): the visual experience of the environment before you was the “primal 
impression”. This had the natural sense of occurring in the present. For Husserl, at t 
there was also a representation of the preceding primal impression of the darkness you 
experienced when you had your eyes closed. This representation was neither a primal 
impression (it was not experienced as happening now) nor a mere memory: it was a 
retention and as such was presently experienced as having just happened. The same 
modifications occur in the next moment when you close your eyes again: your visual 
experience of the scene before you is modified into a retention (and thereby seems to 
have just happened) within your currently occurring primal impression of darkness 
which strikes you as occurring now.  
In short, we are made aware of change and succession despite our experiences only 
lasting for a very brief (though not instantaneous) amount of time: the mode of 
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presentation of the various contents of our experience systematically alters and results 
in the appreciation of currently occurring content fading into the past. As it stands 
Husserl’s model is, although not as simple as an extensional account can be, quite an 
elegant picture of things. However, the following concern forces further 
complications: we are not aware only “of the flow of content through our awareness, 
but we are also aware that our awareness is itself continuous” (Dainton, 2006, p.153). 
Recognising this, Husserl has to say something like the following with regards to your 
brief visual experience at time t: not only is the visual scene accompanied by a 
retention of your previous primal impression but that very retention is of the previous 
primal impression plus the retentions that it was harbouring. In other words, when you 
close your eyes again a moment after t it will not merely be the primal impression of 
the visual scene that will become a retention: the retention that was part of the visual 
experience at t will also be included in the retention of t’s primal impression. Add to 
this the fact that the retention at t is itself partly comprised of a previous retention and 
the complexity begins to show: 
 
A particular primal impression becomes first a retention, then a retention of a 
retention, then a retention of a retention of a retention, and so on, at each 
successive stage being conjoined with a new primal impression together with 
the new and intervening retentions … But individual primal impressions are not 
retained all by themselves in successive acts; they are retained along with all the 
retentions … that they were originally apprehended with. This entire complex 
undergoes successive modifications in the succeeding momentary experiences. 
(Dainton, 2006, p.154, original italics) 
 
Such complexity is not necessarily in itself a problem: the simple experience of 
briefly opening your eyes and closing them again is presumably produced by an 
astoundingly complicated set of processes in the brain, despite our ignorance of them 
(from the first-person perspective). Perhaps it is also in part produced by an 
accompanying phenomenological mechanism of the complex kind that Husserl 
proposes - one that we are typically not explicitly aware of. This might be acceptable 
- given the theoretical gains - if such a mechanism holds up under closer scrutiny. 
However, Dainton highlights a number of problems facing such a model that do call 
its accuracy into question.  
 101 
 The first concerns the immediacy of our awareness of change: 
 
Since primal impressions are momentary, there can be no awareness of change 
or continuity here, for the familiar reason that a succession of impressions is 
distinct from an impression of succession. (Dainton, 2006, p.155) 
 
Husserl does not want to claim that primal impressions are extended through any 
significant amount of time (only that they are not literally instantaneous). This is 
precisely why he needs to invoke the retentional mechanism in order to account for 
our awareness of change. The upshot of this however, is that “whatever direct 
awareness we have of phenomenal duration and continuity is located in the retentional 
matrix, rather than at the level of primal impression” (Dainton, 2006, p.155). The 
problem now is the contrast entailed between those things we are made aware of 
through primal impressions and those that we are only aware of through the 
retentional matrix. It is not clear, to return to our real world example, that your 
awareness of change is less direct or immediate than your awareness of the darkness 
you experience when your eyes are closed. Consider the change from darkness to 
light. The change itself is, of course, not a visual object that you can hold in your 
gaze. But it is an immediate and significant part of the overall character of this stretch 
of experience. Husserl’s model requires that there be less immediacy: the character of 
your visual experience is largely indebted to the primal impression, whereas your 
awareness of change only comes about owing to the changing status of retentions. 
This does not seem to accurately reflect the phenomenology: change is as 
immediately present for us as visual content is.  
 A more general concern for Husserl’s account (and, perhaps, any retentional 
model) is the intelligibility of retentions themselves. What are they, exactly? How do 
they do the work afforded them by the theory; how do they present things as having 
occurred in the “just-past of our current experience” (Dainton, 2006, p.155) rather 
than merely represent them as having occurred in the past, as memories do? The 
following charge seems reasonable: 
 
Husserl is stipulating that retentions have precisely the properties they need to 
have for his purposes. Although they occur in the present, they directly intend 
the immediate past, the past and nothing else … Husserl tells us what retention 
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is not [i.e. either primal impression or memory], and what it does, but provides 
no explanation as to how it accomplishes this. (Dainton, 2006, pp.155-6, 
original italics) 
 
Dainton’s own account can be attacked in a (somewhat) similar way. The role that co-
consciousness plays in accounting for our experience of change and succession can be 
accused of solving the problem whilst still remaining somewhat mysterious. 
However, even if this accusation is fair, Dainton’s model does not bring in the sort of 
complexity we see in Husserl’s and, on this point, scores points for theoretical 
parsimony (all things being equal). Furthermore, and more importantly, a retentional 
framework such as Husserl’s carries further serious problems that do not arise for an 
extensional model. This allows us to judge the two competing views using more 
concrete criteria than theoretical elegance. 
 Dainton names these two key problems “lingering contents and the clogging of 
consciousness” (Dainton, 2006, p.156). In a nutshell, the lingering contents problem 
is this: 
 
According to Husserl … momentary experiences enjoy their moment of full 
consciousness, then slip away, becoming less and less present before finally 
fading altogether - only then, after they have left direct awareness altogether, 
can they appear in the guise of ordinary memory. This does not seem to happen. 
Contents depart from immediate experience cleanly, leaving no residue, and 
become immediately accessible to memory. (Dainton, 2006, p.157) 
 
Dainton’s point seems both hard to disagree with and seriously damaging to the whole 
retentional enterprise. Knock once on a hard surface nearby. Is there any 
phenomenological sense in which the noise you make becomes gradually less and 
less present? Not at all: it is there, and then it isn’t. It is immediately present in your 
awareness and then it is gone, save for a memory that you may or may not choose to 
attend to. The sound of the knock can be described as becoming objectively less and 
less present, in the sense that its time of occurrence is increasing further into the past 
as each moment occurs. But this abstraction has little do with the phenomenological 
claim that Husserl is committed to: the sound of the knock should be becoming less 
and less subjectively present, i.e. gradually less and less present in your awareness. 
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This description does not fit the data: the knock is phenomenally present for you and 
then it is nothing but memory. As Dainton remarks, the lingering contents problem “is 
of an almost embarrassing naivety, given the sophistication of the theories under 
discussion, but it is certainly serious” (Dainton, 2006, p.157). 
 The clogging of consciousness issue is also no less serious. Recall that, on 
Husserl’s view, it is not just the foregoing primal impression that is retained, but 
much more: 
 
We retain not only the past primal impressions, but our preceding total states of 
awareness. The latter include not only retentions of the primal impressions 
which preceded them, but the total states of awareness and their retentional 
complexes, with these retentions themselves containing retentions of previous 
total acts and their retentions, and so on. (Dainton, 2006, p.157) 
 
Husserl is stuck on the horn of a dilemma: he must either deny that we are aware of 
the continuity of our experience, or posit a highly complex network of retentions in 
order to account for such an awareness. Either option lands him in 
phenomenologically suspect waters: we are aware of the continuity of our experience 
but we are quite clearly not aware of such a dense network of content within our 
phenomenology. The deeper issue is obvious: we are meant to be conducting a 
phenomenological investigation into the nature of continuity within consciousness, 
but retentional models such as Husserl’s seem to leave the primary data behind. As 
Dainton remarks: 
 
The account Husserl provides of the most elemental feature of consciousness is 
a purely theoretical construction going far beyond the phenomenological data. 
The theory seeks to explain how our experience is possible, but it does so by 








§4.8 Continuity questioned 
 
A simpler and truly experience-based approach such as Dainton’s extensional account 
is much harder to accuse of such a move. However, Galen Strawson’s account of 
consciousness through time seeks to do just this when he argues that in fact 
consciousness does not even seem continuous, if we look carefully. He claims that 
when he is alone and thinking “I find that my fundamental experience of 
consciousness is one of repeated returns into consciousness from a state of complete, 
if momentary, unconsciousness” (Strawson, 1999a, p.18, original italics). To clarify: 
 
Even if it’s true that an experiential episode always prompts or conditions its 
successor in some way, it certainly doesn’t follow that there’s always some sort 
of experienced sense of connection, conditioning, continuity, or flow. On the 
contrary. Sometimes the experience is one of a complete break, an inklingless 
cut. (Strawson, 2009, p.233) 
 
Strawson’s first claim seems right: there does not seem to be a necessary entailment 
of experienced continuity from prior prompting or conditioning. His second point also 
seems reasonable when considering the flow of thought, which is often erratic: 
“thought has rather little natural phenomenological continuity or experiential flow, if 
mine is anything to go by” (Strawson, 2009, p.234). The processes of thinking 
through a problem, of conceptualising some state of affairs or of narrating our 
experience to ourselves seem often to involve “inklingless cuts” in a sense: moments 
where our train of thought is stopped in its tracks, replaced by another (related or not) 
concern. Dainton agrees but adds the following: 
 
The observation that our thinking is usually fragmented, full of detours and 
dead-ends, is quite compatible with the claim that there is continuity elsewhere, 
most notably in perception, mood and bodily feeling, which together constitute 
the bulk of our experience. (Dainton, 2006, p.118) 
 
In order for Strawson to secure the experience of a “complete break” in consciousness 
he needs to claim that more than mere thought is discontinuous: the phenomenal 
background ought to be disrupted. This is a much harder claim to defend. Moving, 
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ironically quite seamlessly, from thought alone to experience considered as a whole 
Strawson claims that “a positive sense of complete if momentary absence is often part 
of the phenomenology” (Strawson, 2009, p.238) and fleshes this out as follows: 
 
The situation is best described, it seems to me, by saying that it is as if 
consciousness as a whole is continually starting or restarting. The basic 
experience of consciousness is not that there is continuous flowing 
consciousness subject to various small vicissitudes of apparent disconnection, 
lapses and doglegs and hiatuses. The basic experience, however much it is 
smoothed out of attentional awareness in everyday life is, I propose, one of 
tightly packed but non-seamless series of radically disjunct episodes. The 
process of consciousness keeps bursting silently out of nothingness, even as it 
maintains strong contentual continuity from burst to burst, as it so often does … 
(Strawson, 2009, p.238, original italics) 
 
As is often the case with Strawson, his re-assessment of a long-standing view is both 
excitingly disorientating and honest: he accepts that perhaps his own consciousness is 
unusual or that he may be confusing occasional introspectively caused discontinuity 
with the more ubiquitous kind. To the latter charge he concedes that he has “no reply 
to the objection that I may just be wrong about this” (Strawson, 2009, p.239). It is 
obviously not sufficient, however, to merely claim that Strawson may be mistaken. If 
Strawson is able to account for why experience might seem continuous to some 
people (when in fact it isn’t), then he is in a strong position: unlike a defender of 
continuity Strawson would be able to take the phenomenological claims of both sides 
at face value and offer an explanation for the error of his opponents. Thus, Strawson’s 
version of the retentional approach now needs considering. 
 Recall that in the retentional approach: 
 
phenomenal unity (or co-consciousness) is confined to the simultaneous 
contents possessed by momentary episodes of experience, i.e. the contents of 
individual Retentional specious presents; contents in different specious presents 
are never unified in this way … The Retentionalists’ confinement of co-
consciousness to momentary states inevitably fragments our streams of 
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consciousness - for, in effect, each specious present is an entirely discrete 
episode of experiencing in its own right. (Dainton, 2012, p.204) 
 
This picture of things, if accurate, provides Strawson with a powerful reason for his 
claim that - for some people at least - consciousness is not experienced as 
fundamentally continuous. It is composed of discrete episodes: why shouldn’t this fact 
be available to careful phenomenological inspection? However, he cannot have it both 
ways: if we are to give credence to his claim that careful phenomenological 
inspection, for him, reveals “inklingless cuts” in his consciousness, then he needs to 
tackle the opposing - orthodox - view that consciousness can seem continuous both 
typically and when we are engaged in a phenomenological investigation. The first 
part of this opposing claim is perhaps relatively easy for him to deal with: it can seem 
continuous because a good deal of what we are conscious of (i.e. our surrounding 
environment) is continuous, which thereby flavours the character of our experience in 
such a manner. But even if this line of thought can be successfully developed, the 
latter part of the claim remains: for many of us, when we purposefully engage in 
phenomenological inquiry we are met with a seeming continuity that cannot so easily 
be dismissed. If our consciousness really is composed of very brief periods of 
experience, self-contained and not experientially connected to their neighbours 
directly, then why does experience seem continuous in the way it does upon 
examination? Strawson has a somewhat ingenious response to this question.  
 It will help to ground this discussion in a concrete example. Imagine hearing 
someone sing the familiar refrain “Do-Re-Mi-Fa-So-La-Ti-Do” in ascending notes 
with no silence in between words. For the sake of simplicity we will concentrate on 
your auditory experience alone, and stipulate that your specious presents comprise the 
length of two syllables every time. Reflect on the fact that when you hear such a 
sequence each note is experienced as flowing directly into its successor with no break 
in phenomenal continuity. This is, for most of us, an accurate description of how it 
seems: the experience of “Do” flows seamlessly into “Re” which then flows 
seamlessly into “Mi”. There is not a hint of disruption or discontinuity in the on-going 
flow of experience - despite the recognisable beginning of a new syllable each time. 
An extensional approach such as Dainton’s provides a straightforward reason for this 
impression: our consciousness really is flowing uninterruptedly owing to diachronic 
co-consciousness. More fully: it is flowing uninterruptedly - and experienced as such 
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- owing to the overlapping of specious presents whose content is phenomenally 
unified by diachronic co-consciousness. Take the first specious present in this 
sequence: your auditory experience of “Do-Re”. “Re” is heard together, albeit not 
simultaneously, with “Do”. Dainton can now hold, owing to his account being of the 
extensional kind, that the tail-end of this first specious present overlaps with the 
beginning of the next specious present “Re-Mi”. Given that “Re” is diachronically co-
conscious with “Mi” we now have unbroken phenomenal continuity stretching for 
longer than a single specious present. Strawson cannot make this move: his “units” of 
experience are self-contained pulses which raises the following problem: 
 
If diachronic phenomenal unity is confined to the contents within individual 
specious presents, and never bridges the gap between distinct specious presents, 
how could the successive brief phases in a stream be experienced as flowing 
into the next in the way they seem to be? Doesn’t the experiencing of 
uninterrupted flow - experience of the sort that we enjoy all the time - require 
phenomenal unity to run from one specious present to the next? (Dainton, 2012, 
p.205) 
 
Strawson has an answer: there is a duplication of content that, from the first-person 
perspective, provides the illusion of continuity. To return to our (admittedly 
simplified) example, Strawson can claim the following: the first specious present 
covers “Do-Re” and the second “Re-Mi”. Although there is no phenomenal link 
between the two specious presents the subject has the experience of “Do” flowing into 
“Re” and then “Re” flowing into “Mi” and the illusion of a continuous flow occurs. 
We have seen this duplication of contents previously in the work of Husserl, but 
Strawson puts it to further use: it explains why, for some people, consciousness does 
not even seem continuous if studied carefully. It is possible, he claims, to catch a 
glimpse of such breaks. There is, however, a serious problem for this kind of view. 
On the difference between the retentionalist and extensionalist interpretation of such 
sequences Dainton poses the following issue: 
 
If we view experienced successions solely in terms of types of qualitative 
content (or phenomenal character), then the two sequences are largely 
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equivalent. But if we focus instead solely on the interrelations between token 
experiences, they are quite different. (Dainton, 2012, p.205, original italics) 
 
With this in mind, a serious objection can be raised against Strawson’s account: 
 
If one hears “do-re-mi”, isn’t it perfectly clear that the “re” which is 
experienced as following directly on from “do” is the same token experience (or 
the same instance of auditory content) which one experiences as flowing into 
“mi”? As far as I can see, few features of our experience are more obvious than 
this. (Dainton, 2012, p.207) 
 
We do not experience a duplicate of “Re” flowing into “Mi”: we experience “Do” 
flowing into the very same content that then flows into “Mi”. It is not that we 
experience a “Re”-type content flowing from “Do” and into “Mi”: we experience 
“Re” flowing from one to the next, i.e. that very same “Re”-token. Furthermore: 
 
Precisely the same considerations apply to stream-phases which are of different 
apparent durations, e.g., a third or a quarter or a tenth of the duration of the 
specious present … again, such successions can only be accommodated in 
Retentional models in fragmented and abbreviated form: no such succession can 
extend beyond the confines of an individual specious present … Reflect again 
on the continuous character of ordinary perceptual experience, of how each 
brief phase flows into its successor in the same kind of way. To put it simply, 
the Retentional approach is incompatible with the homogeneous character of 
phenomenal succession. (Dainton, 2012, p.208, original italics) 
 
It seems, once again, that a retentional account cannot do full justice to the basic facts 
of our phenomenology. As Dainton remarks on Strawson’s unusual approach: 
 
He has correctly appreciated that the Retentional model breaks our streams of 
consciousness down into innumerable entirely discrete fragments. My guess is 
that most earlier Retentionalists did not fully appreciate that their conception of 
temporal experience has this consequence. (Dainton, 2012, p.209) 
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Dainton’s extensional account clearly faces no such difficulty: overlapping specious 
presents, whose content is glued together by diachronic co-consciousness, neatly 
explain the flow of consciousness. As Dainton himself notes, “in the debates to come 
the Extensional approach may not hold all the aces, and it may not ultimately prevail, 
but it does at least start with several distinct and significant advantages” (Dainton, 
2008c, p.383). This seems a fair and reasonable evaluation of the situation. There is 
also another advantage not yet discussed: Dainton’s account of temporal 
consciousness is in line with the intuitive judgements we are inclined to make when 
thinking through thought experiments concerning personal persistence.  
 
 
§4.9 From temporal experience to personal persistence 
 
A good deal has been written on the topic of personal identity and thought 
experiments. Part of the literature consists in an attack on the very method of thought 
experimentation, within the topic of personal identity but also in philosophy at large.26 
The concern is succinctly summarised by Dan Zahavi when he asks us to consider if 
“our imagination [is] always trustworthy, does it always attest to metaphysical 
possibility, or might it occasionally reflect nothing but our own ignorance?” (Zahavi, 
2005a, p.4). Our inability to answer him with any strong certainty has led some to 
hold that such a mode of inquiry is best used merely as an auxiliary method for use in 
scientific discoveries (whose claims can then go on to be verified or falsified): 
 
Being by nature a speculative enterprise, philosophy benefits from non-
speculative input, such as empirical facts and theories. Science, on the other 
hand, being testable and less speculative, seems to benefit from speculations 
such as thought experiments … since philosophy is speculative by its very 
nature, one should not make it more speculative by concocting recherché 
thought experiments. On the contrary, one should try to find an antidote: try to 
make philosophy more empirical, for instance. (Peijnenburg and Atkinson, 
2003, p.318) 
 
                                                
26 See Wilkes (1988) for a particularly spirited attack on the reliability of thought experiments in the 
context of personal identity. 
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The concern behind such a position is understandable and, without wading into the 
grand task of determining what exactly philosophy should or should not be, it is not 
difficult to agree that empirical facts can serve a philosophical theory better than 
thought experiments. The problem, however, is that in certain areas of inquiry it is not 
clear which empirical facts will be of relevance until a certain amount of philosophy 
has already been done. In areas such as this it would be questionable to deny oneself 
the use of all of the tools at one’s disposal: conceptual analysis, phenomenological 
investigation and, sometimes, thought experimentation. The problem of personal 
identity seems to be exactly such an area. It would certainly be rash to rely entirely on 
the intuitions triggered by thought experiments, but it would perhaps be equally 
unwise to ignore them altogether (particularly if they are very powerful intuitions). 
Dainton illustrates this balanced approach when he claims that “thought experiments 
have a legitimate but limited role to play in our investigations into our own nature” 
(Dainton, 2008b, xviii). This legitimacy has two aspects: firstly, the believability of 
the theory and, secondly, our privileged perspective on the subject matter under 
investigation. To the first aspect Dainton argues the following: 
 
A typical human life is woven from several different strands, some organic, 
some mental. Even if in reality these modes of continuity are not separable, by 
considering imaginary cases in which they do come apart we may be able to 
learn something about those elements of our lives we regard as most essential to 
our survival. If we can effortlessly envisage surviving a procedure which 
eliminates one specific continuity, we have grounds for supposing that this 
continuity will not feature in a readily acceptable account of what our 
persistence requires. If, on the other hand, we find it impossible to imagine 
ourselves surviving such a rupture, we have grounds for supposing the opposite. 
If we want a believable account of our persistence conditions, an account in 
which we can recognize ourselves, then it would surely be foolhardy to ignore 
evidence such as this. (Dainton, 2008b, p.4) 
 
It is hard to find fault with these claims. If a seemingly empirically supported theory 
identified a person’s most essential self with their left earlobe we would, quite rightly, 
find it hard (perhaps impossible) to take its conclusion seriously. There are of course 
theories whose empirical support trumps their counterintuitive claims: it does not 
 111 
matter if we can no longer clearly recognise the concept of “time” in the context of 
relativity theory. We allow the evidence to dictate our beliefs. With the issue of 
selfhood, however, things are not quite so straightforward: revisionary theories in this 
domain are acceptable but become less convincing the more they redescribe our 
nature in such a way as to make it unrecognisable to us. Just why we should give 
credence to believability in this domain above others has to do with our privileged 
position: “[we] are, after all, entities of an unusual kind: we are beings with 
consciousness and self-consciousness, and as such we have a unique perspective on 
what our existence and persistence involves” (Dainton, 2008b, p.4). Dainton is quick 
to acknowledge our fallibility in this respect in noting that, for one thing, 
introspection does not even inform us of the existence of the brain, but argues that 
such “inside knowledge” is valuable and “inevitably going to inform our intuitive 
responses” (Dainton, 2008b, p.4). Such a balanced approach to the issue seems 
reasonable. At the very least we can say this much: if The Identity Thesis finds its 
claims regarding consciousness over time to be in tune with thought experiment-
induced intuitions, then this stands in its favour given our status as self-conscious 
beings. We are now in a position to consider what The Identity Thesis should say 
concerning the nature of the self over time. Having followed Dainton so far, with 
regards to the Simple Conception of experience, the nature of temporal consciousness 




5: The Ephemeral Self 
 
 
§5.1 Intuition pumps 
 
The primary aim of thought experiments within the literature on the problem of 
personal identity is to identify which kind (or kinds) of continuity is necessary and 
sufficient for the continued existence of a self. Broken down into its bare essentials 
the method is simple: a scenario is devised in which one (or more) of our typical 
continuities is disrupted and the intuitions provoked by considering the case are used 
as evidence for or against a particular theory of personal identity. In a nutshell: if we 
can easily and clearly imagine surviving the disruption of a particular kind of 
continuity then we have good reason to believe that this kind of continuity is not 
essential to our continued existence, i.e. that it is not part of our essential nature. 
Thought experiments of this kind are “intuition pumps” and, often, openly so: they 
seek to prod our intuitions and take lessons from the results. Dennett, coining the 
term, has argued that such a method is seriously unreliable and open to significant 
misuse: 
 
The most influential thought experiments in recent philosophy of mind have all 
involved inviting the audience to imagine some specially contrived or stipulated 
state of affairs, and then - without properly checking to see if this feat of 
imagination has actually been accomplished - inviting the audience to “notice” 
various consequences in the fantasy. These “intuition pumps,” as I call them, 
are often fiendishly clever devices. They deserve their fame if only for their 
seductiveness. (Dennett, 1993, p.282) 
 
He warns us to be vigilant for “the sleight of hand that misdirects the audience” 
(Dennett, 1993, p.282) and, in this sense, Dennett’s use of the phrase “intuition 
pump” seems to be targeting only misleading (perhaps purposefully so) thought 
experiments. However, useful and honestly constructed thought experiments can also 
quite naturally be described as “intuition pumps”. The key, then, is not to avoid such a 
method altogether but to ensure that it is properly executed. This, according to 
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Dennett, means ensuring that the proposed feat of imagination “has actually been 
accomplished”. As we will see, one way to ensure that this occurs is to take care to 
provide all of the relevant information. When the thought experiment concerns 
personal persistence, then, this means that all of the relevant continuities should be 
considered.  
 A significant number of the scenarios that have been developed in this field have 
failed to do just this. Broadly speaking, the most popular theories of personal identity 
in this context defend either a physical or a psychological account of our persistence 
conditions. As such, their scenarios specify physical and psychological kinds of 
continuities and attempt to show which one is essential to our nature, i.e. that the 
disruption of only one of them necessitates personal death. But, as we have seen, there 
is a third kind of continuity that might be highly relevant to personal persistence: 
phenomenal continuity. As will become clear in fact, there is a strong case to be made 
for phenomenal continuity as the most intuitively compelling guide to personal 
persistence, when it is actually specified in the description of the imagined scenario 
(Bayne & Dainton, 2005). Just why this kind of continuity has been so neglected in 
the literature is an interesting question, to which there may be a host of intermingling 
answers. One part of the answer will undoubtedly owe itself to the historical progress 
of the field: the structure of this particular strand of the debate began as physical 
versus psychological continuity when John Locke (1975) dismissed the usefulness of 
the soul in accounting for personal identity, and has thus developed along these 
(increasingly nuanced) lines. To see how the debate is both significantly changed and 
improved with the introduction of phenomenal continuity, it will be helpful to start 
with a simple thought experiment. 
 Suppose that right at this instant, for some unknown reason, both yourself and the 
current President of the United States become unconscious and that, furthermore, 
during this period of unconsciousness your entire psychological nature (your 
memories, your beliefs, your dispositions, your preferences etc.) is swapped with the 
psychological nature of the President. Upon gaining consciousness, one person has 
the memory of having just been reading a thesis on consciousness and selfhood, only 
to find themselves waking up surrounded by concerned secret service agents and 
medical staff in the Oval Room. The other person has the memory of having just been 
engaged in a discussion with the White House Chief of Staff, only to find themselves 
waking up in a strange room with an unfamiliar document in front of them describing 
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this very scenario. Which of these two people do you most intuitively identify as 
being yourself? Whatever the fact of the matter (if, indeed, there is one) the person 
waking up in the White House will, as is stipulated, believe that they are you: they 
have all of your memories and beliefs.  
 As it stands, this thought experiment is an intuition pump of the less desirable kind 
identified by Dennett. For one thing, a sleight of hand occurred in the very first 
sentence when the scenario was described as a swapping of psychological natures. 
Although this is not as egregious a case of question begging as it would have been if 
the scenario had been described as a “body-swap”, it is still guilty of skirting over an 
important issue: intuitively, a future psychological state belongs to me if it is 
connected to my past psychological states in the right way. Normally, this means 
being causally connected by being instantiated in the same brain. In the swapping 
scenario this typical causal picture is absent. If we add this consideration into the 
scenario it becomes less clear how relevant the memories and beliefs of the person 
waking up in the White House are. Although they would be similar to your previous 
memories and beliefs they would also be very different: they would not have been 
connected to your previous ones in the usual causal way. This muddies the waters 
considerably in terms of the intuitive support a “body-swap” scenario can demand.  
 Paraphrasing Dennett, there is a further problem with the scenario as described: 
has the invited feat of imagination actually been accomplished? Have you really 
imagined that your entire psychological nature has been swapped (or duplicated)? 
When you entertain the stipulation that your entire psychological nature is now 
instantiated in the person waking up in the White House, how do you do so? 
Probably, you have merely imagined that you have woken up in the White House: you 
have conceptualised the scenario from the first-person perspective as shorthand for 
imagining that your entire psychology has been duplicated. If this is how you thought 
through the scenario then it would not be surprising if you were to conclude that, 
intuitively, the person waking up in the White House is you: this was precisely what 
you were imagining. This is not to say that employing the first-person perspective in 
such a domain is to be avoided, only that we need to be careful how we use it.  
  At present, then, this thought experiment appears to be the kind of intuition pump 
from which we should avoid drawing conclusions: it does not seem obvious that we 
are in fact able to clearly imagine the scenario in a non-compromising fashion. 
Further to this, if we remove the sleight of hand and openly stipulate that the 
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psychological continuity involved is no longer of the typical kind, causally speaking, 
then the direction our intuitions should pull us in becomes much less clear. If 
suddenly, unbeknownst to anyone, the normal causal mechanisms governing reality 
ceased to exist and were replaced with random occurrences that just so happened to 
make the world continue on in its seemingly typical way, should we regard our 
identities as shattered owing to the strange new causal mechanism responsible for our 
psychological lives etc.? It is not obvious whether we should or not. In short, a 
thought experiment of the kind detailed above seems to do very little to ease the 
worries of anyone who is pessimistic as to the usefulness of such a method in this 
domain. There is a simple way, however, of addressing both of these serious 
problems: we can redescribe the scenario in such a way that it provokes a powerful 
and convincing intuitive response without the use of any sleight of hand and, 
crucially, in a clearly imaginable way. This can be done by introducing the kind of 
continuity we saw in the previous chapter: phenomenal continuity. 
 
 
§5.2 Streams and intuitions 
 
In order to let phenomenal continuity do its work we need to alter the sort of scenario 
we have been considering in one important way, for reasons that will become clear 
later. This time, suppose that there is no break in consciousness and that, instead, as 
you are reading these words a blindingly white light appears. You close your eyes but 
the light is still enveloping you. Your body and the surrounding world have receded 
into unconsciousness: you cannot feel or hear anything and your thoughts have 
ceased. You are aware only of the silent light and remain so for some time. Your 
stream of consciousness before, during and after this period is as it normally is: 
continuous. Each phase of your experience flows smoothly into the next in an 
unbroken stream. At some point in this meditative state the previously stipulated 
psychological changes occur immediately and without phenomenal trace.27 Thoughts 
now begin to creep back in and you hear some faint noises. You open your eyes. Are 
you in front of this document or are you in the White House? It is arguably unclear: 
you have the same criteria to go on as in the previous envisaging of the scenario. 
                                                
27 The believability of this stipulation is increased if you consider how few of your innumerable 
memories and beliefs are present in your current experience. 
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There is one piece of information, however, that will immediately fix your intuitive 
response: a description of the visual experience you have upon leaving the meditative 
state. If it is stipulated that you open your eyes and see this document then, 
intuitively, it seems that a brainwashing has occurred. If, on the other hand, it is 
stipulated that you open our eyes and see the inside of the Oval Office then, 
intuitively, it seems that a body swap has occurred. Crucially, our intuitions follow 
phenomenal continuity: we feel that we go with our stream of consciousness.  
 This version of the scenario certainly seems readily imaginable: although unusual 
events are occurring the set of experiences you are described as undergoing are easily 
conceivable. Furthermore, the unusual causal mechanisms do not produce the 
uncertainty that they did previously. However, Dennett and other like-minded critics 
would be quick to point out that this version of the scenario is not free from sleight of 
hand either: in describing the stream and visual experience as yours I have begged the 
question. This, then, needs remedying. Referring back to Dainton’s account of 
temporal consciousness in the previous chapter, consider the following: 
 
The claim that experiences within a typical stream of consciousness are bound 
together by purely phenomenal relations has solid phenomenological support. 
We do not need to look beyond the phenomenal to determine which experiences 
belong to which streams: simultaneous experiences are ‘co-streamal’, part of the 
same stream, only if they are related by synchronic co-consciousness; non-
simultaneous experiences are co-streamal only if they are diachronically co-
conscious, either directly, i.e., they occur within a single phenomenal present, or 
indirectly, i.e., they are part of a chain of overlapping specious presents. 
(Dainton, 2004b, p.379) 
 
As we saw, this account of temporal consciousness faired much better against its rival 
retentional views. A straightforward implication of the above is that the same subject 
possesses any two experiences if they are co-streamal. If a subject has the experience 
x, and x is diachronically co-conscious with experience y (either by occurring within a 
single specious present or as part of an overlapping chain) then the subject of x must 
also be the subject of y.  
 With this terminology in place we can redescribe the thought experiment in a non-
biased way. Consider you current experience, x, and the subject of this experience, s. 
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As per the thought experiment, x now flows seamlessly into y: an experience of white 
light. This continues to flow on for some time, each phase of whiteness directly 
connected with the next by diachronic co-consciousness and the overlapping of 
specious presents. At some point the set of qualitatively identical experiences of light 
flow into the novel visual experience, v, which is had when s opens their eyes. It is 
clear that v is had by the same subject or self that previously enjoyed x: there was no 
gap in the intervening chain of diachronically co-conscious specious presents 
comprising the stream of experiences from x through v. In other words, if you were 
the subject of x then it follows that you are the subject of v. If it is then stipulated that 
v is a visual experience of this document then the scenario appears to be a kind of 
brainwashing. As strange a scenario as this may be (which sees you staring at this 
document with confused Presidential thoughts running through your mind) the 
intuition that you have survived the psychological change is hard to resist if you have 
seriously engaged with the proposed phenomenology: so long as we stipulate that the 
subject of x remained conscious throughout, it is clear that the self goes with the 
stream. Dainton puts the point forcefully: 
 
Try to imagine a scenario in which your stream of consciousness flows on in an 
ordinary straightforward fashion but fails to take you with it. The notion that 
one could be left behind in this way seems absurd, as absurd as supposing one 
could cease to exist without ever losing consciousness. Suppose you have been 
granted the power to experience moving in any way that you desire, at any 
speed, in any direction. It is easy to imagine oneself finding out what it would 
be like to zoom backward or forward across time, or to shoot across to the other 
side of the galaxy in a matter of seconds, or to slide into other dimensions or 
parallel universes. Can you imagine picking up so much speed that you find out 
what it is like to leave your stream of consciousness behind? If you think you 
can imagine what it would be like to do precisely this, are you sure you are not 
just imagining extending your current stream in some unusual way? (Dainton, 
2008b, p.26, original italics) 
 
To put it frankly: phenomenal continuity wins the intuition war. So long as it is 
specified in the thought experiment we can imagine enjoying all kinds of ruptures (be 
they psychological or physical) whilst remaining in existence. Dainton has 
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impressively defended the pre-eminence of phenomenal continuity in this area 
through a series of thought experiments concerning virtual reality. It seems reasonable 
to predict that their power will only increase in tandem with the virtual reality 
technologies that are just now beginning to enter public awareness. Given the efficacy 
of these thought experiments, and the undeniable damage they do to theories of 
psychological continuity in particular, it will be useful to examine them closely.   
 Virtual reality technology is currently in what could be described as its infancy: the 
upcoming competitors in the gaming market essentially consist of special headsets 
that deliver visual and audio input for its user. Surround sound headphones simulate 
the virtual sound space, and two screens inside the headset produce images for each 
eye, rendering a three dimensional world to be looked at. Head-tracking technology 
brings these aspects together to form a powerful impression: upon hearing a noise 
behind you, for example, and turning your head around to see its cause, the images 
are produced in accordance with the movement of the headset and give rise to the 
impression that you are surveying a real three dimensional environment. In effect you 
have the sense that you are situated somewhere other than your living room: games 
designers have remarked that the key to delivering a convincing experience is to instil 
a sense of “presence” for the gamer, a concept that is entirely novel to the industry. 
Despite its relative simplicity the effect that such technology can have on its user is 
powerful. In large part this has to do with the importance of our visual experience in 
engaging with the world and, happily, this is seemingly one of the easier systems to 
trick.  
 It does not seem unreasonable to suppose, however, that - should the technology 
prove commercially successful and its capabilities continue to improve - we may one 
day see the arrival of a virtual reality system that bypasses such crude mechanisms 
that require being strapped to our bodies: information could instead be directly fed 
into the brain of the participant. Whether or not this will be achievable in reality is 
difficult to predict owing to its dependence on the progress we make in two domains: 
in our theorising about the brain’s production of consciousness and in our 
technological achievements. That being said, it does not seem - on the face of it - to 
be a nomological impossibility, so long as we assume that consciousness arises from a 
physical process. We will follow Dainton’s terminology and call this virtual reality of 
the second degree, or VR-2 (Dainton, 2008b, p.14). If such technology is sufficiently 
powerful the world presented to the user would seem as real as the one you currently 
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inhabit. Should a cruel trick be played on someone whereby they were connected to a 
VR2 program whilst asleep, they would be none the wiser as to the virtual nature of 
their bedroom upon regaining consciousness. VR2 is, in effect, a science-fiction 
version of the Cartesian Evil Demon. Although a VR2 user’s environment is merely 
virtual his or her experiences are as real as ours. So too are their memories and beliefs 
etc. We are currently comparing the strength of phenomenal continuity against its 
rival psychological accounts and as such we now need to consider what Dainton calls 
“virtual reality of the third degree, or VR-3” (Dainton, 2008b, p.15). In this 
admittedly much more complex process, VR-3 participants not only have their real 
environment replaced by an illusory world but also their own psychologies. For an 
extended but finite period the subject will have all of their own beliefs, memories and 
personality traits replaced with artificial ones. Quite what such a transformation 
would be like to undergo is difficult to know, but it is certainly a process we can 
envisage surviving (so long as it is stipulated that the subject continues to enjoy an 
unbroken stream of experience throughout). Dainton offers a particularly believable, 
elucidating and tantalising description of what it might be like to undergo a VR-3 
experience, and as such it is worth restating in full: 
 
By way of an illustration, let us suppose that you have long been an aficionado 
of VR-2 adventures and you decide to take another trip. Having always been 
fascinated by the Second World War, you opt to spend a week as a WW2 
submarine commander. If you choose the VR-2 option, you retain your current 
memories and personality traits; if you choose the VR-3 option, your current 
memories and personality traits are wiped from your brain (and stored in the 
computer’s memory) and your brain is furnished with an entirely different 
psychology, of the kind a typical WW2 submarine commander might well have 
had. Since you have already been on several VR-2 vacations, you choose the 
VR-3 option and its promise of a far more immersive experience. You are 
connected to the machine, the technician tells you the program is about to begin, 
and as the echo of his words fades, you find yourself on the windswept deck of 
a submarine at sea, the freezing salty spray lashing your face as the surprisingly 
small vessel courses through the heavy sea - there is no trace of your previous 
environment, or the VR-3 machine. For a few moments you feel surprised by 
this sudden transition, and the entirely realistic character of the illusion, but then 
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a sailor speaks to you, and you find yourself replying, and any sense of 
passively witnessing a life-like illusion disappears: you are soon completely 
absorbed by the task in hand, your previous life utterly forgotten. A week later, 
while in the midst of dealing with a serious depth-charge attack, you find 
yourself transported from your command post in the bowels of your shuddering 
submarine to the quiet of what seems to be a warm bed. After a few moments of 
bafflement, you remember everything. Your original memories, beliefs and 
personality are back in place, you remember the sudden transition to the deck of 
the submarine as the program began its run, and everything that has happened 
over the past week - and remembering the damp, the cold, the terror, the 
adventure of it all, you decide it was worth every penny. You have not only 
looked through the eyes of a submarine commander - a VR-2 simulation would 
provide that - you have experienced what it was like to be one. (Dainton, 2008b, 
pp.15-16, original italics) 
 
The above scenario presents a serious problem for a psychological theory of personal 
continuity: your psychological traits were wiped from your brain during your 
adventure. On a psychological account either you did not exist during the virtual 
reality experience or you were in some sense only alive as the psychological 
information being held in the memory banks of a computer. Either option seems 
difficult to believe - particularly so if you have successfully imagined the above 
scenario, given that your stream of consciousness was stipulated as continuous 
throughout. You were talking to a technician, and then this experience flowed directly 
into a somewhat bewildering experience of being at sea.  How could your stream of 
consciousness have continued on in such a way without you continuing on with it?  
 That there could be such a drastic change in psychology without a corresponding 
interruption in phenomenal continuity seems highly plausible. Consider how few of 
your memories and beliefs are currently impinging on your experience in comparison 
to the vast collection from which you can, at any one moment, choose to recall or be 
guided by. The independence of phenomenal continuity is perhaps at its most evident 
during meditative stretches of experiences: for many, the purpose of meditation is to 
quieten the mind - to stop our incessant inner monologue. Allowing all of one’s 
thoughts to dissipate and refraining from actively conceptualising is difficult, but 
many claim to be able to accomplish it. Such psychologically barren moments give 
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way to reportedly pleasant experiences of peace and calm: there is no reason to think 
that phenomenal continuity has been disrupted in the slightest. 
 An influential argument against the use of thought experimentation needs 
examining: merely redescribing such events can alter the intuitive response we feel 
when imagining them. Bernard Williams (1970) argues that the response elicited from 
a thought experiment can be altered by changing the narrative perspective from the 
third person to the first person. This is, quite clearly, an issue that needs dealing with 
as “it would seem to be a fundamental problem in the design of an experiment if the 
result of the experiment was totally dependent on the perspective of the observer” 
(Coleman, 2000, p.63). The results of scientific experiments are supposed to hold 
independently of the observer’s perspective: if the relevant data changed depending 
on where the observer was located, such an experiment would need re-evaluating. In 
actual fact, Williams’ highlighting of this issue ultimately serves the phenomenal 
approach. It neither detracts from the usefulness of thought experimentation in this 
domain, as some have claimed, nor does it work towards strengthening the physical 
approach, as Williams claimed. To see why this is so, we need to look at the kind of 
thought experiment that Williams was dealing with.  
 This was in fact a “body-swap” thought experiment of the kind we detailed earlier: 
all of your psychological traits are swapped with those of another person. For many, it 
seems that should this occur then they would go with their psychology: the person 
waking up in the White House, recall, has all of your memories and beliefs - they will 
think and behave like you. A convincing story can be told eliciting such an intuition. 
Williams, however, contends that an equally strong story can be told that does the 
opposite: 
 
In Williams reconfiguration of the ‘mind swap’ experiment (somewhat 
paraphrased), person A is told that he will be tortured tomorrow. This prospect 
obviously fills him with dread. Then he is told that he has nothing to fear, for 
when the time comes for him to be tortured, he will not remember being told 
about it beforehand, nor indeed will he be able to remember anything that he 
knows now, he will have total amnesia. Williams states, correctly I believe, that 
person A would not find this statement reassuring. Then person A is told that 
when the time comes for him to be tortured, not only will he have total amnesia, 
but certain changes will be made to his character, and [sic] have new 
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‘memories’ as well, that correspond to those of another fictitious person. 
Williams suggests that person A would not be reassured by this either. Finally, 
person A is told that the memories and character traits which will be implanted 
into his brain will be copied from the mind of another person who is alive today, 
and that this will be accomplished by means of a machine to which both person 
A and the ‘memory donor’ will be connected. This still will give person A no 
reason to not fear the torture, Williams states. (Coleman, 2000, p.61) 
 
As has already been argued, however, an important piece of information has been left 
out of both narratives: the relations between the experiences of each person. Once we 
specify these details our intuitions become locked in: the person “follows” their 
stream of experiences (Bayne & Dainton, 2005). This intuition is irresistible so long 
as it is stipulated that each subject remains conscious throughout the transformation. 
Crucially this is true regardless of the perspective employed: if described from the 
first person perspective, where you experience a flow of experiences, then it seems 
obvious that your survival is determined by your stream of experiences. However, 
even if we switch back to the third person perspective of the original narrative and 
describe the events merely in terms of any given subject undergoing experience x 
flowing into y and then z, our intuitive response favours phenomenal continuity. This 
also remains the case even when emotive techniques are employed: if you are told 
that tomorrow your body will be subjected to horrifying torture but that, prior to this, 
your stream of consciousness will have been miraculously instantiated in the brain of 
a peaceful sunbather it seems likely that you will remain free from fear (if you believe 
both claims). So long as it is made clear that your current stream of experiences will, 
without rupture, continue on elsewhere it is difficult to feel anything other than 
sympathy for the conscious being who will be inhabiting your body during the 
torturous acts.  
 It seems, then, that when phenomenal continuity is specified in the description of 
the scenario our intuitive responses are left unaffected by a change in perspective. As 
such, the unreliability of thought experiments cannot be argued for along these lines. 
Furthermore, such considerations stand in favour of phenomenal continuity: it is the 
only kind of continuity that remains unscathed by redescription, which gives us 
reason to think that it is the most reliable guide to personal persistence.  
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In short, it seems that it is impossible to imagine ourselves separating from our 
currently occurring stream of consciousness. Although it would be unwise to deduce 
too much from our inability to imagine such an occurrence, it is an incredibly 
powerful intuition that should not be ignored. As Dainton succinctly puts it: “[for] an 
account to be maximally plausible, the identity-conferring relationship should be such 
that if it holds between an earlier self X and a later self Y it is impossible for us 
seriously to doubt that X and Y are one and the same” (Dainton, 2008b, p.24, original 
italics). This is exactly what we seem to have arrived at: if subject X and subject Y sit 
at two ends of an uninterrupted stream of consciousness then it is impossible to 
seriously doubt that X and Y are one and the same self.  
 
 
§5.3 The Exhaustive Constitution Thesis 
 
These considerations put pressure on The Identity Thesis. Recall that we are 
individuating experiences by character, time and material basis. The Identity Thesis 
holds that the subject of experience x is identical with x. Experience x at t1 and its 
neighbouring experience y at t2 are different experiences even if they share a common 
part and - on The Identity Thesis - therefore different subjects. Yet, as we saw, it is 
highly plausible to suppose that directly co-conscious experiences belong to the same 
subject. There are three possible responses to this dilemma should we wish to accept 
that The Exclusivity Argument makes an accurate claim regarding our nature. I will 
consider them in order of plausibility from the weakest to the strongest.  
 The first option is to appeal to the notion of “partial identity”. Lewis (1993) and 
Armstrong (1989) have both appealed to such a concept in other areas, but it might be 
applicable to our current concerns. Consider a stream of partially overlapping total 
experiences: e1-e2, e2-e3, e3-e4, e4-e5. We want to account for the numerical identity of 
the subject of e1-e2 with the subject of e2-e3 whilst remaining committed to the 
following claims: firstly; every experience necessarily has a subject, secondly; every 
experience has only one subject, thirdly; there is no distinction between an experience 
and its subject (this is The Identity Thesis), and fourthly; co-conscious experiences 




1. e1 has as subject, e2 has a subject etc. 
2. e1 and e2 are diachronically co-conscious and hence have the same 
subject: s1 
3. e2 and e3 are diachronically co-conscious and hence have the same 
subject: s2 
4. Given The Identity Thesis s1 is identical with e1-e2 and s2 is identical 
with e2-e3 
5. s1 and s2 partially overlap, and are therefore partially identical 
 
This account allows for the claim that co-conscious experiences have the same 
subject: e2 is had by both s1 and s2 but, owing to the fact that both of them are in part 
constituted by e2, they are not entirely distinct: they are partially identical. The entire 
stream of which e2 is a part consists of a maximal series of partially identical subjects. 
This view is not entirely dissimilar from Strawson’s: our lifespan is significantly 
shorter than we tend to think it is but we are not, as with Strawson, isolated pulses of 
experience - we are partially identical with later and earlier subjects in the same 
stream of experiences.  
 This is an interesting option but it does not appear particularly convincing in light 
of the foregoing discussion concerning our survival and its relation to our stream of 
consciousness. We saw that, if my stream of consciousness continues on 
uninterruptedly, then I seem to go with it in an undiluted fashion. The conscious being 
at the end of the stream of experiences is not partially identical with me: it is me. I 
survive; I do not “partially survive”. At least, this was the intuitive reaction to such 
thought experiments.  
 The second possible response is more promising: there is a reasonable sense in 
which, if diachronic co-consciousness runs right through a series of overlapping 
specious presents, this stream of experiences can be described as one (rather long) 
experience. This becomes slightly more palatable to the ear when we consider the 
intrinsic dynamism of any given experience: it is always flowing from its earlier parts 
into its later parts, however minutely it is demarcated. An experience is a process: an 
experiencing. In order to defend this picture we would need to deny that a maximal 
experience is the totality of directly co-conscious phenomenal content, and extend this 
description to include indirectly co-conscious content, i.e. the entire stream. If the 
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stream as a whole is one experience, and an experience has only one subject, then the 
problem appears solved. 
 Dainton himself considers this issue: 
 
I will regard any experiential component of a stream of consciousness as ‘an 
experience’. A complete momentary cross-section of a stream is an experience, 
the complete content of a stream over a given interval is an experience, any 
combination of co-occurring contents within a stream is an experience … A 
typical stream of consciousness can be divided into particular experiences in 
many different ways. Although some divisions are more well founded than 
others, I will not assume that there is any one best way of dividing a given 
stream into its constituent parts. (Dainton, 2006, p.23) 
 
The question arises, then: why divide it at all? Obviously, one simple answer is that it 
is useful to do so: it allows us to analyse the structure of experience and communicate 
clearly with each other about particular aspects of a stream of consciousness. Perhaps 
there are benefits from not dividing it, however, and taking a stream of experiences to 
in fact be “one experience”. Tye (2003) argues just this but there are issues with 
taking such a stance: in terms of the problem of the unity of consciousness, it is not 
clear just how informative it is. Dainton presents a powerful case against Tye’s view 
that such a “one experience” account dissolves the problem. Tye claims the following: 
 
the proposed view best accounts for the facts of unity at a time and unity 
through time. Nothing that we ordinarily say about experience needs to be given 
up. No large bullets need to be swallowed. The view is clear and simple; and it 
explains in a compelling way why the problems of unity for experience seem so 
intractable. Begin with the assumption that there are individual experiences 
somehow bundled together by a phenomenal unity relation to form an 
overarching experience and you will find yourself either supposing that 
phenomenal unity is something unique and basic about which you can say 
nothing else at all except that it bundles experiences together to form a unified 
consciousness, or you will join Hume in confessing that the problem is too hard 
to be solved. The latter course of action at least has the virtue of candor, but the 
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best strategy, it seems to me, is simply to give up the assumption. (Tye, 2003, 
p.107)28 
 
We have followed Dainton in his defence of such experiential unity: we saw 
arguments to the effect that co-consciousness is a real (and experienced) connection 
that exists between our experiences, and found the account highly plausible. For Tye, 
such a project results in no more than the stipulation that phenomenal unity is 
“something unique and basic about which you can say nothing else at all” except that 
it “bundles” experiences together. It is true that co-consciousness is only analysable 
up to a certain point, but Tye’s pessimism seems unwarranted. The following point 
from Dainton goes some way to addressing this: even if I suppose that my current 
stream of experience(s) is in actual fact just one experience, it is still composed of 
parts and, crucially, “even if these parts are not individual experiences, they are 
nonetheless unified in a distinctive way, and the question of what unifies them 
remains very much alive” (Dainton, 2006, p.253, original italics). Instead of asking 
how my visual experience is unified with my auditory experience, I can ask how my 
visual phenomenal region is unified with my auditory phenomenal region (Dainton, 
2006, p.253). Ultimately, it seems that the “one experience” view simply ignores the 
problem that co-consciousness attempts to solve. Further to this, it is not clear that it 
helps with the current issue either. The reasons for this lead to our third option. 
 Whether or not we identify a brief period in a stream of consciousness (t1-t2) as an 
experience or as a phenomenal region of one long experience, it remains the fact that 
the experience/region at t1-t2 is distinct from the experience/region at t2-t3 or t3-t4. 
Another way of putting the issue is this: a stream of experiences (or one long 
experience) cannot exist all at once, i.e. at the same moment in time. It is in the nature 
of a stream of consciousness to exist over time, and to have temporal phases. Our 
third option now presents itself. 
                                                
28 His reference to Hume concerns the following passage: “In short there are two principles, which I 
cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct 
perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among 
distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the 
mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou’d be no difficulty in the case. For my part, 
I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. 
I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more 
mature reflections, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions.” (Hume, 
2007, p.400, original italics) 
 
 127 
 Our earlier analysis of the structure of temporal consciousness points the way 
forward: Tye’s desire to identify a stream of experiences as one experience is 
understandable in the context of the unity that such streams possess. Streams of 
experiences are not random collections of experiences: they consist of parts that are 
fully unified by synchronic and diachronic co-consciousness. Each and every part is 
connected either directly or indirectly to each and every other part, and as such a 
stream of experiences is a unified whole. Its parts are not all directly co-conscious, 
owing to the limited range of diachronic co-consciousness, but it is nevertheless a 
fundamentally unified whole. What, then, is the relationship between these 
experiential wholes and ourselves? Given the implausibility of the partial identity 
view, the intimate relationship we have to our experiences as entailed by The 
Exclusivity Argument, and the highly plausible view that co-conscious experiences 
belong to the same subject there is only one obvious route to take: we are identical 
with our streams. 
 On this view, we are not in fact identical with the experiences that comprise a 
stream of consciousness, as The Identity Thesis holds: these are merely temporal parts 
(or phases) of the stream-as-a-whole with which we are identical. We are, in effect, 
adopting the “perdurance” view of persistence, to use the terminology of Lewis 
(1986). Perdurance accounts hold that material objects are not wholly present at 
particular points in time: they have temporal stages and are more accurately 
conceived of as processes, or events, than “things” or substances that move through 
instants of time. In short: we are not the kind of beings that can exist in their totality 
all at once. 
 Such an account clearly clashes with our everyday self-conception: I do not have 
the impression that what I am is not wholly present right now. I feel that I am fully 
present at any given moment of my life, even though I undergo considerable 
psychological and physical change throughout it. There are three important points to 
say in response to this: the considerations of §1, §2, and §3 have shown that there are 
good reasons to think that we are fundamentally mistaken in our usual way of 
thinking about ourselves. It is not surprising, then, that further implications would go 
against our pre-theoretical notions of the self. This is a revisionist account and, as 
such, we should expect to learn new and surprising facts concerning our identity, if its 
premises hold.  
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Secondly, the perdurance view of identity fits well within the context of our 
current scientifically informed picture of reality. As with most questions of 
significance there is still an on-going debate in the literature and no clear winner has 
been crowned, but the currently popular Block View of space-time is a frontrunner. 
Briefly put, the Block View holds that “now” is not particularly special: all moments 
of time in our universe (including our own relative past and future) share the same 
level of reality. As a result, our conception of objects as spatial entities that exist fully 
at any given moment and move through instants of time is mistaken. Instead, objects 
are spatiotemporal in nature: they are extended through space and time. As such, an 
object has temporal parts in just the way that it has spatial parts: an object does not 
exist in its entirety all at one point in space - it stretches over a spatial region. 
Similarly, an object does not exist in its entirety all at one point in time - it stretches 
over a temporal region. Taking consciousness seriously, and regarding it as a 
spatiotemporal existent, means that we should say the same thing regarding a stream 
of consciousness. 
Thirdly, the perdurance view can allow us to be consistent in holding both that 
there is no ontological gap between a subject and its currently occurring experience 
and that co-conscious experiences are consubjective. This requires a modification of 
The Identity Thesis. The Exclusivity Argument seemed to force our acceptance of a 
subject (s) as identical with its experience (e) through the following reasoning: 
 
P1. e is self-revealing (e is not revealed to a distinct awareness) 
P2. e is revealed to s (s is conscious of e) 
P3. an experience cannot be revealed to x if x lacks any form of awareness 
P4.  given P3: e is not revealed to an x lacking any form of awareness 
P5. given P2 and P4: s cannot be an x lacking any form of awareness, i.e. s 
possesses awareness 
P6. given P1: s’s awareness cannot be distinct from e 
C. s is e 
 
Given that the argument appears valid and that we saw strong reasons to accept P1 
and P2 in §1 and §2, we cannot give up P6 and its essential entailment regarding the 
relationship between a subject and its experience. The conclusion, however, can be 
reinterpreted in the light of the perdurance account of identity. On this view, the 
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subject of a total co-conscious experience (e) existing at t1-t2 is constituted by that 
experience during that interval of time. This is not to say that the subject is in part 
constituted by e during t1-t2, as would be the case if we took the subject to be the 
human being considered as a whole: this is not what the The Exclusivity Argument 
entails. Instead, this means that during t1-t2 the subject of e is exhaustively constituted 
by e: there is no gap between the subject and its experiential episode in that period of 
time. In place of The Identity Thesis, then, we have what I will call The Exhaustive 
Constitution Thesis: 
 
For any total co-conscious experience (e) occurring at t1-t2 for a subject (s): 
 
P1. e is self-revealing (e is not revealed to a distinct awareness) 
P2. e is revealed to s (s is conscious of e) 
P3. an experience cannot be revealed to x if x lacks any form of awareness 
P4.  given P3: e is not revealed to an x lacking any form of awareness 
P5. given P2 and P4: s cannot be an x lacking any form of awareness, i.e. s 
possesses awareness 
P6. given P1: s’s awareness cannot be distinct from e 
C. s is exhaustively constituted by e 
 
Thus, The Exhaustive Constitution Thesis - in conjunction with the previous account 
of temporal consciousness - brings us to the following conclusion: the subject of 
experience x is identical with the stream of diachronically co-conscious experiences 
of which x is a part. In other words, you are identical with the currently occurring 
stream of experiences of which you are (non-inferentially) aware. We can call this 
The Stream Thesis. On this view, an experience lasting the length of a specious 
present constitutes only a brief phase of a subject: the maximal series of partially 
overlapping total experiences constitutes the subject as a whole.  
 What of our natural impression that we are fully present at any given moment? In 
one sense, this needs to be given up - along with our natural sense that typical 
material objects are fully present at any given moment. This is forced on us by the 
perdurance account of identity over time. There is also, however, a sense in which 
The Stream Thesis can do justice to this impression. The brief phase of a subject that 
exists during t1-t2 is present in the way that only experiences can be: it is 
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phenomenally present. The phenomenal content of your current experience is fully 
present: it is difficult to even imagine what its being partially present would be like. 
Although at any given moment the subject considered as a whole is not fully present 
(a stream of consciousness is simply not the kind of thing that can exist in this way), 
the phase of experience constituting the subject at that moment is present in both 
senses of the word: it exists now, in this brief period of time, in its entirety and is also 
experientially manifest.29  
 Of the three options available to us in accepting the spirit of The Identity Thesis, 
restructuring it into The Exhaustive Constitution Thesis and accepting The Stream 
Thesis appears by far the strongest: it accepts the highly plausible view that co-
conscious experiences are consubjective. We have seen strong arguments in support 
of such a view and The Stream Thesis accepts it without resorting to questionable 
metaphysical moves: instead of attempting to adopt the strange notion of partial-
identity we can commit to the straightforward notion of part-whole identity. Instead of 
trying to sweep the problem under the carpet simply by labelling a stream of 
experiences “one experience”, we are able to account for the consubjectivity of 
different, but suitably related, experiences. The metaphysical move into the 
perdurance view is easier to defend: it shares its claims with the widely accepted and 
empirically supported Block Theory of space-time. It is not, then, a terminological 
sleight of hand. There is, however, an arguably more fundamental problem that arises 
if we adopt The Stream Thesis and it is therefore important to deal with it in detail. 
  
 
§5.4 The Bridge Problem 
 
We have, then, an account of our identity and persistence conditions. There is more to 
be said, on the relationship between the human being we typically take ourselves to be 
and the stream of consciousness that we really are, for example, but a basic picture 
has emerged. Selves (of our kind) are self-conscious, self-intimating streams of 
experience. An immediate and obvious problem arises: what of the gaps that do occur 
                                                
29 It is also worth mentioning that if diachronic co-consciousness was not as limited as it is (i.e. if our 
specious presents were longer), then larger phases of a stream of consciousness would be 
phenomenally present in the way described above. In other words, our seeming confinement to brief 
intervals is not due to a genuine brevity in our lifespans - we exist for as long as our streams do - but to 
the range of the diachronic co-consciousness relation. 
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in the experiential life of a typical human being? Diachronic co-consciousness and 
overlapping specious presents guarantee that so long as we remain conscious our 
streams are free from gaps. But what of periods of unconsciousness, such as the 
dreamless sleep we undergo each night? Diachronic co-consciousness, either of the 
direct or indirect kind, cannot reach over these unconscious periods: there is no 
phenomenal bond between the last section of a stream before dreamless sleep and the 
first experience upon waking. Two streams of experience that have no phenomenal 
continuity between them are just that: two numerically distinct streams. Dainton calls 
this “The Bridge Problem” (Dainton, 2008b, p.27). If The Stream Thesis is true, if you 
are identical with the conscious stream that you are currently (non-inferentially) 
aware of, then you cannot also be identical with a different stream.  
 On this account dreamless sleep would not merely be the metaphorical death found 
in poetry, but a literal one: you would cease to exist the moment you became 
unconscious, never to reappear. This might be tonight when you drift into dreamless 
sleep, but it might well be sooner than that - if you were to suffer a swift bang to the 
head or take a nap! We can call this admittedly radical conception The Ephemeral 
Self. On this view, it is an ephemeral self in the standard sense that it can be very 
short-lived, but typically it is ephemeral in the sense that an ephemeral insect or plant 
is: it lives for about a day.  
 I do not wish to claim that such an account has never before even been considered. 
David Chalmers, for one, mentions this kind of view in a footnote: 
 
There is a view … on which we … survive during a single stream of 
consciousness but not when consciousness ceases. On this view, we may … 
survive from moment to moment but perhaps not from day to day. I do not 
endorse this view, but I am not entirely unsympathetic with it. (Chalmers, 2010, 
p.61) 
  
Such a view has not, to my knowledge, been endorsed or defended in any significant 
sense. I hope to address this in two fundamental ways: firstly, by showing that there is 
a (perhaps surprisingly) solid line of reasoning that results in such a view, if certain 
premises are granted. I have begun this task in §1, §2, §3 and §4 but there is more to 
say on the matter. Secondly, I will seek to defend the position against what is perhaps 
its most fundamental weakness: its counterintuitive claims concerning personal death. 
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I hope to show that Chalmers is right in not being “entirely unsympathetic” towards 
such a view. 
 
 
§5.5 The “experience” of sleep 
 
Perhaps, however, we have been too quick to lessen our lifespan in such a way: we 
have, so far, simply assumed that dreamless sleep amounts to unconsciousness. As we 
saw in a previous section this is the default view of many contemporary theories of 
consciousness: 
 
Consciousness consists of inner, qualitative, subjective states and processes of 
sentience or awareness. Consciousness, so defined, begins when we wake in the 
morning from a dreamless sleep and continues until we fall asleep again, die, go 
into a coma, or otherwise become “unconscious”. (Searle, 2000, p.559) 
 
It is certainly an intuitive position to hold, but there are those who question it. If a 
good case can be made for the notion that a form of low-level consciousness always 
accompanies dreamless sleep then The Stream Thesis would have the tools to 
overcome The Bridge Problem: if such a low-level consciousness were of the same 
continuous kind that we enjoy during our waking hours, then there would be no need 
of any bridge as there would be no gap to cross. For this reason, it is a possibility 
worthy of investigation. Ramesh Kumar Sharma (2001) offers an intriguing argument 
along just these lines. He begins by identifying the undeniable differences between 
wakeful consciousness and dreamless sleep: “while we are aware of being awake 
when we are awake, we are not aware of being asleep when we are asleep” (Sharma, 
2001, p.210). We can think about what it means to be awake when we are in such a 
state, and we can report this fact to other people: we can do neither with regards to the 
state of sleep when we are asleep (Sharma, 2001, p.210). Having said as much, he 
goes on to suggest the following: 
 
although there is no awareness, during sleep, of being asleep, there is perhaps 
… an experience of sleep - an experience, that is, of what sleep is like - that 
occurs, and can occur, only during sleep. What I wish to say is that although it 
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is only in waking that the phenomenon of, say, the meaning of sleep can 
become the object of conscious thought, this thought about it, irrespective of the 
theorizing to which it may lead, cannot become a real and significant possibility 
unless we have had the experience of it when we were actually asleep. (Sharma, 
2001, p.210, original italics) 
 
When entering a state of dreamless sleep tonight, if your last typical experience is 
diachronically co-conscious with your first dreamless sleep experience, then your 
stream of consciousness would remain in tact. The kind of experiences that you 
undergo would change (from wakeful experience, to dream experience, to deep sleep 
experience), but there is no obvious reason to think that this would break the usual 
phenomenal bonds between them. Sharma holds that we are able to think about 
dreamless sleep in the way we do only because there exists a corresponding 
experience of sleep. Before looking at his arguments for this position, it is helpful to 
ask just why the orthodox view is what it is. Sharma has his unsympathetic 
explanation: 
 
Now, apart from the (near) total loss of awareness of having a body that it 
seems to involve, the dreamless sleep is sometimes held … also to involve total 
lack of consciousness of anything whatever. This is maintained on the 
seemingly “plausible” ground that in rising from sleep we remember nothing of 
our “experience” during the interval and that, had we really known anything, we 
would not have failed, as we invariably do, to have any memory impression of 
that something … The conclusion drawn, then, is that dreamless sleep 
constitutes a (sort of) discontinuity in an otherwise unbroken conscious life of 
percepts, images, and thoughts. (Sharma, 2001, p.214) 
 
There is something to Sharma’s reluctance to accept this alone as the grounds for 
supposing that dreamless sleep amounts to unconsciousness: lacking the memory of 
an alleged experience (e) is not necessarily evidence of the non-existence of e. You 
may not now, for example, be able to recall the experience you were undergoing an 
hour ago but, if you were awake at that time, you were certainly enjoying one. It is 
also not unusual to have the memory of a previous night’s dream triggered by some 
event or detail we encounter in our subsequent waking hours. Up until the triggering 
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event we may have been quite confident in our assertion that we had not undergone 
any experiences at all during that period of sleep: we had no memory of any 
experiences, and thus no reason to suppose that we had undergone any. Having been 
triggered to recall a dream, and hence to recall an experience, we would have to admit 
that our previous lack of memory had been unreliable evidence of the total absence of 
experience during that time.30 
 Sharma argues that there is in fact a positive reason to deny the orthodox account:  
 
I want to say that even if the subject is not self-conscious during sleep, as it is 
when awake, and, further, even if it is not aware of itself or the body as being 
asleep, it would seem that there is yet some experience of sleep, the experience, 
for instance, of the repose and the unalloyed bliss that attends only sleep and 
that in a way uniquely represents its meaning. To put it through a transcendental 
sort of argument, there must be experience of sleep if its wakeful recollection, 
undeniable in our view, is to make any sense. No creative imagination can be 
called to assistance that can actually picture what sleep is like, nor can its 
experience be reconstructed on the analogy of any other experience. (Sharma, 
2001, p.223, original italics) 
 
We may not, upon waking, be able to recall any explicit content from the period of 
dreamless sleep but, for Sharma, there is something we can recall: having slept 
peacefully. This, it seems to me, is what he is getting at when he references the 
“unalloyed bliss” of dreamless sleep. His argument can be put the following way: if 
dreamless sleep was always accompanied by total unconsciousness then we would not 
be prone, as we are, to look forward to deep sleep in the way that we do and nor 
would we be able to report, upon waking, that we had just undergone a peaceful rest. 
A blissful sleep is something we can look forward to in just the way that we look 
forward to an enjoyable waking experience. If it did, in fact, represent the total 
cessation of experience then this would make no sense - or so the argument goes. 
How could a total lack of consciousness result in a future recollection of that period as 
blissful?  
                                                
30 It also seems to be the case that we can never successfully recall the final wakeful experience of the 
day before. 
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 This appears to be the essence of Sharma’s argument and it is an intriguing 
speculation. There is an alternative interpretation available, however: upon waking 
and feeling refreshed we attribute this to our previous state of sleep and, although we 
do not directly recall an experience of peaceful rest, we retroactively describe that 
period of unconsciousness in experiential terms owing to our current experience. 
Does it really make “no sense” to do so? This is a particularly difficult problem to 
answer, owing to the fact that we cannot investigate it directly when we are fully 
conscious and capable of inquiring into the matter with rigorous analytic thought. 
Perhaps focussing on the phenomenology of the process of waking up will elucidate 
the matter: Evan Thompson (2015) presents a similar argument to Sharma but begins 
from this different consideration: 
  
Consider that although deep sleep creates a gap or a rupture in our 
consciousness, we often feel the gap immediately upon awakening. Our waking 
sense that we were just asleep and unknowing is not outside knowledge - like 
the kind we have when we know about someone else’s having been asleep; it is 
inside, first-hand experience. We are aware of the gap in our consciousness 
from within our consciousness. (Thompson, 2015, p.4) 
 
Thompson’s claim that we “feel the gap” is both important and difficult to verify. If it 
is true that we directly experience the transition from dreamless sleep into waking 
consciousness, then it follows that we were undergoing an experience of some sort 
during dreamless sleep: you cannot directly experience the transition from state A to 
state B if state A is completely absent from your awareness. There is an issue to 
consider here: even if the usual process of awakening consists of an experienced 
transition from a previous state of sleep into wakefulness this would not necessarily 
entail that dreamless sleep is experiential: it could be that, just prior to awakening, we 
tend to enter into a different kind of sleep state (as our body and brain begin to 
approach wakefulness). This concern might be manageable for Thompson: if the gap 
is still felt when a subject is purposefully awoken by a third party when in the midst 
of deep sleep, then his point remains. Let’s grant that such a rude awakening would 
indeed be phenomenologically typical and that there would be a sense of “having just 
been asleep” in just the way there usually is, as Thompson claims. What should we 
conclude from this impression? This is a difficult question to answer with any 
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confidence: being a phenomenological observation it requires that we attend to our 
own experience in order to verify its accuracy. Recalling, now, what it is like to wake 
up from deep sleep is difficult to do and, even if seemingly achieved, is one step 
removed from the actual phenomenology: we are remembering the event, and thus 
interpretive faults have the chance to slip into our reasoning. Unfortunately, attending 
directly to the phenomenology at the moment of its occurrence is also not easy: for 
one thing, one would need to remember to do it often enough to count as valid 
evidence and, furthermore, it is not uncommon for our experience of waking up to 
have a somewhat confused and hazy character. These are not ideal conditions in 
which to enact a phenomenological investigation.  
 Returning, then, to the (slightly) less difficult question of our awareness of sleep in 
a more general sense, Thompson tackles the memory versus inference issue raised by 
Sharma: 
 
When you wake up from a dreamless sleep, you are aware of having had a 
peaceful sleep. You know this directly from memory, so the argument asserts, 
not from inference. In other words, you do not need to reason, “I feel well rested 
now, so I must have had a peaceful sleep.” Rather, you are immediately aware 
of having been happily asleep. Memory, however, presupposes the existence of 
traces that are themselves caused by previous experiences, so in remembering 
that you slept peacefully, a peaceful feeling must have been experienced. To put 
the thought another way, the memory report, “I slept peacefully,” would not be 
possible if awareness were altogether absent from deep sleep; but to say that 
awareness is present in deep sleep is to say that deep sleep is a mode of 
consciousness. (Thompson, 2015, p.4) 
 
The key issue, then, is whether or not the claim “I slept peacefully” is a memory 
report. The alternative viewpoint, as we saw above, is that it is actually an inference 
of some kind: we wake up feeling refreshed, have no memories of the past few hours, 
and infer that we slept peacefully. It appears that we have arrived at somewhat of a 
stalemate with no way to conclusively verify either side of the debate. On the one 
hand it seems reasonable to claim that you cannot infer a lack of consciousness from a 
lack of memory of such an occurrence (perhaps memories are simply not formed 
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during periods of deep sleep experience)31, yet on the other hand it seems 
questionable to posit a conscious state that we have no clear recollection of in order to 
account for the general sense of being rested upon waking. Unfortunately, it is not 
even obvious that future empirical discoveries could help definitively solve the issue: 
suppose a plausible physicalist account of consciousness is eventually constructed 
whereby the brain activity necessary and sufficient for wakeful conscious experience 
of our kind is reliably identified. If this brain activity was observed to be absent from 
a subject during a period of dreamless sleep we may be tempted to conclude that no 
consciousness was occurring for them at that time. This would arguably be a rash 
move to make: the theory would only have identified the neural correlates of typical 
wakeful consciousness (presumably with the help of first-person verbal reports) and 
there is good reason to think that if deep sleep consciousness exists it is likely to be 
quite different in kind from wakeful consciousness and, as such, might be associated 
with an altogether different set of processes within the brain.  
 For Thompson and Sharma the concept of “having slept peacefully” would be 
impossible for us to entertain if we were entirely unconscious during deep sleep. In an 
intriguing twist, Johnstone Jr (1973) has argued that it is only if we undergo a period 
of true unconsciousness that we can have the concept of “consciousness” in the first 
place: 
 
A person could not appropriately acknowledge that he was conscious or claim 
to be conscious unless he knew in the first place what it meant to be conscious. 
Now my argument is that a person who had never slept … could not know the 
meaning of either “consciousness” or “unconsciousness”. (Johnstone Jr, 1973, 
p.74, original italics) 
 
He goes on: 
 
Let us consider how we might be tempted to proceed if we were confronted 
with a person who had never slept (or at least could not remember ever having 
slept), and we wanted to teach him the meaning of either “consciousness” or 
                                                
31 Descartes (1986), of course, identified the self with consciousness. He too held that consciousness 
persists through deep sleep but that memory-failure occurs and, as Hill (2004, p.2) puts it, for Descartes 
such memory-failure was a result of “the soul withdrawing - so to speak - from the body (and in 
particular from the brain)”.  
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“unconsciousness.” We might try to point to consciousness as the property 
common to all his experiences, or as what made these experiences possible. But 
if he continued having one experience after another, this attempt would not be 
helpful. If consciousness were what is common to, or what rendered possible, a 
certain restricted series of experiences, we might be able to point to it as the 
property absent from a different series, but of course a series of experiences 
from which consciousness is absent is not a series of experiences at all. 
(Johnstone Jr, 1973, p.74, original italics) 
 
As Johnstone Jr points out, gesturing to an inanimate object and informing the 
sleepless person that such an object is unconscious would be of little help if he did not 
already have the concept of “consciousness” to contrast it with. How, though, would 
falling asleep help him? Johnstone Jr claims the following: 
 
Suppose it is dark and I am tired. Suddenly it is light, and I am no longer tired. 
If I feel that there is a gap in the flow of my experience, I may be inclined to 
frame a hypothesis to account for this gap. One possible hypothesis is that there 
has been a temporary interruption in the possibility of my experiencing. But 
consciousness is precisely this possibility of experiencing, and the interruption 
is unconsciousness … My position, then, is that until a gap occurs in a person’s 
experience he not only cannot acknowledge that a state of unconsciousness has 
occurred in his life, but also he cannot even conceive a state of unconsciousness. 
(Johnstone Jr, 1973, p.75, original italics) 
 
This is a curious claim and, if true, puts pressure on the views advanced by Sharma 
and Thompson: we clearly do have the concept of unconsciousness (they employ it 
themselves in arguing that it is not what occurs during deep sleep). If we can only 
have such a concept as a result of noticing a true experiential break in our stream of 
consciousness, then it follows that deep sleep cannot be experiential in nature. This is 
far from a definitive solution to the question, but it does suggest one more reason to 
be sceptical of an account that has no room for genuine gaps in consciousness. It also 
speaks to the following concern: it seems that transcendental arguments relating to the 
possibility of obtaining certain concepts can be mounted in defence of both sides of 
the debate. 
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In short, the issue is a difficult one to deal with and, unfortunately, it is not obvious 
which side of the debate is strongest. It seems that we will have to settle for the 
following line of thought: until more powerful arguments are presented for the 
alternative we should side with the default view. There is a general naturalistic point 
in its defense: if consciousness of our kind is produced by processes in our brains, 
giving organisms with such a property an evolutionary advantage, then the powering 
down of such activity during sleep would have energy benefits. If conscious 
experience of our kind creates a survival advantage by allowing an organism to 
negotiate its world in a superior way, then this feature would arguably be useless 
when the organism is not conscious of its environment. Having a mechanism whereby 
such a process completely ceased during certain periods of inactivity would save on 
energy. This is, of course, far from an entirely compelling argument. For one thing, a 
movement from full-on waking consciousness into a lower-level form in deep sleep 
would also save energy, and perhaps there is a reason why naturally evolved brains 
cannot entirely “switch off”. For now, then, we will have to fall back onto Occam’s 
razor: if we accept that there is no experience during deep sleep then we do not need 
to introduce an entirely new kind of consciousness into our ontology. When the 
question is as difficult to answer as this one such considerations gain weight owing to 
the lack of obvious solutions. The Bridge Problem stands, then.  
 
 
§5.6 Conscious capacities 
 
We have seen that there are solid reasons to hold The Exhaustive Constitution Thesis 
and the ensuing Stream Thesis to be true. But, perhaps, it comes at too high a cost. We 
are, after all, seeking an account of selfhood that is both philosophically sound and 
believable. Can you seriously entertain the idea that you did not exist yesterday? As it 
turns out, there is a solid case to be made for the believability of The Stream Thesis 
or, at least, its relative believability. Even further to this, in fact, its implications 
concerning death, whilst certainly radical, might also be somewhat liberating. Before 
addressing these issues, it is necessary to see why we cannot follow Dainton in his 
dealing with The Bridge Problem. Dainton’s theories concerning the self-intimation 
of experience, the temporality of consciousness, and phenomenal continuity as a 
guide to personal persistence have all been found to be robust and agreeable. It will be 
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useful to see just why our prior commitments do not allow us to follow him any 
further. 
 Dainton identifies two very different conceptions of the self, one of which gives 
his account the tools to overcome The Bridge Problem. However, as will be shown, 
moving his theory in this direction brings a new problem that leads to potentially less 
acceptable claims than those entailed by The Stream Thesis. The first conception is 
the following: 
 
The Essentially Conscious Self (ECS): a self is a thing whose essential nature it 
is to be conscious; a self is experiencing at every moment at which it exists; a 
self cannot lose consciousness and continue to exist. (Dainton, 2008b, p.77) 
 
The Exhaustive Constitution Thesis, as we saw, straightforwardly demands that we 
accept this conception of the self: in saying that you are exhaustively constituted by 
the currently occurring experience of which you are non-inferentially aware, it is 
obvious that you cannot exist without the occurrence of an experience. Strictly 
speaking, the above description does not mirror the claims of The Stream Thesis 
exactly, which holds that the self is a thing whose essential nature it is to be 
consciousness. The difference between these two ways of phrasing the claim speaks 
to important concerns that will become clear shortly. Interestingly, the second clause 
of Dainton’s definition can be read in both ways: “a self is experiencing at every 
moment that it exists” can be taken in the usual sense of meaning that the self is 
having experiences, but it can also be taken in the sense implied by The Stream 
Thesis: a self is experiencing, i.e. a self is identical with a stream of experiential 
episodes. 
 The second conception Dainton identifies is the following: 
 
The Potentially Conscious Self (PCS): a self is a thing that is capable of being 
conscious; a self has the capacity for consciousness at every moment at which it 
exists, and it possesses this capacity essentially. A self can lose consciousness 




This conception, which Dainton favours, has its obvious advantages. For one thing, it 
is quite clearly in tune with how we typically see ourselves: we do not usually regard 
unconsciousness as death - so long as a person retains the capacity to wake up again 
we regard them as still very much alive. This conception has another advantage: it can 
deal with The Bridge Problem relatively easily (or so it seems) whilst still paying due 
respect to our intuitions concerning phenomenal continuity and personal identity. We 
now need to look at how Dainton develops his account: it is an intricate and detailed 
theory whose full worth cannot adequately be covered here, but laying out its 
fundamental basics will provide us with enough to motivate an important dilemma. 
 For Dainton, the key to overcoming The Bridge Problem is the self’s capacity for 
consciousness. Fleshing this out, Dainton states the following: 
 
I shall call nomologically grounded capacities which produce conscious 
experience (of any kind) when activated experiential powers. I shall further 
assume that experiential powers are to some degree modular, i.e. that a person’s 
overall capacity for experience at any given moment consists of a variety of 
different and independent experiential powers … Experiential powers are to be 
thought of as typically persisting dispositional properties, akin to inertia or 
electrical charge. (Dainton, 1996, pp.25-6, original italics) 
 
Recall that previously it was shown that two (synchronically or (directly or indirectly) 
diachronically) co-conscious experiences necessarily belong to the same self or 
subject. In short, “co-conscious experiences are co-personal” (Dainton, 1996, p.26) or 
“consubjective” (Dainton, 2008b, p.25). A simple but powerful move can now be 
made owing to that fact that there “is a natural and compelling way to extend this to 
experiential powers: by defining the co-personality of experiential powers by 
reference to the co-consciousness of their potential manifestations” (Dainton, 1996, 
p.26, original italics). 
 Consider your current experience. All of the experiential powers that are currently 
producing the various elements of your experience are co-personal in virtue of the fact 
that they are producing co-conscious (and thus co-personal) experiences. Further to 
this, there are experiential powers that are not currently active but that, if they were, 
would be producing experiences bound by co-consciousness to the one you are 
currently enjoying. These dormant powers, then, are also co-personal with your 
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current experience. If we now consider your ongoing stream of experiences the same 
fundamental principle can be reapplied: an experiential power (p) that is active five 
minutes from now will be co-personal with the power producing your current 
experience (x) if the experience that it produces is indirectly diachronically co-
conscious with x. Recall that an experience is indirectly diachronically co-conscious 
with another experience if between the two there exists an unbroken stream of 
diachronically co-conscious overlapping specious presents, each glued seamlessly to 
the next by a direct phenomenal bond. Crucially, we can also say that if p is in fact 
dormant five minutes from now it is still co-personal with x given that, if it had been 
active, it would have produced an experience that was co-personal with x in virtue of 
the unbroken stream of experiences that could have existed between them but, in fact, 
did not. In short the consubjectivity-conferring co-consciousness of experiences has 
moved down a level: any two experiential powers are consubjective if the experiences 
produced by them would have been either directly or indirectly co-conscious had they 
been active. 
 Defining the maximal collection of active and dormant co-personal experiential 
powers as a “C-system”, Dainton can now make the following ontological claim and 
overcome The Bridge Problem: “Selves (or subjects) are C-systems” (Dainton, 2008b, 
p.113). The forgoing sketch of Dainton’s account gives only the barest outline of its 
essentials: there are multiple ontological options that can be defended in the context 
of experiential powers and a plethora of general and specific issues that have not even 
been mentioned here. However, enough has been covered for us to consider the 
following claims: in order for the C-system theory to adequately overcome The 
Bridge Problem it must claim that the self or subject is the C-system, and this 
introduces a new problem. To begin with, it is clear that identifying the self with the 
C-system does indeed overcome The Bridge Problem: 
 
The move to nomologically grounded potentialities for experience means that 
gaps between streams of consciousness are no longer in the least problematic. 
Two temporally separated streams of consciousness are consubjective if they 
are produced by consubjective experiential powers … Actual experience results 
from the exercise of experiential powers whose consubjectivity consists in the 
co-consciousness of their potential manifestations. A particular experiential 
power persists through periods of quiescence in virtue of the continuous 
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experience which would result from its activation. A cycle of being conscious, 
unconscious, and conscious again is only one of the innumerable forms which 
the manifestations of the underlying set of consubjective experiential powers 
could have taken during that period. (Dainton, 2008b, p.114) 
 
It is also clear that the self must be, in some sense, identified as the C-system in order 
for The Bridge Problem to be overcome: The Exhaustive Constitution Thesis is 
perfectly compatible with the notion of a C-system (when the system is merely the 
experience producer and the subject is the stream of experiences) but still faces the 
issue of gaps in consciousness if the self is identified as the stream of experiences 
being produced by a particular C-system. The C-system producing my current stream 
of experiences will tomorrow - after a period of dreamless sleep - produce 
experiences that would have been diachronically co-conscious with my current ones, 
and hence identical with me. But, as is stipulated, it will not do this: it will produce a 
new stream of experiences that is not phenomenally connected to my current one, and 
thus not identical with me. It is only if we identify the self with the C-system that the 
desired persistence over unconscious periods is secured. 
 
 
§5.7 Vicarious consciousness 
 
The question, then, is the following: what is wrong with identifying a self (or subject) 
with its C-system? The short answer is this: a C-system cannot be conscious of its 
experiences in the way that we manifestly are. Or, at least, there are very strong 
reasons for thinking this.  
 Consider your own situation. You are currently enjoying a range of experiences 
that are being produced by your brain. This is, at least, a plausible assumption to 
make. Taking care not to oversimplify too much, we should note that although your 
brain has the capacity to produce experiences, it also does much more. It would be a 
mistake, then, to identify your brain with your C-system. The C-system is that 
collection of powers instantiated in your brain that produce (or would produce) the 
co-conscious experiences that you enjoy. With this in mind we can ask the following 
question: is your C-system conscious of your experiences in the way that you are? If 
you are identical with your C-system then it ought to be. Recall that, according to the 
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arguments in favour of The Exhaustive Constitution Thesis, you are conscious of your 
experience whenever it occurs and your experience is self-intimating. The upshot of 
this, as we saw, was that if you are conscious of an experience (x) then you must be 
exhaustively constituted by x, owing to the fact that nothing other than x can be aware 
of x in the way the subject of x is (i.e. non-inferentially). The problem for the C-
system approach is that a collection of experiential powers is not the kind of thing that 
can be aware of experiences in this way: only experiences themselves can be.   
 Dainton can say something like the following: the C-system is conscious in virtue 
of its self-intimating conscious states, i.e. the C-system produces conscious 
experiences and is in this sense a conscious being. This sense of being “conscious”, 
however, seems to me to be best described as a “vicarious consciousness” and not 
relevant to the problem at hand. The experiential powers that are currently producing 
your experience are not themselves conscious of the world or your experience of it. In 
other words, your experience is not revealed to your C-system: it is “self-revealing”, 
as Dainton puts it (Dainton, 2006, p.57), and given that it is also self-conscious it is 
revealing itself only to itself. We saw this much in detail in §3 (pp.78-81). 
 That the C-system can be described as conscious in the sense that it is producing 
experiences fails to address the problem: your current experience is not revealed to 
your C-system (or the organism of which the C-system is a part) but it is revealed to 
you. To identify the self with the C-system is therefore untenable. The C-system 
“has” an experience only in the sense that it produces one: but you (the subject of the 
experience) have experiences in the sense of being immediately aware of them. There 
is a clear difference between being the “experiential owner” of an experience, and 
being what we could call the “nomological owner”, i.e. the entity whose set of powers 
are responsible for producing the experience. As was hinted at above this is not just a 
problem for the C-system approach: any theory that distinguishes our essential selves 
from our experiences creates a division between the two that cannot then be 
overcome, if The Exclusivity Argument holds. The subject of your current experience 
is conscious in the fullest sense of that term: it is immediately and non-inferentially 
conscious of a phenomenology and thereby conscious of the world. Only a self-
intimating experience can be conscious in this way and describing various candidates 
as conscious merely in virtue of producing an experience does not address the 
problem. It is worth noting that if some form of mind-matter identity theory turns out 
to be true then it would follow that you are identical with those parts of matter that are 
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themselves consciousness. It would still not be true to say that you are your brain, 
however, only that you are identical with those parts of the brain that are themselves 
the conscious experiences you are currently enjoying, not the parts that are merely 
producing these experiences.  
 Something akin to the distinction between “vicarious consciousness” and full-
blooded consciousness of the sort we are enjoying right this very moment has been 
made using different terms, for different reasons, in other areas of the literature. The 
distinction between “state consciousness” and “creature consciousness” seems to be 
one such example, and the direction of dependence seems clear: 
 
Whilst a creature is conscious it may have both conscious and unconscious 
mental states (and thus it cannot be that the conscious status of a mental state 
simply derives from the conscious status of the creature whose mental state it 
is). (Manson, 2000, p.407, original italics) 
 
The conscious status of a creature, however, does derive from the conscious status of 
its mental states: we classify a creature as a conscious being if it can have conscious 
states in general. Again, however, there is an ambiguity in the use of the word “have”: 
the creature can “have” experiences in the sense that part of the creature (its brain or 
C-system) is producing experiences. But these experiences are not revealed to the 
creature: they are self-revealing (or self-intimating) and are thus revealed only to 
themselves (when inner awareness occurs). There is nothing particularly wrong in 
using the term “conscious” in such a way, but this can become problematic when we 
are dealing with the fundamental question of our essential nature. The particular way 
that we are conscious of our experiences cannot be applied to a system or an organism 
(or anything) if such a being is only “conscious” in virtue of producing experiences. 
In short, we are on the inside of consciousness and nothing other than consciousness 
can reach within this sphere of subjectivity. Consider it put in this way: how could an 
organism or a system become conscious of an experience? It would need to have a 
conscious state directed at this experience. But, as has been argued, this state itself 
would be self-intimating and therefore not revealed to the creature. So how could it 
make the creature conscious of anything in the way that we are? It seems it cannot.  
 The arguments leading to The Exhaustive Constitution Thesis clearly have 
powerful implications that cause problems for more theories of personal identity than 
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Dainton’s. Focusing on Dainton’s account has, however, allowed us to appreciate the 
force of The Bridge Problem. Any experiential account of personal persistence will 
have to deal with periods of unconsciousness. If the move to C-systems cannot be 
justified for the reasons outlined here, then we may be forced to accept the strange 
conception advanced here as The Ephemeral Self. We have looked at arguments 
calling for our philosophical acceptance of it and, although we are far from an entirely 
persuasive account, we have seen a number of phenomenological and analytical 
considerations in its defense. The next question is this: can such an account also 
secure our psychological acceptance?   
 
 
§5.8 Personal identity and believability 
 
It is undeniable that The Ephemeral Self is a radical conception of our nature. Despite 
being grounded in phenomenologically sound observations, and supported by strong 
intuitions concerning our moment-to-moment survival, its larger implications are 
strange to say the least. The question then is this: how damaging is this perceived 
strangeness to the overall viability of the account? A triple-pronged defense can be 
made: firstly, this is not a problem for this account of selfhood alone. Secondly, The 
Ephemeral Self is an intuitively appealing account in some respects and 
counterintuitive in others: if the reasons for its intuitive appeal are stronger than the 
reasons for its perceived strangeness then, on balance, such an account may be more 
readily acceptable than it appears at first sight. Thirdly, a large part of the oddness of 
the theory concerns personal death. Such a reconceptualisation, however, may bring 
benefits that outweigh the potential losses that come with large-scale revisionism such 
as this. These three strands of the defense are in fact intermingled, but tackling them 
one by one is a helpful way of elucidating the matter. 
 The first part of the defense itself comprises two claims: firstly, that this is far from 
the only account of selfhood that suffers from strange consequences and, secondly, 
that there may be good reasons to think that any account of selfhood will have 
counterintuitive implications. To the first claim consider the following fundamentally 
different accounts. Derek Parfit’s highly influential theory of personal identity 
concludes that the question of personal survival can sometimes be indeterminate. 
Parfit describes a scenario in which a scanner encodes a blueprint containing all of his 
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physical and psychological information, destroys both his brain and his body and then 
creates an organic Replica from the blueprint. He goes on to make the following 
points: 
 
We could say here that my Replica will be me, or we could instead say that he 
will merely be someone else who is exactly like me. But we should not regard 
these as competing hypotheses about what will happen. For these to be 
competing hypotheses, my continued existence must involve a further fact. If 
my continued existence merely involves physical and psychological continuity, 
we know just what happens in this case. There will be some future person who 
will be physically exactly like me, and who will be fully psychologically 
continuous with me. This psychological continuity will have a reliable cause, 
the transmission of my blueprint. But this continuity will not have its normal 
cause, since this future person will not be physically continuous with me. This 
is a full description of the facts. There is no further fact about which we are 
ignorant. If personal identity does not involve a further fact, we should not 
believe that there are two different possibilities: that my Replica will be me, or 
that he will be someone else who is merely like me. What could make these 
different possibilities? In what could the difference consist? (Parfit, 1984, 
p.242) 
 
As we saw earlier, there are phenomenal facts that Parfit fails to take into account that 
can provide such an answer: if the scanning process ends my stream of consciousness 
(as it certainly seems to in the above scenario) then the Replica is merely similar to 
me. If my stream of consciousness is (somehow) instantiated in the brain of my clone, 
with no break in phenomenal continuity, then I have survived (though, of course, not 
for long). As Chalmers puts it: “I think it is plausible that once one specifies that there 
is a continuous stream of consciousness over time, there is no longer really an open 
question about whether one survives” (Chalmers, 2010, p.60). The crucial point at 
hand, however, concerns the counterintuitive implications of such a theory. Setting 
aside the philosophical arguments for and against each account, consider which is the 
more counterintuitive. Is it more far-fetched to suppose that sometimes there may be 
literally no answer to the question “will I exist tomorrow?” or that you, this stream of 
consciousness, will indeed cease to exist at some point tonight? It does not seem at all 
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clear that, on this issue, The Ephemeral Self is in any worse a position than Parfit’s 
theory. Evaluating the strength of the two accounts should not, then, be a matter of 
avoiding the oddest one.  
 Broadening our scope, it is also not obvious which of the following views is 
strangest: that we are collections of experience-producing powers, that we are 
immaterial substances, that we are a “centre of narrative gravity” (Dennett, 1993, 
p.410), or that there is no such thing as a self and that your name, for example, is no 
more than a “convenient designation” (Warren, 1957, p.284). There is no shortage of 
strange notions of the self, and this is the case even when we focus on the phenomenal 
approach: Bayne, building on Dennett’s notion, has argued that the self is best 
conceived of as a “virtual centre of ‘phenomenal gravity’” (Bayne, 2010, p.289). 
Offering his account as a third way of interpreting the intimate relation between 
selves and experience, he says the following: 
 
The two versions of phenomenalism that I have examined each identify selves 
with concrete particulars: streams of consciousness in the case of naïve 
phenomenalism and the mechanisms underlying those streams in the case of 
substrate phenomenalism. But there is another way in which we might hope to 
forge a constitutive link between streams of consciousness and selves. Rather 
than looking for something onto which we might map representations of the 
self, we might think of selves as merely intentional entities - entities whose 
identity is determined by the cognitive architecture underlying a stream of 
consciousness. (Bayne, 2010, p.289) 
 
As we have seen The Ephemeral Self account is, in Bayne’s terminology, a version of 
naïve phenomenalism. It results in the strange claim that our lives are much shorter 
than we tend to believe. (Dainton’s C-system approach is a version of substrate 
phenomenalism when it identifies selves with experience-producing powers.) Bayne 
considers a number of objections to naïve phenomenalism but, on the whole, does not 
find them to be particularly damaging. His fundamental problem is in fact the 
following: 
 
[One] extreme response to the [Bridge Problem] is to bite the bullet, and hold 
that selves do indeed last only as long as unbroken chains of phenomenal 
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continuity allow. This approach might appeal to those who are prepared to hold 
a radically revisionist conception of the self, but it does not tempt me. My aim 
here is to understand the role that the self plays within our conceptual scheme, 
and it is quite clear that we regard ourselves as being able to survive the onset of 
dreamless sleep. (Bayne, 2010, p.285) 
 
This is certainly the typical way that selves figure in our conceptual scheme. But, 
firstly, it is not clear that this how we must necessarily conceive of ourselves: perhaps 
we are mistaken and a solid account of how and why we are might lead to a 
reconceptualisation. Ultimately, the crucial difference at issue here is a 
methodological one: The Ephemeral Self account starts from the phenomenology and 
allows it to dictate the theory. Bayne, on the other hand, is attempting a conceptual 
analysis of the role that the self plays. As two different questions there is no conflict. 
However, Bayne does ultimately allow his theory to revise our concept of the self, in 
which case there is a disagreement concerning what it is that should dictate such 
revision: phenomenological considerations or our natural conceptual scheme. There is 
a deeper debate at play here, but it is enough to say this much: it is not obviously 
unreasonable to lend more weight to the experiential facts - no matter where they lead 
- than to our pre-theoretical notions of self.  
 It will be insightful to see just why Bayne’s issue with naïve phenomenalism does 
not stem from the typical objections that can be leveled at it. One objection is 
ontological: selves are clearly “things in their own right” whereas streams of 
experiences are not. As we saw, however, co-consciousness addresses this issue: 
 
Conscious states are not grouped together into streams of consciousness in an 
arbitrary or haphazard manner. Instead, they are bound together by relations of 
synchronic and diachronic phenomenal unity. In fact, it is arguable that the 
forces that knit together the components of a stream of consciousness are no 
less robust than those that knit together the parts of a single mind or even those 
that knit together the parts of a single animal. In each case, we have a genuine 
entity - a thing in its own right. (Bayne, 2010, p.282) 
 
This seems to be the right thing to say. Our pre-theoretical notion of a “stream of 
consciousness” may well strike us as not being a genuine entity: it seems reasonable 
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to guess that a large-scale survey of the general public would find such a result. It is 
tempting to suppose that a significant percentage of people would be naturally 
disinclined to call a stream of water a “thing in its own right”, depending on how they 
interpreted that phrase, let alone a stream of experiences. But, as we saw in §4 (pp.82-
108), when we investigate the relations between experiences, both at and over time, 
the degree of unity found therein is hard to deny. Having done this, it is not difficult 
to conceive of a stream of experiences as a genuine entity.32 Strawson has made 
relevant claims: 
 
when it comes to deciding which phenomena in the universe count as objects 
and which do not, there are no good grounds for thinking that non-experiential, 
non-mental criteria or principles of unity - of the sort that we use to pick out a 
dog or a chair - are more valid than mental or experiential criteria or principles 
of unity. 
 It’s arguable, in fact, that there is no more indisputable unity in nature, and 
therefore no more indisputable physical unity or singularity, and therefore no 
better candidate for the title ‘physical object’, than the mental and in particular 
experiential unity that we come upon when we consider a … subject … in the 
living moment or lived present of experience. (Strawson, 2009, p.297) 
 
As we saw, Strawson’s account of temporal consciousness differs markedly from the 
model defended here, but his comments regarding experiential unity at a time apply 
equally well to diachronic unity if we take co-consciousness to be responsible for both 
(and we have seen good reasons to do just this). If unity is what is required for x to be 
considered a “thing in its own right” then a stream of phenomenally unified 
experiences is a very strong candidate indeed. There is a broader issue at play here: 
taking experience seriously, a stance that has been adopted from the outset of this 
investigation, makes it much more difficult to entertain the notion that a series of 
interconnected experiences is not a genuine entity.33 Arguments in support of taking 
                                                
32 One way of characterising a “genuine entity” or “thing” is to say that it is, in some sense, self-
sufficient: it can exist without other things. It is not obvious that a stream of consciousness is a genuine 
entity in this sense. Another plausible option is to hold that a certain level of unity is sufficient for 
“thinghood”. As we have seen: in this context a stream of consciousness is a solid candidate. 
 
33 Recall that taking experience seriously means to adopt a stance “of robust, full-blooded realism 
about consciousness. This means taking consciousness as seriously as we take science. From this 
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experience seriously, then, by necessity support the view that such a diachronically 
unified stream is a thing in its own right. Such arguments have not been presented 
here but that there is a convincing case to be made along these lines is a very 
reasonable background assumption to hold. 
 A second objection identified by Bayne concerns the sense in which selves can be 
said to “have” experiences. Identifying selves with streams of experiences seems to 
entail that a self can “have what it is” or “have itself”. Bayne proposes a mereological 
response: selves have experiences in the way that wholes have parts, i.e. in the way 
that “universities have philosophy departments” (Bayne, 2010, p.282). As we saw in 
§3 (pp.78-81) there is an even stronger response available, however: “having an 
experience” in the sense of being its experiential owner (i.e. the entity to whom it is 
phenomenally revealed) is a property that can only be had by the experience in 
question. The reasons for thinking this were laid out in The Exclusivity Argument of 
§3 (pp.78-81). In this sense, naïve pheomenalism (of some form) is in fact the only 
kind of account that can do full justice to the sense in which an experience is owned 
by a self. Indeed, it was this consideration that forced us to move in this direction to 
begin with.  
 A third objection identified by Bayne is that if selves are streams of experiences 
then most of our everyday self-descriptions are inaccurate: a stream of experiences 
cannot, for example, drive a car. As Bayne accepts, however, there are ways for a 
naïve phenomenalist to reinterpret such claims. As we will go on to look at in more 
detail in §6.1, Strawson’s approach - in which he highlights the non-univocal nature 
of the concept “I” - is one such option. Briefly put: my current stream of experiences 
is associated with a particular human being and he can indeed drive a car.  
Although Bayne does not find the above objections to be particularly difficult for a 
naïve phenomenalist to overcome, his methodological choices mean that he cannot 
accept such a view: he needs to overcome The Bridge Problem and supplies an 
account that can do just that. However, as with Dainton’s model, this comes at a cost: 
 
We can now see where other approaches to the self go wrong: they assume that 
there must be some ‘real’ entity that plays the role of the self. The only thing 
that plays the self role - indeed, perhaps the only thing that could play the role 
                                                                                                                                      
perspective, sensory experiences, bodily sensations and conscious thoughts are regarded as just as real 
as paradigmatic physical things such as mountains, houses and trees…” (Dainton, 2006, p.1). 
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of the self - is a merely intentional entity. Experiences do indeed have ‘owners’ 
or ‘bearers’, but the owner of an experience is nothing ‘over and above’ a 
virtual object - indeed, the very same virtual object around which that 
experience is structured … To identify the self with a stream of consciousness 
or its underlying substrate is a bit like identifying Hercule Poirot with the novels 
in which he figures. (Bayne, 2010, p.290) 
 
Bayne builds on this metaphor in presenting his solution to The Bridge Problem: we 
can agree that the same self has different streams of consciousness in just the same 
way that we can agree that a fictional character is the “same” character across 
multiple novels: it is, as Bayne admits, ultimately only a matter of convention (Bayne, 
2010, p.291). The strength of Bayne’s approach depends on his arguments, not on the 
counterintuitive nature of the idea of such a virtual self. Having said as much, two 
points are of importance here: firstly, Bayne’s intentional approach is one more 
example of the strange consequences that can result from reasonable premises 
concerning selfhood and, secondly, his account serves to highlight the difficulty that 
any experiential theory faces in overcoming gaps in consciousness. Perhaps, then, it is 
not unreasonable to suppose - as The Ephemeral Self account does - that we should 
bite the bullet with regards to gaps in consciousness: we are simply mistaken when 
we intuitively feel that we have existed for longer than our current stream of 
experiences. Is it more believable to suppose that we only survive gaps in our 
consciousness conventionally, in the same way that a fictional character can be the 
same entity in two different novels? Whether or not it is you who exists tomorrow 
morning certainly doesn’t strike us as the kind of question that is answerable only by 
an appeal to agreed conventions. There seems to be a fact of the matter, no matter 
how difficult it is to know. This, at any rate, is by far the more intuitive position.  
 
 
§5.9 Being real 
 
Another way of making the above point is as follows: The Ephemeral Self account 
may conflict with our sense of how often death occurs, but it does respect our 
intuitions concerning the objective (i.e. non-convention-dependent) fact of its 
occurrence. Mark Johnston (2010) has defended a theory of personal identity that 
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clashes with both intuitions in its claim that we could extend our lifespans merely by 
conceptualising ourselves differently. As with Bayne, this results from taking selves 
to be intentional in nature. Johnston begins by highlighting three issues with the 
typical thought-experiment approach to the problem of personal identity: 
 
First, the specific necessary conditions on our survival, conditions that are the 
upshot of our common essence, need not be available to armchair, or “a priori,” 
reflection. It is after all a Lockean point … that our real essence cannot be 
discovered by attention to our concepts but only by empirical investigation into 
what is in fact the case. (Johnston, 2010, p.44) 
 
The claims of The Ephemeral Self account are admittedly a result of “armchair 
reflection”: the problems discussed have been the kind of problems that require a 
philosophical analysis even when empirical studies are of use. It does not seem 
obvious, however, that this has been a merely conceptual analysis: in investigating the 
structure of our own phenomenology we have, in a certain sense, been undertaking an 
empirical project. We have tried to let our experience as it is in itself dictate our route, 
and have for this reason endeavored - in this particular sphere at least - to look into 
“what is in fact the case”. One of the key claims forwarded by The Exhaustive 
Constitution Thesis is, after all, that it is the essential nature of consciousness to be 
self-conscious and self-intimating - not that our mere concept of consciousness 
necessarily involves such features. We are in fact acquainted with conscious 
experience in a much more intimate way than we are with the objects of scientifically 
empirical studies, and as such are able to make claims that are not justified solely in 
terms of our concepts. Johnston has a further worry: 
 
Second, in the massive core of cases of ordinary survival from day to day, many 
sources of evidence for personal survival, such as persistent bodily integrity and 
mental continuity, converge and agree, whereas the whole philosophical charm 
and supposed utility of the imagined cases in the literature on personal identity 
lie precisely in teasing these elements apart. The obvious question arises: Might 
we not have thereby undermined our ability to make good judgments about 




We have already seen arguments that attempt to deal with this kind of objection in 
§4.9. Simply put, thought experiments of this kind can be legitimate (owing to our 
privileged position as self-conscious beings) albeit limited guides to personal 
persistence. Johnston is not entirely against the use of such a method (he employs it 
himself, albeit to different ends) only wary of relying too much on the intuitions 
provoked by such thinking. This much we should agree with. His third concern moves 
us towards his rival account of the self: 
 
When we take the trouble to look, we do not find much evidence that in tracking 
objects and persons through time we are actually deploying knowledge of 
sufficient conditions from cross-time identity. Instead, as a matter of empirical 
fact, it appears likely that nature saves us inferential labor by having us 
“offload” the question of sufficiency onto the objects and people themselves - if 
I may put it that way. (Johnston, 2010, p.45, original italics) 
 
He offers a motto for offloading: “I don’t know what the (non-trivial) sufficient 
conditions for identity over time are, but I do know a persisting object when I see 
one” (Johnston, 2010, p.45). Johnston takes his point to be entailed from the fact that 
we do not infer that some object is the same over time by considering identity criteria. 
Instead, we are directly aware of its movement and thereby immediately aware of it as 
a persisting object. As we saw in §4.4 (pp.92-94) there are good reasons to agree with 
this account of the phenomenology. Johnston claims that this “off-loading” occurs 
when we are aware of human beings too: they “capture our attention at various times 
and over time, as when we see them moving or hear them talking” (Johnston, 2010, 
p.46, original italics). We directly perceive their identity over time by directly 
perceiving their movement, not by a process of inference concerning facts of personal 
identity over time. So far, there is a good deal to agree with in Johnston’s third 
concern. If we do indeed track objects, including human beings, that are themselves 
“naturally individuated” (Johnston, 2010, p.46) in such a way, and not by way of an 
“implicit grasp of “gensidentity” relations” (Johnston, 2010, p.46) then the reliability 
of our intuitions concerning thought experiments might well be called into question. 
This issue, however, does not seem to be damaging to the kind of thought 
experiments we have been dealing with: the persistence conditions specified by The 
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Stream Thesis are themselves based on our immediate awareness of continuity. 
Instead of an awareness of objectual continuity, however, this was an awareness of 
phenomenal continuity. Johnston, however, cannot follow us in this direction: he does 
not accept the reality of the self in the same way that the account presented here does. 
 To appreciate this we need to introduce Johnston’s notion of “an arena of 
presence” (Johnston, 2010, p.139). Consider your current experience and all of the 
perceptual content that comprises a good deal of it. You are visually aware of various 
objects, you are hearing various sounds and you can sense your body and feel 
anything it is currently touching. Johnston makes the following point: these items are 
not just free-floating objects in a phenomenal space - their modes of presentation are 
perspectival in the sense that they are organised around a particular viewing position. 
Or, to be precise, they are organised around an implied viewing position. There is an 
“arena of presence” and you experience yourself as being at the centre of it. This 
seems to be a phenomenologically accurate description of our typical perceptual 
experience. Having made the previous claims, Johnston hints at the picture to come 
when he asks us to think of the arena “as a sort of virtual frame or “container” … it is 
if you like the mind considered as a sort of place, the mental “bed” in which the 
stream of consciousness flows” (Johnston, 2010, p.140). 
 Johnston claims that it is “the property of being me at the center of this arena of 
presence that is the property of being me in the most intimate and important sense” 
(Johnston, 2010, p.144). If we grant him this, whilst accepting that such an arena is 
organised around a merely implied position, then we must deny the reality of the self. 
The centre of the arena is, after all, merely an illusion: an intentional object 
“answering to nothing in the world” (Johnston, 2010, p.145). The Ephemeral Self 
account faces no such problem for the following reasons: the self undergoing 
experience x is exhaustively constituted by x during its occurrence. This includes, but 
is not limited to, the implied perceptual perspective therein. That we can experience 
ourselves as being at the centre only need not be denied: as we shall see, in §6.5 and 
§6.6, there are good reasons to think that seeing through such an illusion (as opposed 
to identifying ourselves with it) can be psychologically beneficial. We have seen, 
then, one more intuitive gain from identifying ourselves with experience: unless we 
are illusionists about consciousness in general, it blocks this kind of move from 
experiential entity to virtual entity. Part of an experience can be merely intentional (or 
virtual) in nature, but the experience as a whole is still very much real. There is 
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another way in which Johnston’s account forfeits intuitive appeal as a direct result of 
denying the reality of the self: it results in claims concerning personal death that are 
arguably even more radical than those of The Stream Thesis. 
  Johnston presents the issue forcefully when he asks, “[under] what conditions 
does the very same arena of presence and action continue on? You have no idea, and 
neither do I” (Johnston, 2010, p.174). This is, in effect, the same issue raised by 
Bayne’s account: if the self is merely intentional then there are no objective facts 
concerning its identity over time. Just as with the identity of a fictional character 
appearing in different novels, the matter is solved by convention. To put it bluntly: 
whether or not x is identical with y depends on nothing more than the beliefs of the 
relevant people. Johnston takes this entailment seriously, and offers an intriguing 
account of personal death in the process. To simplify: if selves are intentional, if our 
persistence conditions are a matter of convention - akin to fictional characters - then 
we can alter our nature merely by adopting a different narrative. On this view what 
counts as personal survival is “not something fixed in a uniform way by our natures as 
persons” (Johnston, 2010, p.317) but dependent on our “identity-determining 
dispositions” (Johnston, 2010, p.317). In other words, how we are disposed to identify 
with future selves determines the facts concerning our survival. If true, then personal 
death can be avoided merely by believing certain propositions: believing that you 
survive teletransportation of the kind we saw described by Parfit would result in 
survival. Of course, such beliefs would need to be caused by a fundamental change in 
your identity-determining dispositions, and this is not something that Johnston 
supposes would be an easy task, but in principle his account allows for it. There are 
further strange consequences identified by Dainton: 
 
In a similar, but more radical vein, anyone who believes that it is appropriate to 
identify with all future individuals (or at least, those who are deserving of such 
concern), and who also succeed in adjusting their identity-determining 
dispositions accordingly, will be justified in believing that they themselves will 
survive as these future individuals, in a quite literal way. Something 
approximating immortality is thus a genuine possibility for those who are 
suitably disposed. (Dainton, 2012, p.176, original italics) 
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Johnston’s account is intriguing to say the least, but deeply counterintuitive. Consider 
the following: if Johnston is correct then I can solve my own “personal Bridge 
Problem” with ease - I only need to change my fundamental dispositions regarding 
what it is possible for me to survive, and thereby come to believe that a gap in my 
consciousness does not result in my death. But, of course, this is already what I am 
fundamentally disposed to believe (or, at least, until the arguments presented here 
began to erode my certainty). Is it really plausible to hold that there is no Bridge 
Problem purely on the basis of what we are disposed to believe? The point can be put 
quite sharply as follows: if the arguments in support of The Ephemeral Self are strong 
enough then, on Johnston’s view, its adherents would not merely be accepting that our 
lifespans are shorter than they had previously thought: they would be causing them to 
become so! The Ephemeral Self account has the counterintuitive conclusion that I will 
cease to exist tonight but conventionalist accounts, such as Johnston’s, have 
implications that seem absurd by contrast. All of these considerations should be kept 
in mind when we judge the plausibility of The Ephemeral Self on the basis of its 
intuitive appeal or lack thereof.   
There are many routes to a denial of the reality of the self. For someone like 
Thomas Metzinger: “no such things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or 
had a self” (Metzinger, 2003, p.1) and “[f]or all scientific and philosophical purposes, 
the notion of a self - as a theoretical entity - can be safely eliminated” (Metzinger, 
2005, p.3). On Metzinger’s account what I typically take to be my inner experiential 
self is in fact a phenomenal model that is not recognised as a model by the system 
producing it: 
 
We are Ego Machines, natural information-processing systems that arose in the 
process of biological evolution on this planet … We each have conscious self-
models - integrated images of ourselves as a whole, which are fully anchored in 
background emotions and physical sensations. Therefore, the world simulation 
constantly being created by our brains is built around a center. But we are 
unable to experience it as such, or our self-models as models. (Metzinger, 2009, 
p.207) 
 
Such a denial of the self is also a uniting claim amongst the various strands of 
Buddhism. The radical nature of such a position is arguably sometimes not fully 
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appreciated - on the difference between reductive and eliminative views the following 
should be kept in mind: 
 
Both theories … reject the notion of a substantive self which somehow exists 
beyond the bounds of experience. The difference, however, is that while the 
reductionist accounts then go on to resurrect the self and, consequently, its 
identity, in terms of putative psychological relations or various theories of the 
body, the no-self theory lets the self lie where it has fallen. This is because the 
no-self theory is not a theory about the self at all. It is rather a rejection of all 
such theories as inherently untenable. (Giles, 1993, p.175) 
 
As we have seen The Stream Thesis shortens the lifespan of the self in a 
counterintuitive way. It does, however, accept its reality to begin with! In short, it 
seems fair to say this at least: if The Ephemeral Self faces a problem in the way it 
clashes with our everyday intuitions concerning our own nature, it is far from alone in 
this. There is another point to note: Bayne, Johnston, Metzinger, Dainton and the 
Buddhists all appeal to experiential considerations in reaching their conclusions. By 
denying the identity of a persisting self with its experiences, they are led to the 
various odd consequences highlighted above. Accepting such an identity admittedly 
leads to strange claims too, but it is not obvious that they are more implausible than 
the alternatives. When considering experience-centered accounts, then, it seems that a 
purely experiential picture of our nature is an option that we should not discount. 
 
 
§5.10 Animal instincts 
 
Perhaps a more commonsense account of personal identity, however, might avoid 
such issues. One such approach is zoological. On this view human beings are a kind 
of animal and, as such, you are one particular animal (the one reading this now). 
Might it be this simple? Olson (1998, p.654) puts it straightforwardly: “Why couldn’t 
we be human beings?” A seemingly very simple thought experiment puts pressure on 
such a view: suppose that you and I swap heads. (As strange as it may seem head (and 
nervous system) transplants may not be science fiction for much longer, depending on 
which experts you believe.) The problem for Animalism is brought out by Dennett’s 
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quip that nobody would opt to be the body-donor in a one-way head transplant 
situation (Dennett, 1978, p.313). It seems intuitively obvious that if your head is 
transplanted onto a different body you go with your head. The alternative is that you 
remain as the decapitated animal, so long as it is able to survive the process (by being 
hooked up to a life support system, for example). 
Imagine the following scenario: at some point in the near future we develop the 
technology necessary to carry out head and nervous system transplants - the severing 
and reattaching of nerve endings is handled by surgeons wielding highly accurate 
computer-supported instruments. Such operations are routine: in fact, a number of 
your friends and relatives have undergone such a procedure as a form of life 
extension. Unfortunately, all of your major organs other than your brain have begun 
to fail owing to an illness of some kind. Not having a cure for this illness your best bet 
is the following: a routine operation can remove your head (and nervous system) from 
your body and attach it to a healthy one. Luckily for you, a body-donor recently met a 
gruesome end in an accident that resulted in the loss of his head. There is now, then, a 
perfectly healthy body being kept in an incubated state, awaiting a new head. Is it 
really reasonable to suppose that you might be reluctant to undergo the operation on 
the grounds that you might remain as a disembodied animal? Would your survival 
instincts really be aroused in such a way, given the many perfectly happy post-
transplant people you have conversed with? We can suppose that for unknown 
reasons it has been discovered that the procedure is much more likely to be successful 
(physiologically speaking) if the patient is kept conscious throughout. The experience 
of being removed from the top of your body and placed onto another one would be, in 
more ways than one, unnerving. We can therefore suppose that copious drugs are 
given to you to induce a calm and tranquil state of consciousness. You are singing an 
old favourite tune when the surgeons begin the delicate task of removing your head. 
You are surprised by your reaction to being passed into the hands of a nurse: you find 
it amusing and mutter something about rugby. You are still in your drug-induced high 
when your reattachment begins and remain so throughout the whole process. Given 
that each (surreal) stretch of experience directly flowed into the next, is it not obvious 
that you have survived this operation? Is there any plausible sense in which, looking 
over at your ex-body post-operation, you might worry that you had not survived? It is 
difficult to take such a possibility seriously.  
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Animalists have their responses to this, of course, but the point is clear: it seems 
that a perfectly intuitive account of the self is a rare thing indeed. In defense of 
Animalism, Olson claims the following: 
 
Every interesting metaphysical claim has unwelcome consequences, and as 
unwelcome consequences go, these seem to me pretty mild. Couldn’t we just be 
wrong about who would be who in imaginary brain-transplant cases, just as we 
can be wrong about who would be who in other bizarre cases (amnesia, 
brainwashing, duplication) where the usual patterns of evidence break down? 
(Olson, 2007, p.47) 
 
We might well be wrong in such cases but the fact remains: our intuitions can be 
challenged deeply even when the theory on offer is as naturalistic as Animalism. 
Olson gestures at a further important point in claiming that there are unwelcome 
consequences for “every interesting metaphysical claim”. This is a very general 
statement and it would be difficult to prove conclusively but it does seem a reasonable 
one when applied to the domain of personal identity. In our typical non-philosophical 
moods the conception we have of ourselves on a day to day basis is not the result of 
deep theorising: if we think about our essential nature at all it is not usually as part of 
an attempt to get at the necessary and sufficient conditions for personal persistence. 
Our everyday thoughts about ourselves are for the most part socially orientated: we 
think about ourselves in terms of our relationships to other people and in terms of our 
overall life narrative. That there would be a clash between this general conception of 
ourselves and a purposefully specific view of our most essential nature is surely not 
that surprising. If it is less palatable than the counterintuitive facts we learn and accept 
concerning the nature of the objects in the world around us, perhaps this is due in 
large part because it is about ourselves. Whatever the underlying reasons for this, it 
seems fair to say that discounting The Ephemeral Self purely on the grounds that it 







§5.11 Memories and intuition  
 
The second issue to consider is the following: in certain ways The Stream Thesis is 
very much in accordance with our intuitions concerning personal persistence. It 
matches our intuitions concerning our moment-to-moment survival (and does so 
better than any competing view) and on this point The Stream Thesis is intuitive in a 
phenomenologically supported way: when we attend closely and carefully to our 
stream of experiences we notice that they flow into each other seamlessly. That co-
conscious experiences such as this are consubjective is a highly plausible claim. In 
other words, the reason for our intuitive acceptance on this matter is a solid one. What 
of the reasons we have for finding The Stream Thesis unpalatable? As we saw earlier, 
there may be general reasons for the occurrence of psychological friction when we are 
confronted with a new picture of our nature. But, specifically, for what reason do we 
find it hard to accept that what we are now did not exist yesterday? In addition to 
common sense views about personhood a significant part of the answer is memory.  
 In recalling an experience we take it as evidence that we have existed prior to the 
present moment. If you remember having breakfast yesterday you do not just 
remember someone-or-other-having-breakfast: you remember yourself-having-
breakfast, or so it seems. How could you recall you-having-breakfast if there was no 
“you” yesterday? A powerful impression of having existed yesterday is certainly had, 
but it is arguably not as strong or robust as the impression of continuity we feel when 
we attend carefully to the flow of our experiences. Unless we subscribe to some kind 
of direct realist account of memory (and hold that in recalling some event we are 
connected directly to the past) then we must accept that a memory of having breakfast 
yesterday is only a representation of that experience. We can now ask: in what way 
does this representation necessarily entail that the self currently recalling a previous 
experience is the selfsame one represented as having existed previously? The 
following claims from Bertrand Russell are relevant: 
 
It is not logically necessary to the existence of a memory-belief that the event 
remembered should have occurred, or even that the past should have existed at 
all. There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into 
being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that 
“remembered” a wholly unreal past. There is no logically necessary connection 
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between events at different times; therefore nothing that is happening now or 
will happen in the future can disprove the hypothesis that the world began five 
minutes ago. (Russell, 1995, p.132) 
 
Russell’s essential point stands even if we take it to be an analytical truth that I can 
only remember my previous experiences (i.e. experiences that I underwent): we need 
only change his “memory-belief” to an “apparent-memory-belief”. Following Parfit 
(1984, p.220) we can label such apparent memories “quasi-memories” or “q-
memories”: they are qualitatively indistinguishable from genuine memories (and they 
are about previous events) but there is no conceptual requirement that the same 
subject is involved. On the account offered here, then, my memories of earlier today 
are genuine memories, but my memories of yesterday are only q-memories. There is, 
crucially, nothing in either the phenomenological content of the memory experience 
or the causal mechanisms responsible for it that necessitates the identity of the subject 
over the represented time frame: that we can easily conceive of the world having only 
sprung into being five minutes ago speaks to this point. 
 The psychological tension we encounter when confronted by The Ephemeral Self 
account’s claims is not based on a commitment informed by philosophical analysis: 
the claim that memory necessitates an identity between the remembering self and the 
self remembered is not the cause of the trouble. It is based on our interpretation of our 
memories, which in turn is informed by the narrative we tell to ourselves about 
ourselves. This is not a particularly strong reason for holding an account to be 
damagingly counterintuitive. It should not be granted as much weight as our intuitive 
acceptance of The Stream Thesis’ moment-to-moment persistence conditions: this 
acceptance is grounded in our phenomenology itself, as opposed to being grounded in 
an interpretative belief about what our phenomenology represents when it takes the 
form of a memory. We may find it hard to believe that we did not exist yesterday, but 
it is perfectly conceivable. It is not unbelievable in the way that becoming separated 
from our current stream of consciousness is: the lack of believability here is directly 
linked to its inconceivability, not to a pre-theoretical conception of the self.   
 In fact Strawson has argued that not everyone shares the intuition that the self 




Endurantist individuals are those … who in the daily living of their subjecthood 
… intuitively figure the self as something that has long-term diachronic 
continuity, something that was there in the remoter past and will be there in the 
further future. Impermanentist individuals by contrast, are those … whose 
natural, regularly, lived sense of things is that the self that they now experience 
themselves to be is not something that was there in the remoter past or 
something that will be there in the further future, although they are of course 
fully aware of their long-term continuity as human beings considered as a 
whole. (Strawson, 2009, p.221) 
 
Strawson hypothesises that this contrast in outlook may be the result of “a 
fundamental difference between human beings, with its roots in brain chemistry and 
organization, in genetically determined differences in individual temperament or 
general mental style” (Strawson, 2009, p.221). It would be interesting to see a large-
scale questionnaire on this issue, to try and put a number on the percentage of people 
in the general population belonging to each camp. It would also be interesting to see 
just how recent a self the majority of Impermanentists would be naturally willing to 
disown: having the sense that the self of my childhood is distinct from my current one 
is surely more common than having the sense that the self of yesterday is gone. 
Perhaps such a prediction would be surprisingly refuted: Strawson, for one, claims to 
quite naturally conceive of himself as having not existed yesterday. He uses “I*” to 
refer to the self considered as an inner mental subject: 
 
If I engage in the philosophical exercise of trying to reach back to some sort of 
part of yesterday’s consciousness … and manage to come up with something, I 
will certainly judge that it ‘belongs with’ today’s consciousness in so far as it is 
consciousness on the part of the same single human being that I am … I know 
for one thing, that I can’t reach back to anyone else’s consciousness in that 
from-the-inside way. But I don’t thereby feel that it belongs with my present 
consciousness in such a way that I think it was I* who was there yesterday … It 
feels remote. Nor do I judge, or feel, that it is I* who was there yesterday. On 




Strawson doubts that he is unusual in this respect. Whether he is right or not is 
something we will have to remain agnostic on for now. It seems, however, that we 
can say this much: some people naturally have the sense that the particular mental 
subject that they are did not exist in the remote past, regardless of what memories 
they may hold. If they were also persuaded by the arguments leading to The Stream 
Thesis it seems likely, therefore, that they would not find it entirely counterintuitive. 
What of Endurantist individuals? 
 I, myself, am one: I have the natural sense that the self I am today existed as far 
back as my memory can go. This is true even when I purposefully keep in mind the 
view of myself as an experiential being. As such, the conclusions of The Stream 
Thesis do not naturally strike me as intuitive. If I think through it carefully, keeping in 
mind the arguments in support of The Ephemeral Self account, it can seem plausible 
and believable. However, even after rehearsing such arguments, my natural 
disposition is not altered: if I recall a memory from childhood it still very much 
strikes me as being about me: the being I am now. This contrast between intellectual 
belief and what we might call “experiential belief” (a lived sense of something’s 
being the case) is not, however, a particularly new, or damaging, phenomenon. 
Determinists are all too familiar with it: an intellectual acceptance of the lack of 
genuine alternatives does nothing to dispel the sense that on choosing to do x one 
could have instead done y. When we are seeking a believable account of personal 
identity these two different notions of belief are important. If an account delivers only 
intellectual belief this does not mean that we cannot recognise ourselves at all in it, 
only that it might be a difficult picture to assimilate into our daily lives. There is no 
good reason to think that this presents a serious problem for The Ephemeral Self 
account: many theories demand intellectual belief without changing our typical, day 
to day, ways of thinking much. Indirect realism is a good example: we may be, with 
good reason, convinced that we are not in direct contact with the external world, but 
this consideration rarely makes an appearance in our daily lives. This is simply to 
accept that in some ways the models we have of the world and ourselves are 
inaccurate. Given the natural evolution of our brains this is not a surprise: a correct 
appreciation of the fundamental facts concerning our identity is not something that 
would have given us a survival advantage (especially if it is true that you will not 
survive unconsciousness).  
 165 
 What of the response that The Ephemeral Self invites when we look forward in 
time? What does it mean to say that what you are will cease to exist the moment you 
become unconscious? There are reasons to think that this claim is less threatening, 
both to The Stream Thesis and to our own psychological wellbeing, than it might at 
first appear. This reconceptualisation of death is part of a wider set of implications 
brought on by The Ephemeral Self account. There is good reason to think that 
although we must give up a good deal in accepting the theory, there are also 
significant gains to be made. We now need to consider these. 
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6: The Personal Copernican Revolution 
 
 
The Ephemeral Self account, if accepted, demands a significant change in how we 
view our own nature: The Stream Thesis changes how we view our nature considered 
over time and, in doing so, demands a reconceptualisation of death. Even before this, 
however, The Exhaustive Constitution Thesis challenges some prior conceptions we 
have of ourselves and, as will be shown, suggests that our basic self-experience is in 
fact very different from how we typically take it to be. When this latter point is 
directly and experientially recognised by a subject it can fittingly be described as a 
kind of personal Copernican revolution. In considering this we will complete our 
defence of The Stream Thesis’ strange implications concerning personal death. 
 
 
§6.1 Death and myself 
 
Just how palatable is a theory that entails that what you are will cease to exist the 
moment you become unconscious? The first point to make is the following: the claim 
that “I will cease to exist tonight” can be made with different intentions, i.e. the entity 
referenced is not necessarily the same in all utterances: “‘I’ is not univocal. We move 
naturally between conceiving of ourselves primarily as a human being and primarily 
as some sort of persisting inner subject” (Strawson, 2003, p.286). This is an important 
point and worth considering in detail: 
 
I reject the assumption that ‘I’ is univocal in the thought or speech of any given 
individual. The reference of ‘I’ standardly shifts between two different things in 
my thought and speech and in the thought and speech of others. Sometimes ‘I’ 
is used with the intention to refer to a human being considered as a whole, 
sometimes it’s used with the intention to refer to a self - two things that have 
quite different identity conditions … To say this is not to assume that selves 




We have in fact already seen how easily the referent of ‘I’ can shift: recall the “body-
swapping” thought experiment of §5.1 (pp.113-4). In entertaining the scenario you 
were employing the “I” concept: you were considering the question “where will I be 
after the psychological change?” in an attempt to root out your most fundamental 
intuitions concerning your own personal survival. Entertaining the outlandish idea 
that your stream of consciousness might come to be sustained by the brain in the head 
of another body required conceptualising yourself as no more than an “inner 
persisting subject”, as Strawson calls it. We saw that there was no difficulty in 
conceiving of such a scenario, regardless of its presumed nomological impossibility. 
Quite how often we think of ourselves as “inner subjects” is difficult to know, but that 
it can and does happen seems hard to disagree with. If we can think of ourselves in 
such a way this is because we can experience ourselves in such a way: we can have 
the experience of being an inner subject without explicitly considering ourselves as 
human beings. Strawson elaborates: 
 
I mean the experience that people have of themselves as being, specifically, a 
mental presence; a mental someone; a single mental something or other. Such 
Self-experience comes to every normal human being, in some form, in early 
childhood. The realization of the fact that one’s thoughts are unobservable by 
others, the experience of the sense in which one is alone in one’s head or mind, 
the mere awareness of oneself as thinking: these are among the very deepest 
facts about the character of human life … They are vivid forms of Self-
experience that are perhaps most often salient when one is alone and thinking, 
although they can be equally strong in a room full of people. (Strawson, 2002, 
p.104) 
 
The relevance of this to the issue at hand is obvious: the claim that you will cease to 
exist as soon as you lose consciousness can be taken to mean quite different things, 
depending on the kind of self-concept employed at the time of consideration. The 
believability of such a claim alters depending on how the claim is heard - there is, 
after all, all the difference in the world between hearing the following: 
 






2. The human being that you take yourself to be (with all of its memories, 
desires and social relationships) will end tonight. 
 
If care is taken to bear this distinction in mind then the claims of The Ephemeral Self 
account appear far more reasonable. The problem, of course, is that these two 
meanings are easily conflated: it is quite hard to consider the claim that “what I am 
will not exist tomorrow” and remain focused on the use of “I” denoting your 
experiential nature only. One’s mind is pulled in the direction of the social conception 
of oneself: the human being considered as a whole. Trying to picture the continued 
existence of this organism, whilst simultaneously accepting that you (this particular 
inner subject) will be absent, is no easy task. It seems reasonable to assume that this 
difficulty does not merely stem from normal habits of self-conceptualisation, but that 
the typically negative connotations of personal death are also playing their part. 
Interestingly, such connotations are not entirely merited if indeed The Ephemeral Self 
account of our nature is accurate. This means the following: if we can succeed in truly 
believing the claims that this account is putting forward, a significant factor in our 
finding it counterintuitive is lessened.  
 Consider the ways in which this account reconceptualises personal death from both 
the first-person and third-person perspectives. With regards to the latter: it is 
occurring much more often than we previously believed but in such a way that, 
ordinarily, no one even notices. Aside from positing universal eternal life, it is hard to 
think of a more significant way of diminishing the ominous character we attribute to 
our own personal demise. Every (non-vicariously)34 conscious being existing on Earth 
last week has since died, and no one has noticed anything out of the ordinary: society 
has continued on in just the usual way. Of course, from this third-person perspective, 
the biological death of a human being is no less an event of finality and importance. 
The human being (the consciousness producing organism) has ceased to exist and, 
with that, so too have its social relationships. This is an important fact that it would be 
strange to ignore but the following point remains: the (genuinely) conscious being 
                                                
34 As defined in §3 (pp.78-81). 
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that has at that moment ceased to be (i.e. the self-intimating stream of experiences) 
had only been in existence for a relatively short time. Such a consideration will of 
course do nothing to console those in mourning over the death of a human being, but 
it speaks to the following: from the first-person perspective the significance of 
biological death is fundamentally altered if The Ephemeral Self account is accepted. 
Unless the organism currently producing your experiences dies today, its biological 
death is not something that is going to have any effect on you. You, as the stream of 
experiences occurring right now, will have long gone.  
 If this strikes you as swapping one piece of bad news for another then consider 
this: the conscious being that was produced by your C-system (or brain) yesterday, 
who you are currently prone to identify yourself with, has ceased to exist and, 
crucially, this fact is of very little importance to you now. Similarly, the end of you 
(of this particular stream of experiences) will be of no significance tomorrow for the 
conscious being that shares your C-system: it will seem as if the self-same entity has 
survived the night. Is this state of affairs a depressing prospect? If we are prone to 
thinking of ourselves as fairly long-lived beings - as an entity that has experiences, 
but who stands apart from them - then it does imply a great loss. As we shall see, a 
consideration of the phenomenological situation entailed by The Exhaustive 
Constitution Thesis is relevant here: a true appreciation of its claims concerning self-
experience can make The Ephemeral Self’s reconceptualisation of death much more 
acceptable on a personal level. 
 In a sense The Ephemeral Self is an error theory: it claims that, although we 
typically believe ourselves to be more than just our currently occurring stream of 
experiences, we are mistaken. There is a further aspect to this: in becoming aware of 
the error, and in purposefully attending to some phenomenological facts relating to it, 
there is good reason to think that a certain degree of general psychological suffering 
can be alleviated. On both of these points The Ephemeral Self shares a good deal with 
the claims and goals of much of Indian Philosophy, even though the account 
presented here refrains from some of the bolder metaphysical claims that can be found 






§6.2 A middle way 
 
Tentatively, as we enter into somewhat more speculative territory now, The 
Ephemeral Self can be used to present a naturalistic soteriology (whilst also giving 
due credit to our most fundamental intuitions concerning our own moment-to-moment 
persistence). On its soteriological features, it sits well within the following wider 
context: 
 
Irrespective of the often considerable differences between their metaphysical 
doctrines, many of the major philosophical schools of India agree in their basic 
assumption that, in order to become aware of one’s own true nature, one has to 
inhibit one’s self-consciousness in the usual sense, namely one’s ‘ego-sense’ 
(ahaṃkāra, literally ‘I-maker’). The normal way we are aware of ourselves - 
that is, our self-awareness as a distinct psychophysical entity with particular 
characteristics and abilities, formed by a personal history, standing in manifold 
relations to other things and persons, etc. - is in this view really the construction 
of a pseudo-self that obscures what we really are … for Buddhism this means 
that the spiritual aim is to realize that it is an illusion that something like a self 
exists at all, for ‘orthodox’ schools such as Advaita Vedānta or Samkhya and 
Yoga, liberation lies, on the contrary, in becoming aware of the true self (ātman 
or puruṣa). (Fasching, 2010, p.193) 
 
Fasching goes on to present an enlightening interpretation of the phenomenological 
situation confronting a conscious being engaged in the above practise.  A significant 
portion of Fasching’s claims is both philosophically sound and amenable to the 
account being put forward here. There is, however, room for disagreement. Working 
through and tackling his various arguments will shed light on The Ephemeral Self 
account and go some way to addressing its counterintuitive treatment of personal 
death. Further to this, by placing it somewhere between the metaphysics of the 
orthodox schools and their Buddhist rivals a good case can be made for the following: 
The Ephemeral Self is, in actual fact, a relatively moderate theory in this context.  
 Fasching’s stated goal hints at our desired middle-ground: 
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I would like to cast, from a phenomenological point of view, some reflections 
on what this overcoming of the ego-sense strived for by these traditions could 
possibly mean, and will try to vindicate the view of Advaita Vedānta that it does 
not amount to a dissolution of oneself into a mere flux of substrate-less transient 
phenomena, but rather to a realization of one’s self as something that 
changelessly underlies this flux. (Fasching, 2010, pp.193-4) 
 
Broadly speaking, and rephrasing to suit the context of our discussion, the orthodox 
schools of thought (such as Advaita Vedānta) hold that the self persists throughout the 
entirety of a human life (and, indeed, thereafter). The various forms of Buddhism, on 
the other hand, hold that there is no such thing as genuine identity over time: there is 
no self at all, i.e. the no-self theory (anātman) is true. The Ephemeral Self occupies a 
middle-ground: there is no eternal (or even biological-life-long) self, but there is 
genuine personal identity over time (although for a shorter duration than we typically 
believe). Investigating Fasching’s attempted vindication of Advaita Vedānta will help 
to both elucidate this middle-ground and show why it is the strongest position to hold. 
In a nutshell, we will see good reasons to reject Fasching’s bracketed claim below 
whilst agreeing that there is something importantly true, though perhaps somewhat 
difficult to get at, concerning his interpretation of “witnessing”: 
 
the claim against the Buddhists is not that there has to be some entity in addition 
to, and behind or beyond, our experiential life as its substrate, but that there is a 
stable element within it - yet not as some invariant content or content-
constellation we could experience (such a thing is indeed not to be found), but 
as the very process of experiencing itself, as the permanence of ‘witnessing’, in 
which everything we experience has its being-experienced, and which is the 
constant ground of our own being. (Fasching, 2010, p.194) 
 
To the first point we have already seen that there is indeed an “invariant content” to 
be found within a typical stream of experiences: co-consciousness. Co-consciousness 
is an experienced relation between experiences. Fasching, on the unity of 
consciousness, claims that “nothing on the content-side can do this job” (Fasching, 
2009, p.142). In §4 (pp.82-108), we saw strong arguments to the contrary that we 
won’t rehearse here. An important motivation for Fasching’s reluctance to accept the 
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role of phenomenal relations here is the following: if one accepts that consciousness 
can unify itself by itself, as it were, then the theoretical need for a transcendental 
subject vanishes. The problem with this, for Fasching, is that the following thought-
experiment induced implication is unacceptable:    
 
It appears to be perfectly conceivable that this very experience with all its 
relations to other experiences of the same stream of consciousness, to this body 
and to the rest of the world, could have existed without the ‘I’ which 
experiences it being me. This seems to be a contingent … fact. (Fasching, 2010, 
p.199, original italics) 
 
This (apparent) contingency is, for Fasching, entailed by the following: 
 
This ‘who’ of experiencing is an additional fact with regard to the experience 
and its phenomenal character: No facts whatsoever about an experience or its 
‘what-it-feels-like-ness’ can ever imply its being experienced by me (except, 
precisely, that it is I who experiences it). (Fasching, 2010, p.199, original 
italics) 
 
The problem with this claim is that it is only if I hold myself to be distinct from my 
currently occurring experiences that I can coherently imagine undergoing a different 
set of experiences (with none in common with my current stream) whilst remaining 
myself. The impression that I am distinct from my current stream of experiences is 
precisely what is being shown to be inaccurate by The Exhaustive Constitution Thesis. 
Bayne has the following to say on the issue:  
 
Prima facie, it seems to be coherent to suppose that one could have enjoyed a 
stream of consciousness that had no experience in common with those that one 
has actually enjoyed … The naïve phenomenalist may need to accept that it is 
incoherent to suppose that one could have had radically different experiences. 
This may be an objection to naïve phenomenalism but it is not a knockout blow, 
for a good case can be made for thinking that any plausible account of the self 
will need to reject some of the modal intuitions that surround the self. (Bayne, 
2010, p.283, original italics) 
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As we saw earlier, our intuitions concerning selfhood seem to be challenged 
whenever we attempt to specify our persistence conditions in a precise way. The 
arguments in support of The Stream Thesis are, on their own, good reason enough to 
hold that Fasching’s above thought experiment is incoherent. Briefly put: at the 
present time I am exhaustively constituted by the currently occurring experience (x) 
of which I am (non-inferentially) conscious, owing to the fact that only x, as self-
conscious and self-intimating, can be conscious of x in such an immediate fashion. 
Owing to the phenomenal unity that exists between x and the rest of the experiences 
in its stream, I am identical with the stream of consciousness of which x is a part. As 
this stream of experiences I could not have been an entirely different stream of 
experiences: it simply makes no sense to say so. This stream of experiences is this 
stream of experiences. If you can seemingly imagine yourself enjoying a stream of 
experiences sharing zero content with your current one, then you are not imagining 
yourself undergoing change: you are picturing yourself as the bearer of this stream - 
as something distinct from it. This is not to deny, of course, that we can coherently 
imagine having woken up today and decided to spend the rest of the day in bed: if we 
rewind our stream of experiences in our imagination and picture a different set 
flowing on from our earlier ones, we have imagined a possible world in which we 
have different experiences. The crucial point is that such experiences would have 
been directly connected to one or more of the experiences of this stream occurring 
now. This is different from supposing that “I” could have undergone the experiences 
of, say, the President of the United States as they were yesterday: this is simply 
incoherent. It would be even better however, if we can show where Fasching goes 






This aspect of experience is held by Fasching to, in part, do the work of individuating 
different subjects of experience (Fasching, 2008, p.133). We need to investigate, then, 
whether or not “mineness” can indeed perform this function and, furthermore, if the 
necessary work can be done without it. In doing so, it will become clear which aspects 
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of Fasching’s account of “becoming aware of one’s true nature” (Fasching, 2010, 
p.193) are favourable and which we should attempt to do without. Fasching makes his 
case as follows: 
 
In my experiencing them, my experiences are given to me in a totally different 
way than to anyone else, and are in this sense the experiences I have or I 
experience … They are experienced by me and not by you … The “I” is not to 
be found as some observable object, but in the fact of the mineness of my 
experiences. (Fasching, 2009, pp.132-3, original italics) 
 
Dan Zahavi (2005b) employs the same notion for similar purposes. On the shared 
features of different experiences he says the following: 
 
One commonality is the quality of mineness, the fact that the experiences are 
characterized by first-personal givenness. That is, the experience is given (at 
least tacitly) as my experience, as an experience I am undergoing or living 
through. (Zahavi, 2005b, p.16, original italics) 
 
As an act of descriptive (i.e. not transcendental) Phenomenology, Zahavi’s claims 
seem reasonable enough (depending on how we interpret them). A problem develops 
when, instead of “mineness” being posited as a phenomenological feature of 
experience, it is held to be the mechanism responsible for individuating subjects: 
 
Whether a certain experience is experienced as mine or not, does not, however, 
depend upon something apart from the experience, but exactly upon the 
givenness of the experience. If the experience is given originarily, in a first-
personal mode of presentation, it is experienced as my experience, otherwise not 
… the particular primary presence of the experience makes it mine, and 
distinguishes it from whatever experiences others might have. (Zahavi, 2000, 
pp.60-1, original italics) 
 
It seems that “mineness” is here employed to mean two very different things: firstly it 
refers to the way an experience is made manifest for its subject. But it also appears to 
be referring to what it is that makes an experience belong to subject A as opposed to 
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subject B. In other words, it is a structural feature of my experience and it is what 
makes my experience mine as opposed to yours. A serious problem looms. Fasching, 
referencing David H. Lund (2005, p.118), is aware of it: 
 
The question of what it means to say that it is me who has this present 
experience cannot be answered by referring to its property of “mineness” (i.e. 
first-personal givenness), for every experience that ever has been experienced 
possesses this feature. But only those experiences that are first-personally 
experienced by me are mine. The mineness of my experience is not some 
mineness but my mineness. What is this mineness of mineness? (Fasching, 
2009, p.138, original italics) 
 
When “mineness” is employed in such a way its defenders are stuck on the horn of a 
dilemma: either the notion can no longer individuate subjects (owing to the fact that it 
is a quality inherent in all experiences) or it has to be combined with a further feature 
that is itself little more than a stipulation. Zahavi opts for the latter option: on his 
account an experience is mine because it is characterised by a “mineness” that is 
instantiated in a particular primary presence: my primary presence.35 But what exactly 
is this primary presence?  And what makes it my primary presence? It seems to be no 
more than a theoretical placeholder for the task that “mineness” cannot fulfill on its 
own.  
 The Ephemeral Self account, employing only the phenomenologically sound notion 
of co-consciousness, deals with the issue much more efficiently. Consider your 
current experience. Remember to keep in mind that although language demands that it 
is most naturally described as “your” experience it is in fact not something distinct 
from you: during its occurrence you are exhaustively constituted by it. In saying that 
this experience is “given to you” in a way that it is not “given to me” Zahavi and 
Fasching are describing the following fact: my experience is not something you are 
conscious of in the way that you are conscious of your own. You may infer that I am 
having an experience by observing my behavior (among other things) but you do not 
infer your own: it is immediately present. The same is true from my perspective and 
                                                
35 Fasching also combines “mineness” with a further feature: the “dimension of first-personal 
presentation which has no other essential property than being me” (Fasching, 2009, p.146). This seems, 
ultimately, to be the same concept. 
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this much we should certainly agree with. This state of affairs, however, can be 
described quite adequately without recourse to “mineness” in either of its uses. Call 
the experience of which you are (non-inferentially) conscious “x” and the experience 
of which I am (non-inferentially) conscious “y”. The state of affairs is simply this: x 
and y are not co-conscious. They are self-intimating and self-conscious, and they do 
not enter into the immediate phenomenal sphere of each other.  
 The Stream Thesis, with its notion of co-consciousness, accounts for the claim that 
my current experiences are “given to me” in a way that other currently occurring 
experiences are not, without motivating the notion that there is something 
experientially unique about the subject of this particular stream. There is this stream 
and there is that stream, and that is all that needs to be said: there is no special feature 
of my experience (unique to “me”) that is responsible for individuating streams. We 
can put this point in the following way: upon having specified all of the phenomenal 
relations between every experience in existence at this very moment, we have already 
individuated every stream of consciousness from every other one. If such a scenario 
leaves us with the impression that something is left out of this picture then it is 
because we are still thinking of ourselves as distinct from our conscious experiences, 
as an entity that stands apart from its phenomenology.  
The point can also be put the following way: suppose that, for the sake of 
argument, each stream of co-conscious experiences does indeed have a “primary 
presence” unique to its subject. Let’s further suppose that, as Zahavi and Fasching 
both agree, each experience is self-conscious and self-intimating in the way identified 
in §1 and §2 respectively. You are acquainted with only those experiences that are 
given through your particular primary presence, and the same holds for me. Now let’s 
suppose that this primary presence suddenly ceases to exist but that the relevant 
experience producing mechanisms continue to produce experiences with the same co-
conscious relations: immediately, and without warning, experiences are simply given 
“anonymously”, which is to say they do not belong to any particular primary presence 
but instead just appear for their respective subject. Would we notice the difference? 
The experiences that were previously given through your “primary presence” are still 
very much not co-conscious with the experiences previously given through my 
“primary presence”. In other words, what can the notion of “primary presence” 
account for that streams of co-conscious experience cannot? If it is merely the 
intuition that “I” could have had a different set of experiences (with none in common 
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with my current stream), then this is a weak motivation. We should interpret the 
following intuition differently from how we may at first be inclined to: 
 
Strangely, it appears to be a contingent fact that one is the person one is … No 
third-personally formulated feature of the person I am (be it his body, 
personality, or experiences) seems to logically imply that this person is not just 
“an I”, but me… (Fasching, 2009, p.141, original italics) 
 
Instead of taking this to mean that there must be more to being me than the 
occurrence of this particular stream of experiences, we should accept that indeed there 
is never anything more than, as Fasching puts it, an I. The sense that there is 
something experientially unique about this “I” is simply a mistake. We can either 
accept that we are misled as to our nature in this respect or else become committed to 
the mysterious notion of “primary presence” which accounts for nothing (aside from a 
questionable intuition) that co-consciousness cannot. Furthermore, such a notion has 
the suspicious property of exclusively solving the problem at hand without itself 
being particularly scrutable: 
 
No features of my experiences - no matter whether intrinsic or relational - can 
imply their being mine except their having their manifestation in this very 
dimension of first-personal presentation which has no other essential property 
than being me. (Fasching, 2009, p.146) 
 
In a similar fashion to the issue of temporal consciousness, if we can focus on the 
phenomenological data and avoid positing theoretical constructs such as this then our 
theory is stronger for it. It is worth bearing in mind just how intuitive The Stream 
Thesis is, prior to its dealings with death: 
 
The view that the oneness of “one mind” means that various experiences are 
unified, and that this unification is due to some inter-experiential relations is 
certainly not utterly implausible. On the contrary, as a matter of fact, prima 
facie, it seems to be nearly self-evident - how could it be otherwise? Yet on 
closer inspection, as the debate about personal identity brought to light, it turns 




As we saw, however, a close inspection should include specifying the phenomenal 
relations between experiences as opposed to exclusively dealing with physical and 
psychological continuity. This thought goes some way to addressing another of 
Fasching’s problems with views of the reductive kind: 
 
These implications are due to the fact that concepts like “connectedness” or 
“continuity” allow for degrees and also, at least in principle, for splitting and 
merging … Experiences can be more or less unified, borderline cases are 
possible where only an arbitrary decision can determine whether something 
should or should not count as belonging to a unit of bound-together items. But 
can experiences be more or less mine? Can there be borderline cases of 
mineness? Is it not necessarily the case that each experience is either 
experienced by me or not, without any in-between? And is not the question of 
whether it is the one or the other a real difference and not just a question of 
referring to the same matter of fact in different ways? (Fasching, 2009, p.135)  
 
The Stream Thesis is compatible with Fasching’s claim that experiences cannot be 
more or less “mine”: an experience is either co-conscious (directly or indirectly) with 
my current one or it is not (i.e. it is either “mine” or it is not). As we saw, this is one 
advantage that phenomenal continuity has over psychological connectedness: it does 
not result in indeterminacy.  
 It is true that the imaginary scenario in which a stream splits into two (or more) 
presents a difficulty for an experiential account. The same issue can, however, be 
turned back onto Fasching: imagine that your current stream of experiences suddenly 
splits into two. Suppose that branch A retains your “primary presence” and branch B 
does not. According to Fasching and Zahavi experience of our kind is necessarily 
given through a primary presence, so perhaps they would say that the experiences in 
branch B are now given through a new primary presence? Consider this scenario from 
the perspective of the subject moving from the original stream into the B section. If 
consciousness was retained throughout the process then it seems that the subject of 
the experiences in branch B was also conscious during the original phase of the 
stream: any given experience in the B phase is diachronically co-conscious with any 
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given experience in the original phase, owing to the overlapping specious presents 
that exist between them. According to the current interpretation of this state of affairs, 
however, a new primary presence (and hence a new subject) has begun. If primary 
presences do the job of individuating subjects then there is a dilemma: either a subject 
can come apart from its stream of consciousness (this is what happens to the subject 
of the original phase of the stream that ends in B), in which case such an account goes 
against one of our most strongly held intuitions concerning personal persistence, or 
else the subjects in phases A and B share the same primary presence and are therefore 
in fact identical despite enjoying different branches of the stream. In facing the latter 
option a primary-presence account is in the same boat as a reductionist account of the 
experiential kind.  
 Perhaps an overlapping of some kind could solve the problem: Fasching might 
hold that the experiences in the original phase of the stream were in fact given to two 
different subjects (each with their own primary presence) who then separated upon 
the division of the stream. How much sense this makes is unclear, but an overlapping 
move of this kind can also be made by an account that only makes reference to 
experiential-relations. In short, unusual scenarios such as the splitting of conscious 
streams present a problem for both sides of the debate. This is not particularly 
surprising given that our basic intuitions concerning personal identity are rooted in 
typical experiences: stretching our everyday concepts by considering unusual 
scenarios is predictably going to provoke friction.  
 
 
§6.4 The luminosity of consciousness 
 
There are a number of reasons, then, to refrain from following Fasching in his defense 
of “mineness” and “primary presence”. As we will see, however, he does present a 
valuable account of the phenomenology at play for someone recognising his or her 
essential nature as consciousness. To a certain extent this is employed in an attempt to 
strengthen his anti-reductionist position but a good deal of his observations are 
convincing when considered in isolation from that project. As such, they can be used 
to address the issue of The Stream Thesis’ counterintuitive treatment of personal 
death.  
 It strikes me that, in trying to grapple with the following issues, we are taken 
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somewhere near the limits of discursive thought. But it also seems that there is 
something of genuine worth in the following discussion and that we should therefore 
at least try to get to the bottom of it. With this warning in mind, we need to begin with 
Fasching’s notion of “presence”: he claims that “[what] Advaita Vedānta 
soteriologically aims at as the realization of the ‘self’ is nothing other than becoming 
aware of experiential presence (consciousness) as such” (Fasching, 2010, p.207). This 
occurs, for Fasching, through a process of “de-superimposition” whereby: 
 
Instead of identifying certain configurations of experienced contents as being 
‘oneself’, one begins to experience oneself as the abiding experiencing itself 
(the taking place of presence) of any contents. De-superimposition means 
radically distinguishing oneself from all objects by no longer delimiting oneself 
(as an ‘inside’) as opposed to the objects ‘out there’. One stops considering 
anything as being ‘oneself’ or ‘one’s own’ … In the ‘de-identified’ mode of 
experiencing that is strived for, one completely lets go of ‘oneself’ and becomes 
nothing but ‘seeing’, without any distinct ‘seer’ standing apart from the ‘seen’ 
… One becomes aware of oneself precisely when one ceases to find oneself 
anywhere. (Fasching, 2010, pp.211-12) 
 
Within this dense chain of claims there is much to both agree and disagree with. We 
need to dig down into the key concept of “presence”: 
 
for the Advaitins - although they hold that mental states are manifest essentially, 
and not by virtue of being the object of some further, higher-order mental states 
- it is not adequate to say that they are immediately self-aware. Rather, they 
exist in manifesting themselves in the medium of the luminosity of 
consciousness, which is immediately self-revealed … while these experiences 
are permanently fleeting, conscious presence as such abides. (Fasching, 2010, 
p.202, original italics) 
 
Fasching is aware of the problems that can come from drawing a distinction between 
individual experiences and consciousness; we are “obviously hypostasizing 
consciousness into a ‘something’ in addition to experience” (Fasching, 2010, 202). He 
claims, however, that there is a justifiable way to make such a distinction, “in which a 
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multitude of experiences can be the taking place of the same consciousness” 
(Fasching, 2010, 202). We have already seen the reasons Fasching gives for taking 
this route and found them wanting. As such it is difficult to agree with his view that 
“presence” is experience-unifying or that it is responsible for the individuation of 
subjects. We have also seen solid reasons to refrain from drawing a distinction 
between consciousness and its contents in §2 (pp.40-77) (the discussion in §2.8 
(pp.70-77) is particularly relevant). There are, however, good reasons to think that his 
notion of “presence” when considered just in its mode of “luminosity” is getting at 
something extremely important (although elusive) with regards to the process of de-
identification under discussion. If we can understand it without “hypostasizing 
consciousness” into something over and above individual (albeit connected) 
experiences then we may be able to use much of Fasching’s interpretation to shed 
light on The Ephemeral Self’s soteriological possibilities, and thereby reduce the 
intuitive unease we might feel when considering its reconceptualisation of personal 
death.  
 We have in fact already touched upon the “luminosity” of consciousness that 
Fasching mentions. In agreeing with Dainton’s Simple Conception of experience and 
holding that experiences do not require a distinct awareness in order to be conscious, 
we identified them as “self-intimating” or “self-revealing” or “self-illuminating”. 
Putting to the side the reflexive aspect of these concepts for now, we need to consider 
the following: what does it mean for some phenomenal content to be “intimated”, 
“revealed” or “illuminated”? The simplest though perhaps least informative way of 
providing an answer is the following: phenomenal content is luminous in the sense 
that it is here. It is manifested. It is immediately present for its subject in such a way 
that its existence is not open to skeptical doubt: the luminosity of an experience is its 
undeniable appearing. As such it is the shared property of all phenomenal content: it 
is what makes it phenomenal content in the first place. Revisiting the comments of 
Moore from our investigation into transparency, it is this very feature of conscious 
experience that he himself was grasping at: 
 
The term ‘blue’ is easy enough to distinguish, but the other element which I 
have called ‘consciousness’ - that which sensation of blue has in common with 
sensation of green - is extremely difficult to fix. That many people fail to 
distinguish it at all is sufficiently shown by the fact that there are materialists. 
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And, in general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to 
escape us; it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent - we look through 
it and see nothing but the blue; we may be convinced that there is something, 
but what it is no philosopher, I think, has yet clearly recognised. (Moore, 1903, 
p.446, original italics) 
 
Accepting the difficulty we face in trying to attend to (or conceptualise) such a 
feature, we saw that Moore went on to say the following: 
 
the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, 
distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere 
emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the 
blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. Yet it can be distinguished if 
we look attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for. 
My main object in this paragraph has been to try to make the reader see it: but I 
fear I shall have succeeded very ill. (Moore, 1903, p.450, original italics) 
 
I think that Fasching presents a powerful interpretation as to why we find it difficult 
to identify this feature of conscious experience. Building on the metaphor of Moore, 
Fasching phrases it as follows: the luminosity of experience “is not one of the ‘seen’ 
things but the ‘seeing’ itself” (Fasching, 2010, p.208). Such phrasing can seem to lead 
to a reification of consciousness, or the positing of a distinct awareness gazing down 
at phenomenal content. We need not, however, go down this route. It is, after all, only 
a metaphor and as such can be put to work in various ways.  
It will serve us well if we can apply this seemingly abstract notion of “seeing” to 
our own presently occurring phenomenology. Consider your current visual experience 
of this page. If you were to be asked to catalogue what is appearing to you right now 
in this visual experience you could list the external content: the words on the page and 
the objects surrounding this document. You could list the various properties of these 
objects: their shapes, colors and relative positions. As we saw in the discussion 
concerning the ubiquity of inner awareness in §1 (pp.16-39) there is something else 
you must include: this experience itself. You are aware of the visual objects you are 
seeing and you are aware of your experience of them even though this is not itself 
something you see. Your phenomenology is simultaneously world-presenting and 
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self-presenting (in the sense that it presents itself). Now consider your auditory 
experience. The same applies: you are conscious of both the things represented by 
your phenomenology and your phenomenology itself. In short, as Strawson phrases it, 
“all awareness involves awareness of that very awareness” (Strawson, 2013, p.5), i.e. 
your conscious experience is self-luminous and “we can say that awareness takes 
itself as part of its own content; we can allow that this is one acceptable way to 
express what its self-intimation or ‘phosphorescence’ consists in” (Strawson, 2013, 
p.26, original italics).  
Staying only at the phenomenological level of inquiry, for any two experiences we 
can either focus on what makes each of them the particular experience that it is or we 
can focus on the feature that makes each of them an experience at all: the property of 
luminosity. Crucially, this is not to say that content and luminosity are in fact 
separable: as we saw with Dainton’s Simple Conception (§2.8 (pp.70-77)) there are 
very strong reasons to hold that these two aspects of experience are not, in reality, 
distinct. But luminosity alone can be teased out in thought (and made the target of 
explicit attention) owing to the fact that it is common to all experiences.  
Having done our best to differentiate luminosity from the other properties of 
experience, we must now tackle the following: in what way is luminosity itself 
phenomenologically present? This is a particularly difficult question to answer for the 
following reason: the luminosity of a particular phenomenal content just is that 
content’s property of being phenomenologically present. Luminosity, it seems, is not 
some particular phenomenal content that can appear but the very “phenomenality” of 
such appearances, as Fasching puts it (Fasching, 2008, p.467, original italics). Yet we 
clearly are, somehow, aware of it: it is what we are grasping at when we recognise 
that there is a common property shared by all experience, one that is elusive but 
undeniable.  
 Dainton offers a tentative treatment of this issue at the very end of Stream of 
Consciousness (2006). Having examined the nature of co-consciousness in a deep and 
detailed fashion, he speculates that this very relation might be the common property 
shared by all experience and claims that “there is no denying that co-conscious unity 
is a if not the distinguishing characteristic of the phenomenal” (Dainton, 2006, p.239, 
original italics). We have seen a good deal of arguments in support of the first part of 
this claim. That co-conscious unity might be the distinction between phenomenal and 
non-phenomenal properties is harder to agree with. Dainton suggests the following:  
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That this mode of unity is a crucial feature of experience as we know it is easily 
appreciated: remove this unity from a typical stream of consciousness and what 
would be left? At most a myriad of instances of point-like quality, each so 
entirely isolated from the rest that, from the point of view of experience at least, 
they could as well exist in different universes. So might it not be that any 
intrinsic qualities unified by co-consciousness should properly be regarded as 
phenomenal in nature? (Dainton, 2006, p.239, original italics) 
 
The difficulty with thinking through this admittedly speculative claim is that the 
scenario that we are being asked to imagine is unlike anything we have ever 
experienced ourselves: a stream of consciousness minus its unity. As such it is 
difficult to imagine “what would be left” in such a case. In one sense, this could be 
seen to support Dainton’s tentative claim: perhaps we cannot clearly grasp what non-
unified phenomenal qualities would be like because they would not be like anything at 
all experientially speaking i.e. they would not be phenomenal properties and we, in 
some sense, recognise this implicitly. Given that we are able to imagine all sorts of 
strange experiences and have no problem at all in so doing, even when such 
postulated experiences defy the laws of known physics (such as when we imagine 
traveling backwards through time), perhaps this is the very reason why we find it 
difficult to envisage non-unified qualities as phenomenal: they aren’t.  
 We should be careful not to move too fast however, and - in fairness - Dainton 
does not. Perhaps such strange point-like phenomenal properties are possible, and we 
are unable to conceive of them simply because we do not have the conceptual-
imaginative capabilities to do so. Consider the following: if we successfully imagine 
the removal of all unity from a typical stream of consciousness, it seems that we have 
also removed time from the picture. If, in trying to envisage an instance of point-like 
quality, you have in fact imagined a very brief pulse of pinpoint greenness, for 
example, then you have not removed all traces of unity from the scenario: the earlier 
section of this briefest of qualities is unified with the later section. To successfully 
imagine the absence of unity we would need to imagine a literally instantaneous 
quality. Arguably, however, an instantaneous anything is not something we can 
clearly conceive of. It does not follow, then, that such an entity cannot exist. It might 
show, however, that such an entity cannot exist without itself having some form of 
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temporality. Considered in this respect Dainton’s claim is intuitive: experience seems 
to be the kind of thing that requires at least some degree of temporal extension in 
order to exist. If an experience is extended, then it is necessarily unified through time. 
This, however, only speaks to the first part of Dainton’s claim: that co-conscious 
unity is a distinguishing feature of the phenomenal: it does not show that it is the only 
one. Luminosity might also be such a feature. Perhaps co-conscious unity and 
luminosity are in fact interdependent: in order to be unified by co-consciousness x 
needs to be luminous, i.e. x needs to appear, have luminosity, in the way that 
experiences like ours appear, and in order to appear in such a way x needs to have 
some form of temporality and thus will also necessarily be unified by co-
consciousness. Dainton’s claim does have the following advantage: we can articulate 
what we mean by “co-consciousness” in a more satisfying fashion than we can with 
“luminosity”. This is not enough in itself, however, to settle the matter.   
 On the difficulty of thinking about and describing “the glow of experience” 
(Strawson, 2013, p.28) in the language of structure and relation, Strawson claims that 
“we need to acknowledge the inadequacy, and accept that it lies in the nature of 
discursive thought” (Strawson, 2013, p.28). A little light might be shed on this issue if 
we switch to the terminology of Zahavi and Fasching and say that content is “given” 
to its subject when it is phenomenally (and immediately) present for its subject. The 
luminosity of consciousness now becomes the property of “being given”. In our usual 
dealings with the world, and even in our specialised thinking about philosophical 
problems, we are confronted with various kinds of things that are given - ideas, 
objects, and experiences - but we do not usually spend time dealing with the question 
of what it is for something to be given in the first place. Ironically, that things can be 
given at all is taken as given. It is perhaps not surprising then that when we do try and 
attend to the matter our usual ways of thinking seem to fail us. For Fasching, this is a 
habit we cannot easily break even when directly engaging in the philosophical 
problem of consciousness:  
 
To say subjective experience is actually particular neural events, given 
“introspectively”, i.e. as we subjectively experience them, begs the question. 
The taking place of phenomenal givenness - which is, in my view, the core 
explanandum when it comes to consciousness - is simply presupposed. 
(Fasching, 2008, p.468, original italics) 
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We have strayed into the problem of the mind-matter relationship and will not now 
enter any further into it. It does seem to me, however, that Fasching has identified 
something important here. Bearing in mind the difficulty that language seems to have 
in reaching into this sphere, consider the following: 
 
So, by consciousness, we mean here the event of phenomenal presence of 
whatever is present. The distinction between “real” objects and those that only 
exist “in our mind” is a subsequent one in comparison. So in a way there are 
“subjective” and “objective” phenomena, but consciousness is not a subjective 
phenomenon, it is not an “inner world”: It is the being-there of whatever kind of 
phenomena - whether “subjective” or “objective”. Consequently, consciousness 
is not a phenomenon among phenomena but the taking place of the 
phenomenality of phenomena. (Fasching, 2008, p.467, original italics) 
 
Fasching’s claims are powerful and, I think, perfectly compatible with the Simple 
Conception of experience if we take them to be describing the luminous nature of 
experiences: luminosity is just the “being-there” of our self-intimated experiences. It 
is not a “medium” in which contents flow through, as Fasching has it (Fasching, 2010, 
p.22), belonging to a consciousness distinct from its experiences (Fasching, 2010, 
p.202) but an intrinsic aspect of any given experience itself: its self-intimating 
“glow”. It is, however, not a typical phenomenal datum because it is not itself a 
particular content: it is the appearing of phenomenal content. With this in mind we 




§6.5 The ego 
 
If you are identical with your current stream of experiences then your very own nature 
is comprised of these two (inseparable) aspects: qualitative content and luminosity. 
Furthermore, if the soteriological project under discussion here consists in a conscious 
process of de-superimposition, whereby a subject becomes increasingly (and 
explicitly) conscious of the luminosity of experience, then we need an account of 
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what it is like to apprehend this aspect of our own nature (and we also need to look at 
why it might be a soteriological project). We need to try to make sense of what it is, 
phenomenologically speaking, to become explicitly aware of this feature of ourselves. 
Although there are good reasons to disagree with Fasching’s account of “mineness” 
and the individuating of streams (or selves) in terms of it, he does provide a good deal 
of phenomenological insight into the process of “de-superimposition” that we should 
agree with. In line with the views of Advaita, he holds consciousness to be distinct 
from its individual experiences. As such, he takes the process of de-superimposition 
to be a recognition that one is, as consciousness, not one of the various things that are 
appearing. Phenomenologically speaking, one recognises oneself as the presence in 
which the content is arising: one is none of the things witnessed (be they external 
objects or subjective experiences) but the “witnessing” of them all (Fasching, 2010, 
p.12). The task is this: can such a phenomenological account be justified (and made 
sense of) when consciousness is not taken to be distinct from individual experiences? 
I think that this might well be possible. A clue is to be found here: 
 
From the very beginning, consciousness is self-luminosity, and there is nothing 
to add to this. So meditation is not about looking at some hidden place and 
discovering something special there. Rather, the meditative process consists in 
unconstructing the usual ontifying self-apprehension: One becomes 
consciousness through and through, without attributing consciousness to an 
“ego”. (Fasching, 2008, p.477) 
 
Instead of interpreting the above process of de-superimposition (or de-identification) 
as a way to “become consciousness”, we can propose the following picture: one 
becomes explicitly aware of the luminous aspect of one’s experiences, and this 
recognition facilitates de-identification with the “ego”. It is not that one recognises 
that one is distinct from one’s particular experiences, but that one recognises an 
aspect of one’s own nature that is not itself a typical kind of phenomenal content. In 
recognising this, it can become clear that one is not an entity that “has” experiences 
but that this “ego” is just part of the content of any given experience: an experience 
that, as well as being comprised of such content, also has the aspect of luminosity. 
Fasching’s fundamental point is right: you cannot be aware of luminosity without 
being it - you are consciousness through and through - but this does not mean that 
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your nature is exclusively comprised of it: as the experience considered in its entirety 
you are also constituted by its qualitative aspect. 
 This is the personal Copernican revolution: one recognises oneself as the conscious 
experience through which an ego entity appears, as opposed to an ego entity that 
“has” experiences. My claim here is this: focusing one’s attention on the aspect of 
luminosity can foster such an insight, without the need to identify oneself as a 
consciousness in any way distinct from its experience (and without positing a unique 
feature of “my” consciousness that individuates it from “yours”, as Fasching does). 
One recognises that one cannot be identical with the ego-content for whom objects are 
seemingly presented, given that the luminous experience as a whole (of which the 
ego-content is only a part) is something that you are aware of. This is an important 
point and worth looking at more closely. 
 The term “ego” can, and has, been used to mean various different things. In the 
context of the present discussion the ego is the entity that we naturally, and 
incorrectly, take ourselves to be. This, at present, is not a particularly useful definition 
and therefore needs elucidating. Before doing so, it is worth bearing the following in 
mind: in speaking of the “entity” that we naturally take ourselves to be we may not be 
referencing just one thing. As we have seen, there are different ways that we can 
conceive of ourselves and, although we may use one pronoun to tie all such 
conceptions together, such phenomena may be by their very nature varied and, 
perhaps, to a certain extent vague. As Hume himself noted: “in common life ’tis 
evident these ideas of self and person are never very fix’d nor determinate” (Hume, 
2007, p.127). Having said as much, we can follow Miri Albahari (2010) in her 
articulation of the specific experiential features of this ego “entity”, and then consider 
its other aspects in relation to this. Albahari begins by giving a general description of 
the self-conception at issue: 
 
In essence, then [sic] this commonly assumed self is a unified, unbrokenly 
persisting subject of experience with personalized boundaries and a perspective 
on the world. It is a thinker, owner, and agent that stands behind, and is 
somewhat in charge of, the stream of thoughts and experiences, as opposed to 
being constructed by them. (Albahari, 2010, p.83) 
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This is only a general approximation of what we naturally take ourselves to be but 
even in this admittedly preliminary form much has been left out: I do not just take 
myself to be a thinker or agent; I take myself to be, among many other things, a son, a 
brother, a friend, a philosophy teacher, and a Bruce Springsteen fan. Albahari’s 
account can in fact accommodate this: we do take ourselves to be more than the above 
definition suggests but such self-descriptions are grounded in this more fundamental 
sense of ourselves as subjects of experience. She identifies the key feature of such a 
conception as ownership. This feature itself has two aspects: perspectival ownership 
and personal ownership. We have already seen one account of perspectival ownership 
in Johnston’s notion of the “arena of presence” in §5.9 (pp.155-6). It will be 
illuminating to look at how Albahari also attempts to characterise such a crucial 
feature. Perspectival ownership, for Albahari, speaks to the sense we have of being 
the subject of our experiences, as opposed to the objects of which we are aware. This 
subject is: 
 
the inner locus of the first-person perspective: the conscious embodied 
viewpoint from which the world is apprehended. The subject’s modus operandi 
is to observe or witness objects through a variety of perceptual and cognitive 
modalities. (Albahari, 2010, p.83, original italics) 
 
This characterisation is hard to disagree with: although I may not be thinking 
explicitly about my perspective, in my usual dealings with the world I have the sense 
that my most intimate and essential being is located somewhere in my head, roughly 
between my ears and behind my eyes. This sense of position might not be 
permanently present; there may be moments when I am engaged in some practical 
endeavor, for example, where a distinction between my body as a whole and myself is 
not showing up. As Strawson argues, however, this awareness “is fully compatible 
with our thinking of ourselves primarily or centrally as mental things; and those who 
stress somatic awareness risk forgetting that it is just as true to say that there is 
constant background (as well as foreground) awareness of our minds” (Strawson, 
1999b, p.129). Even when I do become fully focused on some practical endeavor, the 
sense of being essentially situated in my head is readily slipped back into, and it is 
especially prominent when I am thinking through some issue, or narrating my 
experience to myself. One could put the point like this: it is reasonable to suppose that 
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this implicit sense of my own position would be different if evolution had seen fit to 
place our eyes on the end of each of our little fingers, and our ears on our chest. Quite 
what it would be like to occupy the perspective(s) of such a being is hard to imagine, 
but it seems safe to assume that our experiential sense of position, i.e. where we - in 
the form of thinking subjects - seem to be located, would be different from where it is 
now. Had our evolutionary history developed along such lines it seems unlikely that 
we would still be inclined, for example, to encourage a particularly solemn and quiet 
friend to become more engaged by saying: “Try to get out of your own head for a 
bit”. It seems likely that such metaphorical advice would not have the intuitive appeal 
that it has for creatures like us, whose visual and audio inputs are situated on the front 
and sides of our heads.  
 Having said as much, our experiential perspective is not limited to only this 
implied position. Although this is an important part of it, it is not the whole story: 
when I experience a pain in my foot, for example, I do not experience it as coming 
from my head. The pain is just there: either located in my foot or, if at that moment I 
feel obliged to consider the phenomenal character of pain as it is in itself, seemingly 
not located anywhere in particular - there is just a sense of pain occurring here, for 
me. This latter point speaks to the broader sense in which Albahari identifies self-
experience as intimately related with perspectival ownership: 
 
Any conscious creature is uniquely positioned to observe (via witness-
consciousness) an array of such objects as pains, thoughts, or its own body, 
from a perspective to which no other creature has direct access. Insofar as 
various objects appear to a subject’s perspective, in this direct first-personal 
way, the subject can be termed a perspectival owner of other objects. (Albahari, 
2010, pp.83-4, original italics) 
 
Perspectival ownership itself, then, has two aspects: I have the sense that I am the 
owner of a stream of experience; the subject, here, as opposed to the “objects” (be 
they worldly objects or thoughts and sensations), there, and I have the sense that the 
stream I own is this particular one here, as opposed to any others out there. My claim 
is that it is this first sense of perspectival ownership that is exposed as inaccurate 
when we attend to the luminosity of our experiences. Before looking at why this 
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might be the case we need to consider Albahari’s second kind of ownership, as it will 
become relevant shortly. 
 Personal ownership speaks to the sense we have of being a subject “with an 
identity (or ‘who-I-am-ness’) as opposed to a merely impersonal point of view” 
(Albahari, 2010, p.84, original italics). It is this sense of ownership that is responsible 
for the difficulty we face in trying to pin down what it is that we naturally take 
ourselves to be: our identity in this sense covers a lot of ground. My social status goes 
towards my general sense of “who-I-am-ness”, as do my autobiographical details, my 
preferences, and my relationships. My possessions feed into it: my house and my car 
can be appropriated into a general sense of “who-I-am-ness”, to various degrees. It is 
also not a static feature of my self-conception: depending on the social context, 
varying aspects of my character can come to the fore or recede into the background. 
My overall sense of “who-I-am” might be quite different if I am socialising with my 
friends as opposed to being questioned by an authority figure. In my own experience, 
it is this sense of “identity” that those unfamiliar with the literature take the 
philosophical problem of personal identity to be dealing with. In discussing personal 
identity in terms of person A’s numerical identity with person B at a later time, it has 
not been uncommon to find first-year students conflating such notions of identity by 
talking about the kind of person they are - their identity in the sense of their 
preferences and dispositions. To a certain extent, perspectival ownership speaks to 
how we experience ourselves, whereas personal ownership speaks to how we think, 
and talk, about ourselves. This is by no means a clean distinction, and the two feed 
into each other, but it seems broadly accurate.  
 Ownership, then, characterises a significant deal of the ego-entity that we naturally 
take ourselves to be. We now need to look at the role of luminosity in the 
phenomenological process of recognising our non-identity with such an ego. The 
crucial upshot of ownership on this issue is that it serves to create the impression that 
what we are “stands behind, and is somewhat in charge of, the stream of thoughts and 
experiences, as opposed to being constructed by them” (Albahari, 2010, p.83, my 
italics). As we saw earlier in §5.8 (p.151) this was an objection raised against naïve 
phenomenalism: we do not typically feel that we are identical with our experiences 
but, instead, we feel that we “have” them; that we own them. The structure of our 
conscious experiences is what gives rise to this sense of perspectival ownership, and it 
does it in at least two ways. Firstly, as we saw detailed by both Johnston (2010) in 
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§5.9 (pp.155-6) and Albahari (2010, p.83) here, the perspectival presentation of 
objects results in an implied position. Often this seems to be somewhere in our heads 
owing to the viewing point implied by the visual presentation of the world as being 
out there - in front of me. This gives rise to the impression that I am located at the 
centre of this “arena of presence”. Although the following explicit reasoning is not 
involved, it speaks to the effect of such an implied position: if x is at the centre of y, 
then x cannot be identical with y considered as a whole. Ultimately, we have the 
natural impression that we are in some way distinct from our experiences whilst not 
being entirely divorced from them either. 
 The second way that the structure of experience results in such an impression has 
to do with introspection. In dealing with some particular object in the world, I am 
aware of it as something that is distinct from me: I can inspect various parts of it and 
compare it to other objects. We have a fundamental sense of this epistemological 
relation as a distinction between the knower and what is known, which is itself 
informed by our implied position. The claim is this: when we turn our attention to our 
experiences themselves, we typically continue to work under this inappropriate 
model. We can move our attention from one aspect of our experience to another, in 
just the way that we can attend to one object or another in the external world. This can 
give rise to the impression that we are looking at our experiences as things distinct 
from ourselves. In effect, the sense of being an observer, or knower, distinct from 
what is observed, or known, stays with us as we introspect our experiences. As we 
saw in §2.5 (pp.55-60) this is a mistake: we are not aware of our experiences in the 
same way that we are aware of objects in the world around us. We can come to see 
this error through philosophical analysis of the kind we have been conducting. We 
can also, however, come to see the error experientially, in an immediate fashion and, 
in so doing, gain an insight into our own nature. This, at least, is the claim under 
consideration here. Why then should attending to the luminosity of experience expose 
the inaccuracy of this self-conception? 
 I think this occurs in two ways: attending to luminosity weakens the illusion of 
being at the centre of an experience, whilst also challenging the natural impression 
that we are aware of experiences in an objectual way. As we saw, luminosity is not a 
typical phenomenal property: it is not any of the “seen” content but the very “seeing” 
of it (Fasching, 2010, p.208). It is not, then, the kind of thing we can be made aware 
of by looking at it in the way we look at objects or seem to look at experiences when 
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we introspect. Attending to such an aspect of one’s experience might then force the 
realisation that one is not a distinct observer of it. 
 The relationship between luminosity and our implied position at the centre of our 
phenomenal field is an equally significant issue. In recognising that luminosity is an 
intrinsic aspect of the entire experience of which I am aware, it can become apparent 
that what I am (as the being who is aware of this luminosity) cannot merely be at the 
centre. The implied position at the centre of the phenomenal field is, instead, only 
part of the total luminous experience, the entirety of which I am aware. There is a 
flipping of sorts: instead of regarding my experience as something that I can observe 
from a central location, this perspective itself is seen as only one part of the entire 
phenomenal scene of which I am aware. It is more accurate to say that it is 
consciousness that is aware of the “subject”, rather than the other way around: this 
experienced flipping of perspective motivates the term “personal Copernican 
revolution”. Crucially, however, this is not because consciousness is distinct from 
both the “subject” and object components of the experience (as Fasching holds), but 
because the self-intimating and self-conscious experience has, as part of it, an implied 
centre. The conscious being recognises itself as the total phenomenal episode, as 
opposed to an entity that stands apart from it and owns it. In first-personal terms, I 
recognise the ego-entity that I have been identifying with to be an appearance within 
myself as this self-luminous experience. In metaphorical terms, if I focus on the 
luminous aspect of my nature as this currently occurring experiential episode, I have 
the impression of being the light of consciousness: the presence in which all of the 
content is arising (Fasching, 2010, p.211). Such descriptions of self-experience are 
common in Indian philosophy: The Ephemeral Self account helps to explain why they 
are: we are consciousness, and we can recognise this by attending to a particular 
aspect of our nature. Śankarā offers a particularly poetic description of his 
phenomenology when he claims the following: “I am Seeing, pure and by nature 
changeless … I am unborn, abiding in Myself” (Śankarācārya, 1992, p.123). Being an 
Advaitin he holds that such “Seeing” is eternal but, taken only as a phenomenological 
description, it seems to me that such a self-definition could equally well apply to 
someone who was explicitly attending to the luminous aspect of the experience they 
are constituted by, without a commitment to the timeless nature of the self. The 
luminous aspect of experience is “changeless” in that it is constantly present, as a 
ubiquitous feature of phenomenal consciousness. It is “unborn” in the sense that it 
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does not move from non-appearance to appearance, such as a particular content does: 
it is there in each phase of the diachronically co-conscious stream.  
 
 
§6.6 Death revisited 
 
Having seen through the illusion of being an entity that stands apart from experience, 
the usual extension of the ego into the area of personal ownership is less likely to 
occur. This, claim both the Buddhists and Advaitins, will lead to a decrease in 
unnecessary suffering. Such a claim is too substantive to be investigated in any detail 
here, but it is tempting to predict that such a loss of emphasis on one’s sense of “who-
I-am” might well be met with an increase in wellbeing. Globally speaking, the tribal 
mentality that is in part responsible for many damaging world events is itself largely 
based on a sense of ownership: this is my clan and my history. In a less dramatic way, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that a good deal of personal angst is directly related to 
the image we have of ourselves, and our natural desire to defend and promote it. 
However much we might recognise the futility of it, we do care what others think of 
us: attending to our own self-image and presenting it to others in its best possible light 
is one way that we try to appease this concern. It is obvious, however, that even if 
such an insight might result in an alleviation of suffering it would do little to help 
anyone who did not already have their basic survival needs met.  
 There is, also, the issue of personal death. If we identify ourselves as an ego-entity 
and extend this sense of ownership to our wider personality and autobiographical 
history, then death is indeed a terrifying prospect. We may well be able to console 
ourselves by considering Wittgenstein’s (2007, p.106) point that death is not 
something that happens to us, lying as it does outside of our experience. We may be 
comforted by the notion that what it will be like to be us after death will be exactly 
the same as what it was like to be us before we were born, i.e. nothing to worry about. 
But death will still be the dissolution of all of the myriad factors that go into what 
makes my sense of “who-I-am” what it is: my decades-long narrative, my social 
relationships, my goals and projects, and my memories will all end. If, on the other 
hand, we identify ourselves as this currently occurring stream of experiences in a 
genuinely transformative fashion, then the end of the ego might strike us as less 
terrifying. Perhaps the death of my genuine self, i.e. the end of this stream of 
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experiences, will also be less concerning. Genuinely, and experientially, recognising 
ourselves as an egoless stream of experiences might well change much of our 
psychological dispositions, including the fear of death. If I was to genuinely 
apprehend myself as this stream of experiences by recognising my luminous nature, 
the desire for tomorrow’s stream to be me might not arise. This is difficult to know 
without experiencing such a process personally, but it seems possible. There is 
admittedly a problem with this defense: until we succeed in carrying out such a 
process of self-realisation the claims of The Ephemeral Self account are somewhat 
shocking, if the arguments strike us as powerful. An intellectual acceptance of its 
claims, in the absence of transformative experiential recognition of the self that it 
describes, leaves us in an unstable middle-ground, psychologically speaking.  
 There is, however, the following possibility to consider. The luminosity of 
consciousness is a property of phenomenal content, albeit an unusual one. When your 
stream of consciousness ends so too does the luminosity of its content. The property 
of luminosity, however, has not ceased to exist: all streams of consciousness have it. 
In this sense a crucial aspect of what we are “outlives us”. Quite how we spell this out 
depends on what view of properties we adopt: if properties are universals then the 
very same luminosity of which you partly consist is already in every other stream of 
experience. It will also exist for as long as conscious beings inhabit the universe. This 
is close to Advaita’s concept of Brahman: the one self of all selves. If, alternatively, 
we adopt the trope view of properties then it is still the case that all experiences 
possess a property that exactly resembles an aspect of your nature. Such a thought 
might be of some consolation in thinking about such matters.36 
 The foregoing is, admittedly, a somewhat more speculative series of claims than 
those that have been put forward in the main body of this thesis. To a certain extent 
whether or not it is an accurate description of the experiential recognition aimed for 
by Advaita and Buddhism can only be verified by personal investigation, and I cannot 
claim any certainty on my part in this respect. Having said as much, it strikes me that 
such an interpretation is plausible and, crucially, it does not posit self-luminous 
consciousness as distinct from its content, in the way that Fasching does. 
                                                
36 It has also been proposed that attending to the luminosity of consciousness can lead to a blissful state 
in and of itself. Advaitins use the concept of “sat-cit-ānanda”, meaning “being-consciousness-bliss”, to 
denote the three aspects of this single state of being. This is an interesting thought but beyond our 
present scope: I have aimed only to investigate the nature of the first two aspects of such a reality - the 
possibility of being consciousness. 
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In closing, then, for Fasching, “[the] essence of the meditative process of 
becoming self-aware is, in my view, a de-identification from what we normally 
ascribe to ourselves (i.e. what we take to be our “inwardness”)” (Fasching, 2008, 
p.478). This is, of course, a highly radical view: we are neither the biological 
organisms that produce our conscious experiences, the social self that we typically 
take ourselves to be or even, for Fasching, the experiences that comprise our stream of 
consciousness. We are simply the witnessing of all that arises for us. The Ephemeral 
Self account, instead, acknowledges that an aspect of our nature is such that it can be 
described as an atypically phenomenal “seeing” but denies that this is all that we are. 
It agrees with the general Buddhist refusal to accept the existence of an eternal self, 
but accepts genuine personal identity over time. It can agree with the spirit of 
Advaita, in holding that a recognition of the luminosity of consciousness can result in 
a de-identification of sorts, but denies that consciousness is distinct from its content. It 
therefore represents a middle-ground in this debate. As I have said, the veracity of its 
soteriological claims can only be tested against personal experience. But the 
following point seems reasonable: if such radical self-realisation is both possible and 
successfully undertaken, it might in fact change our relationship to death in a 






We began this investigation with a warning from Hume: 
 
It is certain there is no question in philosophy more abstruse than that 
concerning identity, and the nature of the uniting principle, which constitutes a 
person. (Hume, 2007, p.127) 
 
It seems unlikely that the foregoing discussion will do much to dissuade anyone 
sympathetic to Hume’s claim. The claims and positions of the various theories we 
have covered are each open to counter-arguments from rival views. A gain in 
theoretical parsimony in area x seems often to lead to a loss in intuitive appeal in 
domain y, and vice versa. Measuring the various strengths and weaknesses of any one 
theory and comparing it with the alternative views of another is a complicated matter, 
and it is tempting to suppose that a fully convincing account may remain forever out 
of our grasp. This is, at least, a view that we cannot blame Hume for adopting. This 
state of affairs applies to many other areas of philosophy as well, of course, owing to 
the very nature of the questions and methods of which the pursuit is comprised. That 
being said, I hope to have advanced something of worth in the foregoing discussion.  
For one thing, we have seen that the acceptance of just two very plausible and 
intuitive premises leads to an important, and surprising, account of the relationship we 
each have to our own experiences. The first premise was that inner awareness is a 
ubiquitous feature of consciousness. For some this premise has seemed so obviously 
true as to require no philosophical defence (see §3 (p.80)): it seems enough to point 
out that an experience that fails to be apprehended by its subject is, in effect, an 
“unconscious consciousness” and as such is an incoherent postulation. Although, of 
course, not everyone agrees with such an assessment, the intuitive appeal of the 
premise, leading to such complacency, is hard to deny. Further to this we saw that the 
plausibility of a ubiquitous inner awareness (UIA) was strengthened by its ability to 
cope with The Novelty Problem. To recap briefly: when we attend to the intrinsic 
phenomenal character of our experience it does not seem to us that something new 
has been revealed. UIA offers a straightforward explanation for this: we were already 
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conscious of our experience, and hence nothing new is discovered upon introspection. 
We saw that other views of inner awareness did not fare as well and, whilst no 
knockdown argument was offered against the many different ways such accounts 
could try to overcome The Novelty Problem, UIA’s ability to easily, and intuitively, 
account for the lack of phenomenal novelty gave it a clear advantage. The most 
serious problem with UIA is arguably the difficulty we face in trying to offer a 
naturalistic account of it: how exactly does consciousness apprehend itself in such a 
manner? Taking consciousness seriously, however, and adopting a “consciousness-
first” approach (Goff, MS), demands our rejection of the assumption that the correct 
account of the phenomena will sit well with our reductive ambitions.  
The second plausible premise was that experience is self-intimating. The rival 
accounts of the higher-order theorists were found to be problematic in various ways, 
some more fundamental than others. The debate concerning higher-order theories is 
still very much underway in the literature and it would have been foolish to expect a 
definitive assessment given the scope of this investigation. Having said as much, we 
identified a number of problems facing such views that do not arise for the self-
intimation model. We saw, once again, that the premise under consideration was 
phenomenologically sound and generally plausible, but not as amenable to a 
naturalisation of consciousness as its rivals.  
Having defended the accuracy of these two plausible, intuitive and widely accepted 
premises we saw that an important entailment followed from their acceptance - one 
that seems to have gone unrecognised by many. Succinctly put, if an experience (x) is 
both self-conscious (in the sense that inner awareness is present) and self-intimating, 
then the only being that can be (non-inferentially) conscious of x is x itself. If you are 
(non-inferentially) conscious of an experience right now, then it follows that you are 
exhaustively constituted by that experience for the duration of its occurrence. This is, 
of course, a tentative claim: it requires the truth of both premises identified above and 
these matters were not irresistibly settled by any means. It does, however, appear to 
be both an important and quite simple entailment should those claims hold. It need 
make no reference, as some similar accounts do, to the notions of “mineness” or 
“primary presence” in order for the argument to work. It is tempting to guess that the 
simplicity of the argument is partly responsible for its previous lack of articulation in 
this form. Of course, I cannot claim to have read all of the literature that exists on the 
issue, such work dates back thousands of years across multiple disciplines and 
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cultures, and it is possible that such an argument has been put forward before (or 
something very close to it). But it does appear to have been overlooked in the 
contemporary areas we have covered: for one thing, it seems to me that a 
naturalistically inclined higher-order theorist could use it in precisely the opposite 
direction than has been presented here. Noting that an acceptance of self-intimation in 
conjunction with UIA entails the dubious notion that we are identical with our 
experiences, he or she might want to employ the argument as a reductio ad absurdum 
against the self-intimation view. For many of the higher-order theorists it seems quite 
obvious that we are not, in ourselves, intrinsically conscious beings: we are made 
conscious in virtue of some of our mental states. To my knowledge no higher-order 
theorist has used the argument in such a way and this suggests that these entailments 
have not been fully recognised. We also saw that Dainton’s C-system approach was 
put under pressure by The Exhaustive Constitution Thesis and, whilst there are moves 
that can be made in response, the fact that such a consideration was not dealt with in 
Dainton’s substantially detailed study of the unity of consciousness and its relation to 
the self suggests that the entailments of The Exclusivity Argument had not been 
apparent. 
We then saw that the findings so far reached, in conjunction with a plausible 
account of temporal consciousness, led to The Stream Thesis and the novel Ephemeral 
Self theory of personal identity. The final move towards this account came from 
responding to The Bridge Problem by biting the bullet: what we are does not survive 
periods of unconsciousness. In defence of such a move I argued that the various 
attempts we have seen to overcome The Bridge Problem also result in counterintuitive 
consequences. Gaps in consciousness pose no problem for virtual or intentional 
accounts of the self, but the reality of the self is thereby denied: that the survival of 
myself is a matter of convention is arguably less intuitive than the claims of The 
Stream Thesis. We saw that The Bridge Problem can also be overcome by identifying 
the self as the substrate of its stream of consciousness, and considered one of the 
strongest accounts of this kind on offer: Dainton’s C-system approach. Once again, 
the solving of The Bridge Problem came at a cost: the relationship between a subject 
and its experiences entailed by such a move brought considerable problems. 
Succinctly put, it seemed to misdescribe the way that we, as subjects, are conscious. 
The Ephemeral Self account, in accepting the fatal nature of gaps in consciousness, 
avoided all of these issues: the reality of the self was fully recognised and the intimate 
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relationship between a subject and its experiences was kept intact. Noting that any 
theory of the self will, to a certain extent, clash with our intuitions it was argued that 
The Ephemeral Self is - on balance - a plausible theory. We saw that its 
counterintuitive features result from our pre-theoretical conception of ourselves, 
whereas its intuitive appeal was a direct result of its adherence to certain basic 
phenomenological features of experience. In totalling up the various strengths and 
weaknesses of a theory such a contrast in the reasons for intuitive acceptance or 
rejection counts very much in The Ephemeral Self’s favour: judgements resulting 
from a careful examination of our immediate experience are likely to be much more 
reliable than any pre-theoretical notions of the self. 
We also saw that the account offered here is arguably of the moderate kind when 
situated in the context of the debate concerning selfhood found in Indian Philosophy. 
It sat between the Advaitic notion of a life-long (eternal) self and the Buddhist 
rejection of genuine identity over time. In a more speculative section, we saw that 
accepting The Ephemeral Self might in fact bring soteriological gains: a core claim 
uniting the disparate philosophies found in the Indian sphere is that suffering can be 
alleviated through a recognition of our true nature. Such a discovery must, by 
necessity, result in a revision of our previous understanding of ourselves. An attempt 
was made to incorporate an interpretation of such self-recognition into the claims of 
The Ephemeral Self and, although there is more work to be done here, a plausible 
picture was suggested. The theory defended here has, then, a further strength: it offers 
the possibility of meaningful self-realisation without recourse to anything 
supernatural or eternal. At the same time it accepts genuine identity over time and as 
such is more intuitively palatable than the no-self theory of Buddhism. 
It seems fitting to end with the following self-appraisal from Hume: 
 
I had entertain’d some hopes, that however deficient our theory of the 
intellectual world might be, it wou’d be free from those contradictions, and 
absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human reason can give 
of the material world. But upon a more strict review of the section concerning 
personal identity, I find myself involv’d in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, 
I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them 
consistent. If this be not a good general reason for scepticism, ’tis at least a 
sufficient one (if I were not already abundantly supply’d) for me to entertain a 
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diffidence and modesty in all my decisions. (Hume, 2007, p.399, original 
italics) 
 
Such a moderate scepticism is wise: each and every account of inner awareness, 
experience, and personal identity that we have surveyed is vulnerable to objections, 
and the fundamental assumptions grounding such theories are also very much subject 
to debate. As such, it would be unwise to expect a definitive account of the 
relationship between consciousness and selfhood anytime soon. Having said as much, 
within the landscape of possible options we have here seen another worthy 
competitor. The Ephemeral Self account represents a genuine alternative to its 
experience-based sister accounts, one that is both grounded in careful 
phenomenological investigation and conceptual analysis and free from certain 
counterintuitive consequences (although, as we have seen, not without its own). In the 
philosophical “labyrinth” that opens up before us in seeking to answer that seemingly 
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